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Abstract
Some personal or collective histories can never be completely integrated into the
continuum of one’s emotional life. Such stories produced in traumatic times or in disastrous
events are likely to remain only partially understood or accepted. Examining the human
consequence of traumatic events such as the enslavement of Africans in the United States or the
attempted extermination of the Jewish people in Europe is one challenging focus of this work. It
is comparatively productive, however, if these events are approached from the perspective of the
trauma they have produced—an approach that suspends chronological and geographical barriers
of time and space. The trilogy by postmodern French artist Charlotte Delbo, an Auschwitz
survivor who narrated her story in testimonial form, offers that insight into trauma, as does the
postcolonial work of Toni Morrison. The first volumes of both trilogies, Aucun de nous ne
reviendra and Beloved expose the damage done to individuals and collectivities in terms of
trauma by revealing the extent to which living at the edge of life and witnessing horrific acts of
massive death and destruction shape and impact not only victims but the societies to which they
return. Attempting to work through those strikingly traumatic experiences further highlights
attitudes commonly found in narratives of survival. Une connaissance inutile and Jazz, the
second volumes of the trilogies, enhance that kind of understanding, while both point at the
necessary impossibility of forgetting the traumatic experiences that remain clearly undigested.
Events such as senseless extermination of an entire people and the brutal exploitation of an entire
race were not only not avoided, but systematically promoted by the communities in question.
Mesure de nos jours and Paradise, the last volumes of the trilogies, clearly document the lack of
attentiveness to the pleas of survivors and emancipated slaves by their respective communities
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after liberation and emancipation. Even though support was not shown by these communities in
the aftermath of the traumatic occurrences, this should not disengage us from our gravest
responsibility: to bear witness to the sufferings of an excluded other whose processes of recovery
and working through remain elusive.
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Chapter 1. Introduction: Listening to Silence
If I am getting ready to speak at length about ghosts, inheritance, and generations,
generations of ghosts, which is to say about certain others who are not present, nor
presently living, either to us, in us, or outside us, it is in the name of justice. And this
beingwith specters would also be, not only but also, a politics of memory, of inheritance,
and of generations.
The future is its memory.
Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx
Memory (the deliberate act of remembering) is a form of willed creation. It is not an
effort to find out the way it really was—that is research. The point is to dwell on the way
it appeared and why it appeared in that particular way.
Memory is for me always fresh, in spite of the fact that the object being remembered is
done and past.
Toni Morrison, “Memory, Creation, and Writing”
“Our memory repeats to us what we haven’t understood. Repetition is addressed to
incomprehension.”
Paul Valéry, Oeuvres
The way contemporary culture engages in the present, along with the ways it projects its
future, may illuminate the way it reshapes the image of its past. Such cultural
engagements with the past, as the epigraphs by Derrida, Morrison, and Valéry suggest,
necessarily involve works of remembrance, reflection, and inscription. Remembering,
reflecting, and inscribing the past in consciousness and in the realms of present and future
have been particularly resonant in some postcolonial and postmodern discourses. Indeed,
while postcolonial and postmodern narratives have looked at some injustice of the past,
they have engaged in discourses to awaken the desire for a future more just. So doing,
postcolonial and postmodern texts have motivated and initiated necessary acts of cultural
crossings between what history has decided to remember and what our collective memory
is prepared to acknowledge. With these acts, possibilities for projecting a future more
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promising, more “just,” and for living in the present “otherwise . . . and more justly,” in
Jacques Derrida’s words, have not only illuminated interdependencies between past,
present, and future (Specters of Marx xviii). These texts have also called attention to the
importance of being attentive to the lessons that history can reveal to us.
While the works of Charlotte Delbo and Toni Morrison enable us to explore the
tensions of an oppressive past in connection with the present and the future, they also
invite us to participate, in Morrison’s terms, in a ceaseless work of active “reconstruction
of a world.” Yet as two modes of bearing witness to histories of ethnic and racial
oppression, both authors also insist on the necessity to live with the memory, not only of
the living, but of the dead as well. Similarly, Derrida argues that one possibility for a just
future lies in our ability to live to remember the victims of injustice—indeed to conjure
the dead rather than to bury them. By refusing to bury the past entirely, both Delbo’s and
Morrison’s art stresses the responsibility to remember, rather than fail to remember, the
dead and the forgotten. As such, for Delbo and according to Morrison, if the living can
be an object of literary reflection and celebration, and lead to “the revelation of a kind of
truth,” so are the dead (“The site of Memory” 95). Especially if their human existence is
being or has been disavowed. Turning to the past and to the histories that it holds can
thus initiate necessary processes of remembrance of those whose relevance has been
denied. It can also possibly bring us closer to that part of history that may not be easily
accessible. This work of recollection of the past and of the dead will crucially inform,
and possibly entrust, the living with some forms of knowledge. Eventually, being attuned
to the lessons of both the past and present, dead and living may facilitate new forms of
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wisdom. And for Derrida, “nothing is more necessary than this wisdom” in learning and
in “learning to live” (Specters of Marx xx).
The “learning to live,” as Derrida insists, cannot simply entail “learning to live” in
the present. It also necessitates learning to live “beyond the living present in general”
(Specters of Marx xx). Likewise, these acts of learning to live solely “from oneself and
by oneself” can, in Derrida’s contention, only fall short, because living would then be
reduced to an “impossibility.” For him, not only from “death,” but also from “the other”
can the teachings about living take place and be learnt. Derrida phrases this necessity of
learning in the following terms: “But to learn to live, to learn it from oneself and by
oneself, all alone, to teach oneself to live (‘I would like to learn to live finally’), is that
not impossible for a living being?” Derrida keeps asking, “Is it not what logic itself
forbids?” Derrida further posits that “To live, by definition, is not something one learns.
Not from oneself, it is not learned from life, taught by life. Only from the other and by
death. In any case from the other at the edge of life. At the internal border or the
external border, it is heterodidactics between life and death” (xviii).
As he locates “the other” and “death” at the center of an argument about learning
to live more wisely and more justly, Derrida also insists, as previously mentioned, on an
obligation to live not solely in “the present,” but “beyond all living present.” For
Derrida, it would require living with the bearings of the past and the presence of the
future in mind. Facing the past, and tending to it as a presence in the present moment and
in the future constitutes, for Derrida, our gravest “responsibility.” It would have us face
the necessity of our being attentive to what he coins the “noncontemporaneity of the
living present.” It signals a responsibility for us to attend to those of the past who are “no
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longer” or about whom there is or has been little or denied awareness (xix). As Derrida
argues, “the dead can often be more powerful than the living” (48). Yet being attentive
to those of the future “who are not yet present and living” is equally significant. In other
words, living, while recognizing and holding in respect those “who are no longer,” or
“those others who are not yet there, presently living,” whether “they are already dead or
not yet born,” can and should be actively performed.
For Derrida, this compelling act of learning—“living beyond the present” with
respect and remembrance of the past, and with a sense of justice for the future—means to
live with ghosts. As he claims, no justice is possible without bearing in mind “that which
disjoins the living present.” For Derrida, what disrupts and unhinges that present is the
“generations of ghosts, . . . certain others who are not present, nor presently living, either
to us, in us, or outside us. ” As such, for justice to be conceivable, it must be called for
“before the ghosts of those who are not yet born or who are already dead.” These ghosts,
he reminds us, may originate from troubled times or from beyond the present. They
include all of those who have been living in oppression or injustice, “be they victims of
wars, political or other kinds of violence, nationalist, racist, colonialist, sexist, or other
kinds of exterminations, victims of the oppressions of capitalist imperialism or any forms
of totalitarianism.” Writing for a tomorrow of fairer sort, Derrida concludes by posing
the following question: “Without this noncontemporaneity with itself of the living
present, without that which secretly unhinges it, without this responsibility and this
respect for justice concerning those who are not there, of those who are no longer or who
are not yet present and living, what sense would there be to ask the question ‘where?’
‘where tomorrow?’ ‘whither?’” (xix).
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In chapter 1, I want to explore how some postcolonial and postmodern thinkers
have called for a duty to remember these “ghosts,” the dead, the living and “the other at
the edge of life” with a view to justice (xviii). Since, for Derrida, “learning to live” can
happen only between life and death,” yet “neither in life nor in death alone,” but between
the “two,” learning will obviously involve some elements of “the spectral” and of
“spirits ” (xviii). This “spectral” space, as one that “maintains itself with some ghost,”
can, for Derrida, be equated with a place, which is “neither substance, nor essence, nor
existence, nor even something that “is ever present as such.” This space will serve our
present inquiry by calling to attention the spectral or haunting property of some forms of
memories that are to be retrieved from the past despite the pain they caused or the forms
of denial they produced. It will also serve to inquire into how the reconstructed
memories of the past that “others” have made consciously manifest through testimonials
can affect our perception of that past (xviii). As such, I want to explore how and in what
ways we may be compelled to address some of the traces of a ghastly past that various
postcolonial and postmodern thinkers have intently urged us to remember through their
narrative requests. Examining how and in what ways the “spectral” as a form of return
of some repressed or denied histories can impinge on our understanding of the world is
part of that concern. Another is to inquire into how our own perception of a past that has
been experienced or imagined, but recollected and put in writing by others and artists can
affect the construction of our own memories.
No living memory can make claims for the certainty or the endurance of the
remembered object. Memory may not even warrant the permanence of the remembrance,
nor even desire it. For Marianne Hirsch, modes of remembering may actually account for
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“varying degrees” of approaching or “gaining distance from the past” (“Marked by
Memory” 74). Besides, appending, altering, and removing memories from consciousness
constitute active, reactive or creative acts of remembering or forgetting. These acts,
along with the vitality or the numbing that they variously generate or discourage, make
memory not fixed, but changing. Whether these transactions with lived experiences or
recollections of events are deliberate or not, they can be made manifest in singular and
personal ways, as well as in plural and collective ones. Besides, and more importantly,
as Ernest Van Alphen notices these memories need to be “mediated” through discourse.
Indeed, for Van Alphen, experiences are not “direct . . . subjectively lived accounts of
reality,” as it is traditionally assumed. Rather, experience depends on “discourse to come
about,” and as such, experience is necessarily and “fundamentally discursive.” Thus for
Van Alphen, forms of experience do not just depend “on the event or history that is being
experienced, but also on the discourse in which the event is
expressed/thought/conceptualized” (“Symptoms of Discursivity” 24).
Memory and discourse, it seems, are always processes in the making. As such,
they keep being reinvented. French poet and nineteenth century experimental artist
Arthur Rimbaud serves as an illustration of this point. Rimbaud’s poetry is indeed
exemplary of the mediation between experience, memory, and discourse that I want to
emphasize here. His poetry verges towards what Derrida coins a “politics of memory, of
inheritance,” and imparts knowledge to other “generations” (Specters of Marx xix).
Besides, Rimbaud’s vision of poetry as “a means for discovering the unknown,” along
with his “desire to liberate his ego and his art from all restrictions,” in the words of Enid
Rhodes Peschel, both allow for a possible expansion of the imagination. This extension
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of the imagination was certainly more than desirable in the case of Rimbaud since he set
out to explore and uncover some unfamiliar ground. As “a poetalchemist, a visionary
maker of images who, by deranging his senses, sought to uncover the unconscious
sources of the poetic imagination,” Rimbaud indeed serves our purpose well. Namely,
he enables us to pose the question of how lived experiences, recollection, and
transcription of experiences can shape, mediate, and permeate each other in narrative
processes.
Rimbaud was an artist who creatively engaged in reinscribing reality through
acts of sensuous perceptions and illuminations. Becoming more and more audacious in
his experimenting “the real and the unreal in visionary and hallucinatory projections,” he
set out to explore in innovative ways modes of connecting reality with memory and
imagination with language (Arthur Rimbaud: A Season in Hell 20). He went into some
of his own personal experiences that he reminisced and translated into literary form
through his artistic practice. Named as “a Surrealist in the practice of life and elsewhere”
by André Breton, Rimbaud did not merely probe reality in order to shape it into various
aesthetic forms. He also committed his art to examining the conflicting emotions that he
personally experienced when he subjected himself to new experiences, whether they were
actually felt, imagined, or the objects of his “reverie” or “revolt” (21). Rimbaud did thus
not only engage in various forms of artistic expression. He also supplemented his poetic
language with constantly renewed forms of experiences that he reminisced and inscribed
in the spaces of his art.
Rimbaud’s experimenting with life and art had him challenge some of the
traditionally accepted boundaries around him. As he set out to explore the borders where
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life and art meet, he also expanded the realms of their possible interactions. He did so by
setting in new contexts and new experiences an imagination pushed to the extreme.
Rimbaud’s work points at how literary productions can mutually inform experience and
vice versa. Discussing the possibilities of rhetorical modes of expression in relation to
objects of experience is our point here. It correlates well with Delbo’s and Morrison’s
art. Indeed, both Delbo and Morrison, along with Rimbaud, demonstrate an urgent
concern for the possibilities of expressing in literary language experiences and
occurrences that have bordered and are bordering on events of the extreme. Rimbaud’s
work serves well to open an examination of forms of knowledge and of experiences that
can be considered out of the ordinary or culturally difficult to admit. His work also
enables a discussion of how some forms of horrific knowledge can be mediated through
poetry. As Pierre Brunel observes in Arthur Rimbaud: Une saison en enfer, Rimbaud’s
“Délires II.Alchimie du verbe” is actually the poetic journey of the poet into the “horror
of horrors,” into the social “death of an ‘I,’” which deals with “une histoire atroce” that
attaches itself to “une histoire de la poésie” through “un parcours poétique qui n’a duré
que le temps d’une saison” (17).
Rimbaud anticipated that occurrences of love or beauty, but also of death or
emptiness, could be in urgent need of new forms of recollection and expression. These
occasions of social death demanded artistic reinvention. The poet’s “expérience
surhumaine” in Une saison en enfer while he was in search of new sensations, even
hallucinations, is a case in point that illuminates his experiment with new forms of poetic
language (82). Experiencing the extreme, probing its limits, and inscribing these in
poetic language is the legacy of Rimbaud that I wish to retain here. It will facilitate

8

exploring some of the possibilities of transposing surreal, quasi inexpressible,
experiences into acts of artistic creation. As noted by critic Paule Lapeyre, this is what
Rimbaud set out to do when he expressed the loss of an “I” in the prison of the soul. In
Lapeyre’s words, quoted by Brunel in his critical edition, Une saison en enfer is indeed a
harrowing cry of anguish and loss. More precisely, it is “le cri d’horreur poussé par une
âme dont le poème retrace la chute à l’intérieur de l’être.” Brunel goes further by
claiming that the surreal death experienced by the poet is even more resounding because
it is actually not triggered by the physical extinction of the body, but by the imprisoning
of the “I.” For Brunel, “ce n’est plus alors le corps qui est un tombeau, c’est le moi.
C’est lui qui est un enfer” (42). In other words, exploring various histories of an “I” that
survived the deadly menace of a profoundly shattering reality, whether colonial,
concentrationary, or social can be done through art. Through art also, can those who
survived a fragmenting or partial deadening of the self, offer their testimony. Through
their artistic poetry and prose, Rimbaud, Delbo, and Morrison illuminate those processes
of the deadening of the soul. More importantly, they also enlighten with their work what
it takes to reconnect to life and living. And they have done so with force and grace.
In a first step to search the “new” in order to reach “the unknown,” Rimbaud
explored, among others, the memory of a sensuous world. In his “Délires II.Alchimie
du verbe,” he recalls assigning colors to vowels. Likewise, he ascribed forms and
movements to consonants. For and through poetic verses, he actually recreated senses
and meanings. The artistic translation of his experimentation and his construed
reminiscences read as follows. “J’inventai la couleur des voyelles! A noir, E blanc, I
rouge, O bleu, U vert.—Je réglai la forme et le mouvement de chaque consonne et, avec
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des rythmes instinctifs, je me flattai d’inventer un verbe poétique accessible, un jour ou
l’autre, à tous les sens.” As he kept exploring prosaicpoetic writing, he recollected, “Je
réservais la traduction. Ce fut d’abord une étude. J’écrivais des silences, des nuits, je
notais l’inexprimable. Je fixais des vertiges (“Alchimie du verbe” Oeuvres 223). In a
state of near madness, worn by his excessive life experiences, Rimbaud was eventually
torn between a desire to speak and an impossibility of speaking (“Mauvais Sang”
Oeuvres 209). Close to a poetic death rendered by his “Je ne sais plus parler,” Rimbaud
threatened to muffle his imagination, deaden his memories, and silence his poetic art
(“Matin” Oeuvres 234). Towards the end of his life and in an act of humility, he
confessed, “J’ai essayé d’inventer de nouvelles fleurs, de nouveaux astres, de nouvelles
chairs, de nouvelles langues. J’ai cru acquérir des pouvoirs surnaturels. Eh bien! Je dois
enterrer mon imagination et mes souvenirs.” Returned to a reality that he dutifully felt
compelled to acknowledge and account for, Rimbaud accepted, however, the weight of
reality’s deadening burden. In the face of life, “la vie” came to be seen by the poet as a
despairing farce. Lamenting life’s senseless component, he related it to “la farce à mener
par tous” (“Adieu” Oeuvres 235). Yet, compelled by a sense of duty to keep exploring
life’s hold, he wrote, “Moi! Moi qui me suis dit mage ou ange, dispensé de toute morale,
je suis rendu au sol, avec un devoir à chercher, et la réalité rugueuse à étreindre”
(“Mauvais Sang,” and “Adieu,” Oeuvres 214, 235).
This discussion of Rimbaud may seem removed from the object of my inquiry. It
is only so in appearance. Indeed, Rimbaud’s struggle to return to reality after an almost
complete silencing of his poetics is crucial to an exploration of a literature of loss, quasi
death, and survival—which involves a poetics of “descent into hell” or from “beyond the
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grave.” This poetics from “beyond the grave” was obviously explored by Rimbaud
himself in Une saison en enfer, but also by other French surrealist poets such as Gérard
de Nerval, with Aurélia, and Auguste de Chateaubriand, with Mémoire d’outretombe,
among others. The point that I want to make here is actually a reminder of Derrida’s
insistence on the necessity to attend to “the other” at “the edge” of life, if we want to
access meaningful ways to learn about life. We remember that for Derrida, life must be
learned through the “heterodidactics” between life and death (Specters of Marx xviii).
My discussion of Rimbaud initiates two questions that I want to address. They
can be posed as follows. First, what can possibly be left or alive of the imagination and
in the memories of individuals who have experienceddirectly or notextreme forms of
trauma? Second, how can survivors of extreme experiences phrase, put into words, and
share with a community of readers what is left of their capacities to imagine and
remember? Or more precisely, how can surviving artists recollect and transcribe that of
which, in Primo Levi’s words, “it is better that there remains no memory” (Survival in
Auschwitz 16). In other words, how did survivors of traumatic experiences keep an
imagination active and alive? How did they transpose their painful memories in artistic
forms? For Primo Levi, attempts at working through some atrocious experiences,
especially those he suffered at Auschwitz, tie also, as for Rimbaud, Morrison, and Delbo,
into processes of creative acts of writing. In The Periodic Table, Primo Levi claims a
sense of exaltation in recreating through language some of his experiences and emotions,
however dreadful. He writes, “It was exalting to search and find, or create, the right word
. . . to dredge up events from my memory and describe them with the greatest rigor and
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the least clutter. Paradoxically, my baggage of atrocious memories became a wealth, a
seed; it seemed to me that by writing, I was growing like a plant” (153).
Examining the difficulties inherent in transmitting traumatic knowledge to future
generations is a complex and sensitive project to undertake. Such a project deals with
events that may be very painful, are certainly disturbing, and situated at the limits of the
conceivable or imaginable. Besides, the ethical implications brought about by narrated
testimonials of experiences dealing with atrocity or atrocious lived circumstances raise
major questions. One, for instance, relates to our acceptance of the term “being human”
and to the meaning that we may have attached to the word. While we may have taken for
granted our human character, we certainly have to ponder what it means to be human in
the face of circumstances that challenge our expectations of what constitute human acts.
The significance of the term “being human,” surrounded by fellow humans, in collective
spaces and times that inscribe themselves in what we can normally expect in a “civilized
culture” thus, and in the scope of this project, demand reexamination and reappraisal.
If, in the words of David Patterson, “that which is human is that which speaks, the
process of dehumanization, on the other hand, is a process of rendering silent.” If, as
Patterson argues, “The Holocaust novel addresses this division [of the word divorced
from the thing, of the human severed from the voice, of the self against itself], it struggles
to work out some kind of reconnection between the terms” (The Shriek of Silence 12).
Also, one may want to ask, is it still relevant, or even possible, to initiate dialogues within
frames of reference that make use of commonly accepted terms such as humanity,
culture, progress, art and beauty? If so, how have the underlying relations between
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significance and reference in these concepts shifted in a new context of traumatic
aftermath? These are the questions to which I would like to attend for now.
“There is always a decision for or against silence,” says Geoffrey Hartman in the
“Introduction” to his work in Holocaust studies The Longest Shadow (3). His point
exposes choices about deciding for or against the making known of an experienced
reality. With the posing of this choice comes a corollary decision. Hartman refers to that
decision, that difficulty of making an informed determination to remain silent or quiet
about an experience, a “dilemma” that we need to confront. This dilemma is especially
brutal when it involves choosing what to disclose or not to disclose in textual accounts
that deal with disaster. It may even be more harrowing if it centers around disclosing an
experience that has been threatening to one’s life, shattering to one’s ego, and
endangering to one’s sense of social being—for example, in the literature of testimonials
that explore events of disastrous consequences, such as are produced in an aftermath of
bondage or deportation.
For Hartman, not remaining silent may have us face the possibility that our trust
in humanity has been shattered. It may have us confront the realization that our faith in
mankind has been irremediably lost. This is especially true for those who have been
closely connected to the events of traumatic magnitude such as slavery in the US or the
Shoah in Europe. In discussing the attempted annihilation of European Jewry by the
Nazis, Hartman claims that “to integrate the Holocaust into our image of human nature is
to despair of humanity, as well as of language.” Remaining silent about the genocide
may safeguard a continued belief in humanity. But such a semblance of optimism in the
humanly possible, he contends, would be selfdefeating. As Hartman has it, “Yet to
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conclude that [the Holocaust] cannot be integrated is also to despair—if it means
abandoning the hope that a remedy may be available through collective action based on
selfunderstanding and tradition.” The underlying question becomes thus, “As new
details or new perspectives emerge, can we draw any practical consequences from what
we have learned?” (4).
Hartman’s arguing the dilemmaand the priceof breaking silences had already
been prefigured by Primo Levi after his harrowing experience at Auschwitz. By
reflecting on a “human condition,” whose idea he explored and exposed in Survival in
Auschwitz, Levi illuminates Hartman’s conflict (17). Hartman’s point, we recall, is about
breaking silence around a senseless evil that may be at the core of humanity. Levi’s
reflection revolves more around examining the possibility of integrating a reality at the
confines of the inhuman(e) and the barbaric. Even though, in his work of testimonial,
Levi, like Hartman, explores the possible loss of faith in our image of humanity, he also
appeals to forms of fraternity that can partially restore that image. Along with
emphasizing an underlying presence of evil in humanity, Primo Levi indeed also inquires
into what comes into play in reshaping a sense of humanity in more positive terms. For
Primo Levi, this reshaping can come through a sense of responsibility towards a less
fortunate “other.”
Primo Levi first observed an outrageous reality at Auschwitz that baffled him to
his utter amazement. In approaching this reality, he contended that new perceptions of
reality, especially those that verge on the atrocious and horrific, may arise when reality
brutally collides with our habitual expectations. Part of what Pierre Bourdieu calls the
“habitus,” these structured and structuring “dispositions” would predict, to a larger
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extent, the ways in which we operate, represent, or respond to our reality (le sens
pratique 88). In the case of Levi, these were seriously thrown off balance. For Levi,
upsetting new responses had thus to come into play. This actually is meant to happen if or
when our “natural trust” in humanity is fractured. As such, a new, “profound
amazement” at the uncertainty of our conceptual frames of reference, in the words of
Primo Levi, can occur. This new uncertainty, however sudden, can be very
“destabilizing” for a human being. Likewise, the collision between reality and what we
may expect of reality may not induce total despair about human nature. It may, however,
profoundly shatter its foundations.
Levi’s discussion first grounds itself in human choices that have led to barbaric
actions, such as those he witnessed during his internment. In a universe of senseless and
atrocious human violence and crimes against humanity, Levi raises questions about the
human mind and its motives for destruction. Along with addressing upsetting questions
such as “how one can hit a man without anger?,” Levi searched, and found the basis of
human resistance (16). Also we need to consider what can possibly be experienced and
survived by an “other” at the edge of life, in response to a threat at the limit of the
humanly imaginable, but also with responsibility to fellow “others” defeated by death.
By refusing his consent to the annihilating Nazi machine, Levi attempted to
remain human in an inhuman world. He underscored, as such, the possibility of
inscribing culture in the realms of the extreme. As he reflected on the actual presence of
the civilized in the domain of barbarity, he emphasized that point in his writings.
Significantly, his work shows that both culture and barbarism actually interact with each
other in various complex situations. His discussion of the boundaries between atrocity
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and humanity, fashioned within the scope of his direct and lived experience, is
particularly resonant with the literary genre of the extreme that we are exploring here.
This is especially so, because we want to inquire not so much into the exact point where
culture ends and where barbarism begins, an impossible, probably dogmatic task in itself,
but because we wish to explore the particular instances in which culture and barbarism
are in each other’s proximity. We also wish to explore how they inform each other. The
questions raised by Levi’s argument are thus to the point and crucial in suggesting that
evil and humanity may not be two separate and distinct categories exclusive of each
other. But they are, or can be, actually interactive with and constantly present to each
other. In this regard, attending to one question suggested by Levi’s work is particularly
revealing. Dealing with the possible cooccurrences and instances in which culture met
with barbarism, the problem resulting from their encounter can be posed as follows. In
what borderlands of the hardly conceivable, yet possible, did barbarity and culture meet?
How did they coexist with one another in the making of a contemporary reality marked
by evil?
Exploring what Levi calls the “gray zone,” along with the sinister news of “ce que
l’homme, à Auschwitz, a pu faire d’un autre,” will serve our point here. Levi’s “gray
zone” reflects on culture and barbarism from a perspective illuminating the ways humans
work within an “outofthe ordinary” or “outofthe expected” cultural framework (Si
c’est un homme 82). This culture beyond normality can be best revealed here through
instances of human destruction that Levi personally witnessed. These events, after he
directly confronted and recollected them, matched no prior knowledge. He recounts the
music and the playing of songs dear to German ears that were played at “the Lager”
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during his ten months in the German death camp. Levi recalls “Une douzaine de motifs
seulement . . . des marches et des chansons populaires chères aux coeurs allemands.” He
further ponders on the marching songs, and reflects, “elles sont la voix du Lager,
l’expression sensible de sa folie géométrique, de la détermination avec laquelle des
hommes entreprirent de nous anéantir, de nous détruire en tant qu’hommes (7374). In
these blurred spaces, in which scraps of culturethe playing of musicand blatant
barbarismthe orchestrated will to exterminate—merge, so does senselessness. A
senselessness described by Aharon Appelfeld, who was a child during the Holocaust, as
“another expression of horror,” that reveals “the depths of human degradation” (Beyond
Despair 27). As both signs of culture and barbarism merged in a kind of foggy zone in
which humanity is imminently threatened, Levi remembers the following. He writes,
“Quand cette musique éclate, nous savons que nos camarades, dehors dans le brouillard,
se mettent en marche comme des automates; leurs âmes sont mortes et c’est la musique
qui les pousse en avant comme le vent les feuilles sèches, et leur tient lieu de volonté.
Car ils n’ont plus de volonté.” Pondering on the anonymity and immensity of the damage
done to men turned into nonmen, Levi reminisces, “ Ils sont dix mille hommes, et ils ne
forment plus qu’une même machine grise; ils sont exactement déterminés; ils ne pensent
pas, ils ne veulent pas, ils marchent” (Si c’est un homme 75).
Probing the gray spaces that transform culture and humanity into barbarity and
anonymity, Levi eventually insisted on possibilities for retaining spaces for the human.
These possibilities, he suggests, arose not outside, but within the borderlands of atrocity
that he witnessed. Opposing the orchestrated acts of annihilation and anonymity that he
saw, Levi also witnessed acts of survival. These acts of survival were not so much acts
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of willful living as they were of willful remembrance on his part. Offering resistance to
dehumanization through deliberate acts of reflection and testimonial is thus the human
stance that Levi posed. He did so very early and throughout his internment in Auschwitz.
When they were threatened to the core of their being, Levi’s fellow men became
“nonmen,” or nonhuman. This was so because at some point, they surrendered their
capacity to think. Reflecting on their nonhuman condition, Levi foresaw that so many of
these men were lost. They were lost because they had lost the memory of, or the
possibility, of human action. Likewise, many had lost the comforting prospect of divine
intervention as well. As such, the nonmen that Levi described with so much accuracy
were actually made to join and reinforce the Nazi machinery of inhumane destruction.
Made aware of the dehumanizing process inflicted on all at the camp, Levi noticed the
ones least able to face the ruthless process of Nazi selection. He saw them as the
“drowned,” not the “saved.” As such, Levi concluded that dehumanization produced a
loss of faith in human possibilities. This loss of faith in the human was furthered by the
destruction of hope in the divine. For the “drowned,” both losses irremediably brought
about severe forms of hopelessness and despair. As Levi pondered and declared, “Ce
sont eux, les Muselmänner, les damnés, . . . des nonhommes en qui l’étincelle divine
s’est éteinte, et qui marchent et peinent en silence, trop vides déjà pour souffrir
vraiment.”
In his vision of what constituted radical evil in his eyes, namely the de
humanization of man and the detachment from his habitus, Levi was haunted by a vision
that roots itself, not in Dante’s inferno, but in Auschwitz’s hell. Attentive to this
haunting and daunting vision of hell, Levi, however, reclaimed some form of humanity
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for those men. He did so through committing to memory the ones in danger of being
forgotten, the immensely lonely, the defeated. As he reflected, “Ils peuplent ma
mémoire de leur présence sans visage.” Indeed, as he pondered on the barbarism that he
was forced to witness, he willfully transcribed his vision into an act of recollection,
remembrance, and reflection, for future generations to ponder. Still in Si c’est un homme,
he proposed, as a result of his witnessing dehumanization and evil, that “Si je pouvais
résumer tout le mal de notre temps en une seule image, je choisirais cette vision qui m’est
familière: un homme décharné, le front courbé et les épaules voûtées, dont le visage et les
yeux ne reflètent nulle trace de pensée” (138).
As Levi’s text indicates, presenting evil in its starkest aspect or in its most de
humanizing form may be discomforting and upsetting. This dehumanizing evil of the
Holocaust did, however, unquestionably happen, as did slavery. Keeping silent about it
would only strengthen the positions of those who would wish to deny or evade that
horrific knowledge. As Geoffrey Hartman summarizes in The Longest Shadow, “Now
that the public silence has been broken, it will be broken.” He further states that “no
shame attaches to those who evoke that darkest time to give it meaning,” no shame
should attach to those who “dispute the meanings given” (44). Addressing the works of
survivors, such as Primo Levi’s, but also of Elie Wiesel’s, Jorge Semprun’s, and many
others, Hartman commends these authors for breaking silences. Also, along with his
acknowledgement of their works of testimonial, Hartman pleads for the lifting of the
stigma or shame that attaches to those who disclose shameful events. At this point, the
discussion by Theodor Adorno of a culture that can be associated with shame because it
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failed disastrously offers some insight into the problematic of disclosure or silence, of
remembering or forgetting.
Like Primo Levi, the German philosopher of Jewish descent Theodor Adorno
survived the Nazi extermination. Unlike Levi, however, he did not spend the war years
in concentrationary internment. With his famous statement that it is no longer possible to
write poetry after Auschwitz, or more precisely that “to write poetry after Auschwitz is
barbaric,” Adorno expressed his disappointment in and bitterness about a culture that
located itself at the confines of barbarism (Prisms 34). His dictum was meant to reach,
however, beyond his disappointment in a totalitarian culture. It targeted also totalitarian
forms of art and aesthetics. It is precisely totalitarian aesthetics, whose lack of autonomy
he denounced with express bitterness that I want to address now.
The uncompromising attack on art that Adorno launched after the Holocaust was
clearly aimed at culture before the Holocaust also. Indeed, Adorno’s remark revealed
that German society had been corrupt long before the Nazis made that truth brutally clear.
When he formulated his dictum about the impossibility of art or poetry after Auschwitz,
he harshly criticized various forms of aesthetic representation. His statement even
questioned the cultural possibilities for adequately being able to reflect on a reality in an
autonomous manner. Whether his pronouncement signalled a quasidefeat of
imaginative writing in the face of the barbaric character of a culture, such as the one
displayed by the Nazis, is an interesting point. If so, could also the charge by Adorno be
that public recognition of the Holocaust may increase “the exploiting, profaning, or
trivializing” of suffering, and be grounds for imposing silence about what happened
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between 1933 and 1945 in Western Europe? (The Longest Shadow 44). Would art then
be worthless in the face of life?
If, in Adorno’s words, “culture has failed miserably,” its failure is not solely
attributable to the idea that Auschwitz was a “social disaster” that “defied human
imagination” (Negative Dialectics 361). Culture was flawed also because it could not
initiate an examination of itself, nor generate or sustain a critique of the ideologies that it
diffused. As Adorno stressed in the 60s, “All post Auschwitz culture, including its urgent
critique, is garbage. In restoring itself after the things that happened without resistance in
its own countryside, culture has turned entirely into the ideology it had been potentially”
(367).
Adorno’s argument further opens the divide between culture and barbarism. As
he conceded, “cultural criticism found itself faced with the final stage of the dialectic of
culture and barbarism” (Prisms 34). Seeking an impossible resolution, because his
negative dialectics demanded a clear definition of the terms culture and barbarism, an
impossibility in itself, Adorno’s argument seemed locked in a selfdefeating impasse.
Besides, along with the negative critical framing of the terms that brought about the
deadlock in the first place, Adorno offered little hope for our present time’s capabilities
of disengaging from, or at least facing cultural decay and guilt. Little ground, it seems,
was offered in Negative Dialectics for contemplating the possibilities of a future—a
future culturally acceptable or at least possibly viable. As Adorno posited, “whoever
pleads for the maintenance of this radically culpable and shabby culture becomes its
accomplice.” But yet, “the man who says no to culture is directly furthering the
barbarism which our culture showed itself to be” (Negative Dialectic 367). How can we
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then, following this logic, pose the previously asked question by Derrida of “where?”
“where tomorrow?” “whither?” (Specters of Marx xix).
In “‘The Grave in the Air’: Unbound Metaphors in PostHolocaust Poetry,” Sidra
DeKoven Ezrahi questions the negative dialectical impasse in which Adorno locked
himself. Claiming that his dictum was “appropriated unreflectively since his death in
1969 by the very ‘culture industry’ he so vigorously attacked in his lifetime,” Ezrahi
contends, however, that Adorno returned to his statement time and again to refine and
restate it. Yet, for Ezrahi, Adorno’s dialectics could not allow to pose the problem in a
different manner. One problem that arose, for Ezrahi, was the impossibility to pose how
“distinctions” be “drawn between ‘barbarity,’ which is by definition outside the civilized
discourse, and liminality, which is not?” (260). Her question, out of scope for our
discussion at this time, reengages, however, the following point. It suggests, as
previously mentioned, that barbarity and civilized culture should not be posed in
mutually exclusive terms. They rather tend to remain in a space critically blurred that
resists easy articulation.
It is this critical stance that Ross Chambers adopts in his Untimely Interventions.
He starts the discussion by reminding us that human evolution may have produced a
species, termed “hybrid,” that is neither “simply animal in nature, nor yet cultured,” in
the meaning of “civilized or humane.” Culture, it would seem, regularly fails us as we
plunge into “animalistic behavior and instincts which kick our human ideals to the side.”
For Chambers, thus, the evidence is that “the brutalities, atrocities, and acts of violence,”
of which humans are so obviously capable, are themselves “the products, not of an
animal nature, but of culture.” In the terms “products of culture” that he uses here, he
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clearly refers to culture as “the general mediator of relations,” that which is at the core of
civilization itself (xviii). His argument suggests, then, that barbarism is not located
outside of culture, or alien to it, but rather is constitutive of it. As such, the menacing
presence and frequent reoccurrence of barbarism inherently attaches to the very condition
of culture. In a line of thought similar to Primo Levi’s and Adorno’s, Chambers phrases
the problem as such. He writes, “the occasions on which . . . ‘culture’ lets us down are
the occasions on which human culture reveals something crucial about itself.” Namely
that it has “an essential faultline running through it, or a ‘dark side’ that is not accidental
but rather constitutive, definitional.” As such, the “violence” that “culture pretends to
hold at bay” is actually “something that it does produce, qua culture, with frightening
regularity” (xviii).
What is to be done, then? Should the witness of inhumane deeds keep silent for
fear of shattering our trust in humanity? Should we despair of humanity and take for
granted its possibilities for evil? Should we shy away from aesthetic or philosophical
culture because of its failure in producing unambivalent social good?
The literary and critical reflections contributed by Primo Levi and Adorno, but
also by Ezrahi and Chambers, uncover various venues for the further exploration of these
questions. Going beyond Adorno’s dialectic, Chambers suggests that some forms of
literature have actually as their point, and even as their “burden,” the view that atrocity or
disaster can happen here or there. These literary pieces are thus meant to reveal that
these human catastrophes can erupt at any moment, in any location, and as we know
incredibly well, they have in the past and still do. With his Untimely Interventions,
Chambers himself sets out to remind us of what “we need to know and acknowledge.” In
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the face of instances of barbaric atrocities, we need to be reminded “again and again and
again,” of their potential outbursts, if only to be “awakened” sufficiently to the signs they
may produce before they strike there (xx).
The necessity of reading those signs may, actually and after all, have been
indirectly introduced and suggested by Adorno himself. The approach by which we are
encouraged to remain alert to the possibility of cultural violence may indeed be assumed
in Adorno’s revised position on art. Although the point is made not explicitly, but
implicitly, Adorno’s “after Auschwitz” provides, or at least suggests, a theoretical
impetus for searching for new forms of cognition and representation of culture. Also, if
authentic forms of knowledge are constantly in the making and are indeed necessary, they
are all the more so in circumstances of the extreme. They become urgent when the
potential strikes that culture unleashes are deadly. As has been presumed by Adorno,
initiated by Primo Levi, and explicitly formulated by Chambers, new forms of
representation become thus all the more crucial when reality or culture brutally collide
with the habitual expectation we have of that reality or of that culture. This, as
previously mentioned, is particularly true when the reality we are facing grounds itself in
barbaric or evil experiences.
As Michael Rothberg comments in Traumatic Realism, “Adorno’s writings . . .
suggest the need for new forms of representation capable of registering the traumatic
shock of modern genocide.” As such, Rothberg not only calls for new forms of
representation to reveal destructive violence in our modern age. He also summons these
forms of representation at a collective level. Likewise, he addresses the necessity to find
“new forms of publicity” that will “translate knowledge of extremity for a mass
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audience” (58). Ezrahi makes a similar point also in her attempt to move beyond
Adorno’s critique. Her critical intuition is to articulate new insights for art. She thus not
only attempts to move the discussion of the duty of art beyond the shattered loss of its
autonomy. She asks for appraising some new forms of artistic representation as art’s
object and purpose.
Art, since it reduced itself to a reflection, not a critique, of totalitarian ideology
and Nazism, became in a certain way, according to Adorno’s dialectical rationale,
disconcertingly barbaric. But also, Adorno’s objection to the critical value of art, which I
want to question here, supposes another contention. Adorno indeed argued that art after
Auschwitz would operate, because of its aesthetic qualities, as a sort of “anesthetic” to
barbarism. In other words, for Adorno, the focus on form would actually preempt an
assimilation of the content. If we attribute the statement to Adorno, quoted in Ezrahi, that
the “more poetically crafted a text, the more inherently estranged from the reality it is
meant to represent,” then his statement about art may point not only at a radical
separation between art and experience in some cases. It also means that some style that
art employs might be inappropriate. As he stresses the unsuitable character of art’s style
specifically in regard to a literature of atrocity, he claims, “Through the aesthetic
principle of stylization . . . an unimaginable fate still seems as if it had some meaning; it
becomes transfigured, with something of the horror removed” (“‘The Grave in the Air’”
267).
The process by which art is claimed by Adorno to lose critical autonomy and
authenticity on the one hand, and aesthetic or ethical relevance on the other, is an
important one. Art is either too involved in reality or too removed from it. Yet Adorno’s
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restrictions may serve as a new background to further explore the possible relevance of
art in regard to a literature of atrocity. Examining how aesthetic productions that are
motivated by critical and social responsibility prove actually not only possible but
desirable is thus our next point. As Derrida and Chambers suggest, remaining attentive to
the signs of culture and its potential for violence and atrocity may invest art with renewed
critical prospects.
As we turn to these prospects, it is necessary to be reminded of the
interdependencies between life and art. The necessary interconnections between art,
reality, and modes of representing that reality are particularly well argued, in yet another
context, by Patrick McGee as he discusses Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory. In relation to the
works of AfricanAmerican artist Ishmael Reed, McGee makes a point about the
interrelations between art and ideology. His point is of particular relevance, and I will
follow it here. It indicates where art may be meant to open up, not limit, new creative
cultural possibilities.
In assessing the artist’s place in the artistic process, McGee points at the complex
interrelations that come into play in aesthetic production. In ISHMAEL REED and the
Ends of Race, McGee argues that “specific forms of knowledge and life experience . . .
have a bearing on the process of aesthetic production.” The set of abilities and pre
dispositions that make up what Adorno calls “the métier” of the artist are, in a certain
way, “the imprint of society on the artist.” This imprint of society on the artist constitutes
also the “actual productive forces that make art possible in the first place.” Viewed in this
light, art, which may have seemed to foreclose spaces for autonomy of expression or
independence of thought, may actually open those spaces, not limit them. Especially if
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the artist, who engages in artistic production, specifically and purposefully means to
bring into her work “specific forms of knowledge and life experience.” She also
continuously shapes and transforms “the imprint of society” through her subjective art. It
seems, then, that the artist may purposefully choose not to disengage herself from her
milieu. On the contrary, the artist may rather decide to engage more in its reality. In
doing so, she may situate herself in a position to better apprehend it and critically reflect
on it, in relation to herself, and the community (63).
Toni Morrison has discussed this attentive engagement of the artist with her
milieu at great length. She has done so particularly in reference to and within the
AfricanAmerican community. One of her points organizes itself around the “conflict”
between public and private life. Conflicting only in appearance, these positions of the
individual at both a singular level and within community are crucial for Morrison. She
makes that point in “Rootedness: The Ancestor as Foundation.” While she discusses the
role of the artist in her critical work, she asserts the following: “There must have been a
time when an artist could be genuinely representative of the tribe and in it.” She further
explains that that time was also “when an artist could have a tribal or racial sensibility
and an individual expression of it.” Along with that sensibility and expression of
individual consciousness, “there were spaces and places in which a single person could
enter and behave . . . in the context of the community.” In Morrison’s contention,
personal statements, made or “performed” in “Black” church services or through music,
in the presence of a supportive or protecting community, once fulfilled that singular and
collective function of art (339). At the same time, along with functioning as art, these
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statements and performances also enabled an individual voice to fulfill the social duty of
the artist.
For Morrison, novels can also perform this crucial function. As she claims, “it
seems to me that the novel is needed by AfricanAmericans now in a way that it was not
needed before.” She regards the contemporary novel as “a way to accomplish certain
very strong functions,” one of which is “to get new information” out there. Her sense of
the novel is that, it “has always functioned for the class or the group that wrote it.” Her
claim is particularly valid in light of the emergence of the novel at a time when other art
forms were in decline. Indeed, at some point, art in the guise of “storytelling, songs and
dances, and ceremony, and gossips, and celebrations,” for the lower classes, or
“patronized art” for the aristocracy fell short. Art could no longer “fulfill embracing,
instructive or separating functions for the individual or the group.” In Morrison’s
contention, it was a time when “new art forms had to be produced” (340).
This specific “new art form” that has become a predominant social and aesthetic
vehicle, Morrison claims, is not only the novel, but the autobiographical novel. This form
of art is particularly relevant for her, not only because it is in keeping with the exigencies
of its times, but also because the autobiographical novel is a privileged instance that
fulfils a crucial social function. As “it seeks to reflect, present or inscribe the moral
dilemmas of the single individual in the face of the tribe,” a novel of autobiographical
inclination can serve to tie “singular life experiences into communal forms of
knowledge.” For her, it provides the artist an instance in which (s)he can “be
representative.” As such, the artist can say, “my single solitary and individual life is like
the lives of the tribe; it differs in these specific ways, but it is a balanced life because it is
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both solitary and representative” (339). Even though the slave narratives and
autobiographical works that Morrison discusses may actually be less openended and
more constrained in form than most contemporary pieces, including Morrison’s own
work, they were vital in prefiguring the roles of art and of the artist that Morrison
endorses. Besides, Morrison is that type of an artist who produces art, who is
inextricably embedded in her milieu, and who feels urged to critically reflect on it. Her
critical and literary insight on art and life may thus be more than a disillusioned and
discredited receptacle of culture. It may be a powerful vehicle for shaping subjective
stories and mapping collective realities, past and present.
Contemporary author and incisive literary critic, Morrison is attentive to the social
responsibility that her art is meant to embrace. As she claims, a novel should be not only
“beautiful, and powerful,” but it should also “work” (341). Indeed, it “should have
something in it that enlightens; something in it that opens the door and points the way.
Something in it that suggests what the conflicts are, what the problems are.” But, she
adds, “it need not solve those problems because it is not a case study, it is not a recipe”
(342). For Morrison, art should thus not be prescriptive, but illuminating. Also, in order
to be inviting to the community that it addresses, it should involve specific artistic
elements to which the community can relate. As such, she makes it a point to incorporate
in her fiction what she labels “Black art.” By “Black art,” she means, for instance, a form
of literature that involves the combination of both “print and oral” elements of literature
(341). These are meaningful to the extent “that the stories can be read in silence, of
course.” But, for Morrison, one should also “be able to hear them as well” (33941).
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These two elements are crucial because they enable a form of literature that has great
testimonial value.
Our approach to a literature of disaster, produced in an aftermath of slavery or the
Holocaust, and in light of the critical bearings of McGee, Chambers and Morrison on the
duty of art poses another question. It relates to the particular modes of representation that
a culture can safeguardor discouragewhen it makes statements about its reality. In
search of modes of representation in the context of traumatic histories, as experienced in
slavery or the Holocaust, the necessity to find a suitable and eloquent mode of
transmission may be harrowing. Its challenge is encapsulated in the following statement
by Ezrahi. It is closely related to what she coins “the widespread if unarticulated sense of
the propriety of the symbolic language that faces Auschwitz” (“‘The Grave in the Air’”
260).
The aptness of language to deal with Holocaust experiences has been discussed
extensively. Two accounts by two different camp survivors are particularly revealing
here. One is by Jorge Semprun. The other is by Aharon Appelfeld, a child survivor of
the Holocaust who turned poet, critic, and writer. The comment by Imre Kertész, also
Holocaust survivor and writer, can serve as an introductory remark. The excerpts
proposed are grounded in a specific reflection on language. All explore the possibilities
but also difficulties and conflicts that artists face in order to make language signify
pertinently in the context of a literature of atrocity.
Some narratives, written in troubled historic times, risk coming under suspicion.
In Jared Stark’s contention, narratives that take the form of memoirs are those more
specifically under attack. The skepticism towards them, according to Stark, grounds
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itself in the following objection. These narratives may appear unable to tackle the whole
picture. In his words, they may lack “the spontaneity of oral testimony,” on the one hand.
On the other hand, they may lack “the verifiability demanded of historic evidence.” As a
result, some survivor memoirs have addressed these suspicions by adopting various
literary stances. Some authors, Stark contends, have responded to these charges of
deficiency by “showing or suggesting that there may be no language or form capable of
representing the full truth of the Holocaust’ (“Broken Records” 199). This point is
challenged by Hungarian writer and Holocaust survivor (and recent Nobel winner) Imre
Kertész. Indeed, in Imre Kertész’’s contention, if there were a language in which the
Holocaust could “find a home,” wouldn’t “this language have to be so terrifying, so
lugubrious, that it would destroy those who speak it?” (“The Freedom of SelfDefinition”
39).
Jorge Semprun has addressed the question of a necessary lack of equivalence
between art and experience in a literature of atrocity by discussing the appropriateness of
language, along with the meaningfulness of writing, in regards to his devastating
experience in Buchenwald. After his encounter with death, or rather with what he labels
his “crossing through” death in Buchenwald, Semprun searched for ways to reattach to
life (Literature or Life 15). Writing offered an exceptional means to do so. As such,
literature became for Semprun a powerful vehicle to come back to the community of the
living. It also activated contradictory emotions in Semprun, as he struggled to return to a
more ordinary life after Buchenwald. Indeed, Semprun’s acts of writing, while they
brought him back into life, also forced him to confront the difficult question of tackling
reality through a literature that brought him back to death.
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The following passage by Semprun is remarkable in the harrowing dilemma his
writing poses. With it, Semprun struggles with the problematic of engaging into acts of
reminiscing and writing about an experience that was horrific and that asked to be
simultaneously forgotten. Semprun’s predicament had him thus face a powerful force of
language that could be a means to life. But it also had him concurrently account for
language as a vehicle that signified death. Semprun’s reflection reads as follows. “Il
avait raison, [César] Vallejo. Je ne possède rien d’autre que ma mort, mon expérience de
la mort, pour dire ma vie, l’exprimer, la porter en avant.” As he reflects on the urgency
of writing to find a new meaning for life, he contends, “Il faut que je fabrique de la vie
avec toute cette mort. Et la meilleure façon d’y parvenir, c’est l’écriture.” The healing
quality of Semprun’s commitment to writing what he experienced is, however, clouded
by the burden of death. He declares, “Or, [lécriture] me ramène à la mort, m’y enferme,
m’y asphyxie.” As he ponders on how life and death inextricably permeate each other,
even in life after Buchenwald, likewise, Semprun keeps reflecting extensively on the
following contradictory, yet unsolvable reality of narrating his story. Writing and
reminiscing about his experiences may indeed keep him living, but they also bring him
back to the realm of death and the dying. Choosing to write and be close to death, or
remaining silent in an attempt to forget deadly encounters brought Semprun to his
harrowing impasse. It is encapsulated in the following quote. He declares, “Voilà où
j’en suis: je ne puis vivre qu’en assumant cette mort par l’écriture, mais l’écriture
m’interdit littéralement de vivre” (L’écriture ou la vie 215).
Semprun’s reflections on writing as an act of survival after a lifeindeath closely
relates to the testimony by Aharon Appelfeld. Like Semprun, Appelfeld first reflects on
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the inextricability of life and death as he actually experienced them, and on the way they
shaped his writing at first. In Beyond Despair, Appelfeld writes, “Over the years we
learned to live with death as with a familiar acquaintance (11). Also, for Appelfeld, “the
sights” of the Holocaust were so terrible and enormous, that they seemed unable to be put
into words. As we read Appelfeld’s words, “the sights were dreadful and immense, and
words are frail and impotent.” Also, Appelfeld was forced to admit that his “interior was
locked away” (x). As such, his “deepest and most delicate feelings were hesitant to stand
naked” (xi). For years, he felt that “Life after the Holocaust seemed an untimely
resurrection, a new nightmare. No one knew whether this was rescue or punishment.”
The memory of his experience, and reflecting about it became his most dreaded and
dreadful “enemies”(x). Also he contends, “Memory seemed to be the most necessary
content of my experience. To be faithful to what had happened was an imperative from
which one was not to deviate. But what was I to do? For memory itself proved to be the
enemy of my writing.” In “a feeling of despair,” Appelfeld claims that, “It took me years
to understand that the inner enemy [my memory] was impeding my writing.” He claims
that “compulsive memory took over my writing.” In Appelfeld’s terms, compulsive
memory imprisoned him because it allowed for no possible deviation from a recollection
of experience that he wanted “exact.” This oppressive memory “denied him access to
any other creative element” (xi). A turning point came, for Appelfeld, when he realized
the following. After contending that, “There can be no literature without memory,” he
came to a new understanding of both. He came to perceive how memory can be used
differently and more pertinently, besides as for keeping record of mere facts (xii). He
posits this idea in the following statement. He claims that “memory is not only fact and
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vision and the course plotted for them, but also a warm emotion” (xii). “Memory,” as
“doubtless the essence of creation,” thus turned for Appelfeld from “compulsive” to
“creative” (x). As such, for Appelfeld, the power of the creative imagination lies “not in
intensity and exaggeration” but “in giving a new order to facts.” As such, it does not
reside in “inventing new facts,” but in “their correct order” (xiii). As he concludes, “Life
in the Holocaust does not demand the invention of new facts and sights. That life was so
‘rich’ one could choke on it. The literary problem is not to pile fact upon fact, but rather
to choose the most necessary ones, the ones that touch the heart of the experience and not
its edges” (xiii).
Not only did Appelfeld and Semprun reflect on writing as a means, however
problematic, to reattach to life. They also claimed that literature and language were
powerful vehicles to assess and express experience, including experiences of the extreme.
Not doubting the capacities of language to be able to express everything, to “contain”
everything, Semprun insists on the power of words (Literature or Life 13). He contends,
“On peut toujours tout dire, en somme.” Insisting on the tremendous capacities of
language, he repeats his statement and elaborates on it. He claims, “On peut toujours tout
dire, le langage contient tout. On peut dire l’amour le plus fou, la plus terrible cruauté.
On peut nommer le mal, son goût de pavot, ses bonheurs délétères. On peut dire Dieu et
ce n’est pas peu dire.” He continues to enumerate only a few among all the emotions,
feelings, thoughts, or objects that are expressible in and through language. He declares,
“On peut dire la rose et la rosée, l’espace d’un matin. On peut dire la tendresse, l’océan
tutélaire de la bonté. On peut dire l’avenir, les poètes s’y aventurent les yeux fermés, la
bouche fertile” (L’écriture ou la vie 26). Not once does Semprun doubt language as a
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medium for knowing or expressing the reality of a world that, however complex, is
familiar. Doubts, on the other hand, assail him, when it comes “to tell the story”
(Literature or life 13). He asserts, “Pourtant, un doute me vient sur la possibilité de
raconter. Non pas que l’expérience vécue soit indicible. Elle a été invivable, ce qui est
tout autre chose.” Questioning the “content” of that experience, rather than the “form” of
the narrative that relates to that lived reality, he continues with, “Autre chose qui ne
concerne pas la forme d’un récit possible, mais sa substance. Non pas son articulation,
mais sa densité” (L’écriture ou la vie 25). As he reflects on the urgency of the work of
art to appropriately reveal a reality that was unbearable, he pursues with the following.
“Ne parviendront à cette substance, à cette densité transparente que ceux qui sauront faire
de leur témoignage un objet artistique, un espace de création. Ou de récréation. Seul
l’artifice d’un récit maîtrisé parviendra à transmettre partiellement la vérité du
témoignage.” He concludes by stating that, “Mais ceci n’a rien d’exceptionnel: il en
arrive ainsi de toutes les grandes expériences historiques” (26).
In addressing our responsibility towards an event such as Auschwitz, Jean
François Lyotard, has also raised questions about “the propriety of the symbolic
language” that surrounds Auschwitz. More precisely, he has questioned “the propriety,’
not of “language” as such, but of discourse around Auschwitz. His point of inquiry
actually revolves around the validity of “the genre of discourse that links onto
‘Auschwitz’” (The Differend 88). Lyotard’s early questioning of the limits of
traditionally wellseparated discursive genres has done a lot in initiating rhetorical
inquiries for theorists. In our case, his position enables us to address forms of discourses
that appear, to a greater or lesser extent, appropriate, or not, to articulate experiences of
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the extreme. In other words, are there types of discourse that fall short of the task of
articulating a reality that was horrific? If so, how are they lacking?
An inquiry into the genres of discourse allows for exploring what Lyotard’s friend
and critic David Carroll calls, in his “Memorial for the Différend,” the “obligation” of a
postmodern politics to “respond to injustice.” It also enables us to inquire into some
possible forms of discursive “responses to injustice.”
Lyotard claims that various approaches or responses to the problems of injustice
are necessarily difficult or even “contradictory.” It is so because of the way or manner in
which some of the problems have been posed. Lyotard argues that “contradictory
effects” are indeed faced by “all forms of political action in their attempted forms of
justice.” More importantly, he points at inherent contradictions and exclusions that some
forms of discourse may perform. Not only does he make these discursive contradictions
and exclusions appear clearly but he also questions the limited character of the means that
some of these discourses employ. As a result, Lyotard calls for discourses to reach
outside and beyond their more traditional or restrictive boundaries.
In the case of Auschwitz, Lyotard addresses a form of flagrant and devastating
political injustice that he links to a “fundamental problem of historical knowledge.” More
specifically, he draws attention to “Auschwitz” by posing a question about the historical
knowledge or historical “truth” that surrounds “Auschwitz.” His point is to question the
validity of responses regarding the truth of a situation if it is framed exclusively
according to the strict, univocal rules of one discourse. Here, it is the historical discourse
and its modes of inquiry into truth that he doubts. He phrases the problematic in the
following terms: “according to strict historical rules,” how is it that we can actually
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“know if a situation ever really existed or if events occurred if there were no surviving
witnesses to the events?” He further asks, “what can or will be inferred from Auschwitz”
if “the limited number of witnesses to the situation and events do not or cannot report
them adequately or completely?” Also, he asks, what happens if these witnesses
“contradict one another?” And then, what can we make of the situation if these
“witnesses describe only limited aspects of the situation and not the situation as a
whole?” How is it possible, Lyotard thus asks, ever to “determine conclusively,” or
“according to strict historical rules” that “what these witnesses do speak about in the case
of Auschwitz” is in fact “a representative part of the general situation?” How is it
possible to know that it is not an “aberration from a general situation,” or even a “part of
the general situation?” And if “the situation is such that an overwhelming number of
potential witnesses have already died,” then “how can a survivor speak of and to that
loss, since he or she did not die and cannot speak for or as those who did?” (20).
In Lyotard’s thinking, questions of historical credibility directly relate to the
possible forms of representation that events can take or that witnesses can make. As they
open Lyotard’s discussion of the differend of Auschwitz, these questions of historical
attempt at truth based solely on one mode of inquiry serve a crucial purpose. They have
Lyotard denounce the reductive character of grounding discourse in one specific,
exclusive, limiting form of political action or discourse. This condemning of historical
supremacy in representing events had already been prefigured by Lyotard’s withdrawal
from engaged political practice altogether. Indeed, the confrontation with what he coins
the “irresolvable dilemma or double bind” that attaches to a discourse that claims
universal truth eventually had him disassociate himself from his early Marxist position.
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It eventually had him leave the more “radical dissident” form of Marxism and the journal
Socialisme ou Barbarie as well. From then on, Lyotard’s discontent with the limitations
imposed by one form of discourse kept growing.
For Lyotard, restricting oneself to one form of discourse is indeed bound to lead
to political or discursive assumptions that accept one meaning only. For Lyotard, this
one meaning or this one mode of representation cannot suffice. One mode is not
acceptable, because for Lyotard, one meaning may equal a “nonmeaning” (14). Besides,
modes of thinking or discourses that accept one definition only are not in a position to
sustain or even frame contradictions (15). More precisely, they cannot allow for
contradictions at all. This is so because they have no place for dissenting voices within
their own discourse. They inherently exclude those voices. On the other hand, if those
opposing views are expressed outside of that particular discourse, they are intrinsically
outside of that discourse. This gives rise to “the double bind” or “irresolvable dilemma”
that Lyotard denounces (14). By not allowing for contradictions, a univocal discourse
thus reduces itself to a blatant contradiction. To make this point clear, he turns to the
instance of a fictitious communist militant who is a dissident communist. Calling this
dissident communist the “Ivanian witness,” Lyotard argues the following. For the
“Ivanian witness,” Lyotard claims, it is impossible “to express contest and dissidence
within the idiom being contested.” It is so because “the very language of the dissident
communist is ruled out from the start.” As such, the dissident’s right or authority to
phrase reality in a way that is “different from the way the Party and the State phrase
reality” is denied to him. As a result, in Lyotard’s contention, the dissenting communist
can only be treated as either “insane, or as an enemy of the people, or both.” Opting for
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an alternate choice, the dissident communist can decide to confess and admit his crime.
But then, in Lyotard’s contention, he runs the risk of being excluded, and he ceases to be
regarded as a communist. In that case, he is “damned” (15). Both choices, because they
are grounded in either inclusive or exclusive terms, are unacceptable. The Ivanian
witness can only face the Lyotardian “double bind.” In framing the dilemma in terms of
discourse, we can conclude with the following. If the dissenting communist does not
confess to his crime, he “implicitly recognizes that the communist authorities are the only
ones competent” to implement the communist character of the society he wants to
contest. Yet, he cannot phrase dissent explicitly and discursively without being excluded
by the communist authorities. In either case, “his testimony is silenced before it can be
made” (14).
According to Lyotard’s critique, “phrasing a right to dissidence” and yet
“remaining a Marxist” would thus seem an appropriate course to adopt. It would at least
constitute a “first phase of dissent.” But it is, in actuality, insufficient. It is insufficient
because “it still accepts the language of Marxism as universal.” The next phase for
Lyotard is thus to phrase the relativity of Marxist discourse itself. That phase requires to
phrase a “differend.” That “differend,” in Lyotard’s words, becomes thus a
“contentiousness,” a place for arguments, that Marxism itself cannot “negate, overcome,
or either incorporate into itself or exclude from itself” (15).
Lyotard is thus noteworthy, and actually celebrated, for having questioned some
of the formal limitations imposed by dominant ways of thinking. As evidenced by his
criticism of the discursive practices at work in “metanarratives” or “grand narratives,”
one of his major contributions has also been to question the legitimating acts they pose
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(Browning, Lyotard 32). By interrogating how narratives impose a certain vision of a
future through the legitimating discourses they set out to produce, Lyotard’s work
illuminates our project. It does so thanks to its proposed displacement of boundaries.
Indeed, in dealing with postcolonial and postmodern texts, thinking within
compartmentalized, rigidly defined categories and disciplines may be too reductive or
restrictive. Not only because this confinement may have impeded the reading of some
forms of literature. But also because it has not allowed us to address a realityturned
barbaricin its full complexity. In arguing for the necessity of displacing, exploding, and
expanding the boundaries separating categories of discourses, Lyotard has thus enabled
new insights. With them, new spaces have been opened as well. I propose they serve as
borderlands in which to inscribe and probe experiences at the “limit,” such as the “para
experience” that was “named Auschwitz” (Differend 89).
Lyotard’s postmodern work on “grand narratives” can open up the perceptions we
have attached to slavery or the Holocaust (Lyotard 32). Discourses on extreme violence,
we know, can alter our understanding of it. This widening of perceptions can be
prompted, I propose, not so much by offering counternarratives, however. This critical
stance would not suffice. In the case of the Holocaust and slavery, it would simply mean
a negative reversal of discursive power. This reversal would serve solely to locate the
discourse of the persecuted as counternarrative. A counternarrative of that type would
simply serve to disprove the dominant story. Yet, the dominant story of the persecutors
involved in the trade of human slaves or in the Nazi extermination of European Jewry
should not be denied, disproved, or silenced. On the contrary, it should be inscribed in
memory and publicly known. In Lyotard’s words, “We definitely have to explore clouds
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of thoughts. No indifference is possible or, better yet, indifference as such is a mode of
answering the appeal” (Peregrinations 12). Rather than proposing counternarratives that
would merely disprove dominant stories, Lyotard’s critique allows for something else:
critical stances of broader insights. His critique actually enables the inscription of a
variety of discourses from nondominant forces that do not silence a dominant story.
Some discourses may thus open up our capacity for the perception of realities
that, because they were extreme, may have been left in the background. But also, by
having these dormant forces surface, by allowing them to come to the foreground, a
plurality of new insights may emerge and be registered. One privileged medium for these
voices to be heard, as I will propose later, is through a literature of testimonial, such as
that of Delbo and Morrison. If we follow this line of thinking, our perception of history
can thus be expanded and supplemented with testimonies of survivors. New perceptions
of slavery and the Holocaust may then emerge. My point is thus that even though
evidence of these forces of the past may not have been ultimately preserved in dominant,
collective memory, they can still, however, be located and accessed. In our case, this
evidence is to be found in accounts of individual experiences and in the personal
recollections of these experiences. Also, attention to these emerging nondominant
forces may enable inquiring into new sets of critical problems. One, for example, grounds
itself in a certain meaningfulness that, for instance, revolves around the types of silence
that can be encountered in personal accounts of extreme circumstances.
Lyotard has approached the problem of silence in The Differend and elsewhere.
He claims that the relevance and problem of possible silence may have us rethink our
ways of approaching discourses of political injustice. As such, he asks for a re
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examination of silence, whether personally or culturally selfimposed, that gravitates
around events of extreme violence especially in postcolonial and postmodern discourses.
He first asserts that the irresolvable character of events of undecided social or cultural
character inscribed in these discourses should be no ground for silence or indifference
towards them. Also, being unreceptive to events of unjust character, on the pretense that
it is impossible to ever get to a full cognition of them, is not acceptable. Likewise, not
being receptive to them because they “foreclose comparisons,” or because we cannot
“speculate” about them, as in the case of Auschwitz, falls short. For Lyotard,
“Auschwitz” does not open onto possible speculation because its outcome is past and
done with. It does not, or should not, however, and in his words, “preclude the need to
talk about it” (89). For him, discussing or disputing what is “indiscutable” or
“indisputable” is and remains a necessary political and discursive stance. Indeed, for
him, what is not open to a “different” result or historical outcome should not “deter us of
the certain, necessary moral obligation to respond to instances of injustice or exploitation,
past or present.” In his contention, even though one cannot speak of an “experience”
with a changed or changeable “result” as in “the case of Auschwitz,” we are still faced
with a responsibility towards Auschwitz (88).
Our liability towards Auschwitz concerns thus learning to be receptive and open
to silences. Whether these refer to what David Carroll calls a “historical sense of
silence,” or concern “the different types of silence” of various testimonies by witnesses
after Auschwitz matters little. More pressing and relevant to the discussion is the
possibilities for interpretative work that must be done around silence and around its
possible meanings.
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As a matter of fact, Lyotard was not solely interested in specific types of
knowledge around Auschwitz. Whether that knowledge was grounded in historical,
ethical, or political discourses is not the point here. Indeed, Lyotard was most interested
also in what is not or has not been verbalized about Auschwitz. He was particularly
engaged and attentive to its silencing, the silence(s) made around it. As David Carroll
explains, “Lyotard is interested not just in what is said in such testimonies but also in
what is not said.” With these testimonies, Lyotard is also attentive to “what cannot be
said, even when everything is said.” Carroll further explicates that Lyoard is likewise
interested in “what remains silent in testimony, not through simple forgetting, distortion,
or traumatic repression.” This attentiveness to silence by Lyotard derives from the fact
that “there is always something else, something more (and perhaps something less) that
needs to be said.”
Lyotard’s point, we remember, is that knowledge purely grounded in a historical
context, no matter how complex or complete, is not sufficient. In Carroll’s wording,
historical knowledge “does not and cannot suffice,” because “there is something else at
stake,” besides historical knowledge, that needs to be acknowledged by the historian.
This acknowledgement, Carroll argues, needs to be done “in the name of both history and
justice” (“Memorial for the Différend” 21). In treating silences as signs, not facts of
history, Lyotard thus asks for a new or renewed type of attention around accounts of
historical disaster.
In Peregrinations, Lyotard stresses the importance of being receptive or sensitive
to “events.” It includes those that do not conform to political expectations or strategies.
Through a “form of political modesty,” however, and in Lyotard’s words, we should be
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able to approach events that have a character of nonsolvability or nonresolvability, such
as Auschwitz. This openness or sensitivity can indeed unlock spaces of critical thinking
in which events can be scrutinized anew, and confronted from different angles and
sources. Even though resolutions of problems must always be resisted, and always
opposed, dialogues about these problems must, however, continuously be pursued. These
dialogues, then, should remain openended. Posing problems in terms of différends, and
opening our sensitivities to events may thus renew attention to some urgent critical
questions. Many of these are confronted by Delbo and Morrison.
While the problematic past of some historical narratives, such as slavery or
extermination, is not open to speculation, it cannot open around a differend. Does this
mean then, that some narratives are destined to remain unattended to or undiscussed?
The answer is no. No, events should not remain undisclosed, unattended to or
undiscussed. Neither should their discourses, in Lyotard’s words, be of arrogance,
authority, universality, or prescription. Rather, they should be encouraging us to be
“receptive,” and supplement our understanding of painful realities (13). The discourses
of Delbo and Morrison, as we will see in the following chapters, will not proceed to
“authorize, prescribe, or command” one outcome over the others. Rather, they will
illuminate themselves in the ways in which they request our utmost attention to their
object. As such, the intent of these narratives by Delbo and Morrison is not so much an
attempt to determine once and for all the outcome of discourses of past exclusion or
annihilation. Nor is their object to close discussions around them. Rather, their
textualities will be shown to illuminate and supplement a critical reflection on the
aberrations of histories of political exploitation and social injustice. As such, they will be
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explored through a literature of testimonials and personal reflections that ground
themselves in individual, yet also, collective approaches of reality.
One of our responsibilities, then, will have to do with dealing with the shocks,
“dreadful and immense,” to recount the words of Appelfeld, that slavery and the
Holocaust may have us register (Beyond Despair x). Facing events of such magnitude, as
encompassed in slavery and the Holocaust, will then call for a close examination of the
reception that their occasion produced. As Geoffrey Hartman claims in “The Book of
Destruction,” as he refers to the Holocaust, “We want to say, ‘It is inconceivable.’” Yet,
as he continues with his claim, “yet we know it was conceived and acted upon
systematically.” In his words, and in order to maintain a sense of safety, “We continue to
harbor, therefore, a sense of improbability.” This sense of “improbability” arises in us,
however, “not because there is any doubt whatsoever about the Shoah as a fact.” Doubt
surges in us, almost as a spontaneous form of response or reflex, rather “because what
was lived through, or what we have learned about, cannot be a part of us: the mind rejects
it, casts it out—or it casts out the mind.” As he continues, “We are forced to admit that
something in human behavior is alien to us.” Similar to the argument previously made by
Chambers, this admission to an essential “fault” in our human behavior is that “yet it
could be speciesrelated” (322).
The discussion of the narratives by Delbo and Morrison will bring to light that
“fault” (xviii). Besides, by being stories grounded in loss of innocence and in the painful
acquisition of a certain knowledge, they enable the following. By bearing witness to
experiences that Chambers inscribes in “cultural obscenity,” they will facilitate exploring
primary experiences of trauma. While in Chambers’s words, this type of witnessing is
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particularly emphasized in “the case of Holocaust writing,” I will posit that it may be
found in a literature that deals with slavery also (Untimely Interventions 68).
Besides, and it is the second point that I wish to make here, Delbo’s and
Morrison’s textualities permit an exploration of how we can be made attentive to the
sense of political or ethical “responsibility” that Lyotard or Derrida call for. Exploring a
form of literature that is based on testimonials, in which every voice, every silence, and
every mediating space inbetween is meaningful, is one way. But also, by being stories
that resist a universal approach or reading, and that focus on some muted voices around
histories of individual or historical trauma, they may have us move closer to that
responsibility.
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Chapter 2. The Haunting of the Past
In Testimony, Shoshana Felman claims that literature and art can be a “precocious mode”
of “witnessing” and “accessing reality” (xx). She further contends that it is “especially”
so, “when all other modes of knowledge are precluded” (xx). In this chapter, I propose to
read Charlotte Delbo’s Aucun de nous ne reviendra and Toni Morrison’s Beloved as
narrative acts of witnessing. I suggest that, through their testimonial function, their
works enable access to particular forms of knowledge. As part of a literature of
testament, their writings can initiate in us some understanding of how some literary
works can be particularly adequate to reveal experiences of the extreme. This opens two
questions. One concerns examining how traumatic experiences or events may affect
individuals, and to what extent. The other relates to how some experienced trauma can
be narratively performed and revealed through testimonial acts of (hi)story telling.
However partial and fragmented the knowledge to be uncovered is, it is
meaningful. Because it is traumatic and because it was accounted for in singular ways,
this type of knowledge seems, however, particularly complex and difficult to tackle. It is
so because it is at the core of collective and cultural histories besides being grounded in
stories of personal traumas. It may be useful to look more closely into the issues and
difficulties that this type of traumatic knowledge propounds. Also, it is meaningful to
explore how this personally or culturally devastating knowledge has not only been
experienced by witnesses, but how it has been conveyed as well. In this regard, the
following preliminary consideration will guide us in our exploration. It relates to the
extent to which writers of traumatic events have had to stretch the capacities of their art
and of their imagination in order to transmit the shocks of their experience. Looking at
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some challenging obstacles that writers of trauma have had to face in their writing may
thus be a good place to start.
In her essay about the memorialization of the victims of the Holocaust, Patricia
Gartland discusses what can impede awareness, recollection and transmission of
knowledge grounded in trauma. In “Three Holocaust Writers” Gartland contends that
the “obstacles” that Holocaust writers have had to “overcome” are “many” and “huge.”
In her contention, writing about the Holocaust has not only meant to “initially” face and
confront “a felt inability to comprehend the event fully.” It has also entailed the
difficulties of “finding a means to express” eloquently and effectively experiences of
traumatic resonance, while using “the conventions of language.” As such, crafting the
language artistically in order to successfully convey through “accessible, simple means”
the traumatic object of experience so that it might lead to “cognitive understanding,” has
been a major challenge. As she encapsulates the many daunting obstacles faced by
Holocaust writers, Gartland claims the following:
Holocaust writers have had to overcome many obstacles. They had first to
confront the profoundly unsettling reality of atrocity and deal with the personal
trauma, the shock of recognition inherent in their confrontation with the utter
depth of human behavior. They had to deal with the fact that the world
either chose not to know or, for all practical purposes, did not care about the fate
of the Jews. They have had to engage their readers in a process of discovery that
can at best be described as terribly painful, and they have had to seek vehicles to
transmit the tenor of their message that would neither reduce nor distort its
immensity. These are huge tasks for people who had traveled on roads through
hell. (46)
Delbo’s experience as a Nazi camp survivor eludes, to a certain extent, traditional
expression in words or representation. As such, the nonrepresentational form of writing
that she chooses to adopt as her artistic prose is a deliberate stylistic choice on her part. It
has her testimonial piece pose as an eloquently and convincingly written piece of art that
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has profound ethical implications. Overcoming the many obstacles faced by Holocaust
writers as described by Gartland, Delbo’s work is groundbreaking. By exploding some
forms of conventional writing, she has indeed produced the meaningfulness that she
sought her work to convey. The potency of her literary work written in the context of a
postmodern era is not only beautifully crafted aesthetically. It is also profoundly
significant ethically. Besides, the beauty and relevance of Delbo’s art, despite aesthetic
and contextual differences, can be read in conjunction with the postcolonial work of Toni
Morrison. The following preliminary remarks on the apparent difficulty, yet paradoxical
necessity, to address experiences perceived as not fully comprehensible are thus valid for
both Delbo’s and Morrison’s art.
Delbo’s search for expression to reveal the “inexplicable” can be easily related to
Morrison’s approach to the “unspeakable” (“Unspeakable Things Unspoken” 220).
Finding the most convincing and eloquent ways to communicate the hardly “explicable”
or the “speakable” was one of their major literary challenges. The craft and artistic
virtuosity displayed by both artists to tackle that challenge is, however, precisely one of
the underlying connections between them that requests attention. In this chapter, I will
thus attempt to bring the following to light. Namely, that both narratives are constructed
as attempts to reveal, rather than explain, and signify, rather than describe, experiences
grounded in trauma. Whether the experiences transmitted were personally and
immediately witnessed matters little. What does is that their point is to signify within a
community of readers. As such, showing that both Delbo’s and Morrison’s art is potent
because it makes an afterAuschwitz experience and a postcolonial aftermath vividly
present for us is crucial. It is so to such an extent that their “presence,” “nowness,” or
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“maintenance,” in the words of Derrida, is resonant today (“Signature, Event, Context”
328).
The experiences of trauma that Delbo and Morrison artistically render are also
actually haunting. Written so as “not to lay the ghosts” of the concentrationary universe
or of colonialism, Aucun and Beloved thus both aim, for Chambers, at becoming
obsessive and haunting to their readers. As such, the “hauntedness” of these narratives
can actually be said to perform their objects by becoming “haunting.” In this regard, both
pieces have thus become, for Chambers, “modes of cultural infiltration” that have a
profound ethical message to deliver.
Delbo’s art attempts to go beyond mere explanation. The subjectmatter of Aucun
is the unusual and the baffling. It actually “deals with that which cannot be totally
elucidated or explained.” The aim of Delbo’s narrative is to demonstrate that
inexplicability. In the words of Chambers, the narrative’s “burden” of Delbo’s work is
thus “to manifest” the inextricable character of an experience that was highly traumatic
(Untimely Interventions 230). This attempt to “demonstrate that inexplicability, i.e. to
manifest it, in lieu of explaining it” is very closely related to, but goes beyond, the
postmodern attitude of JeanFrançois Lyotard in the face of art. Specifically referring to
art after Auschwitz, Lyotard contends that what art can actually “do” is specifically “to
bear witness,” not to “the sublime,” but to the “aporia of art and to its pain.” As Lyotard
further asserts, “art” does “not say the unsayable,” but it “says that it cannot say it”
(Heidegger and “the jews” 47). Also, for Chambers, in order for the artist to
“demonstrate” the “unsayable” or to “display” the “inexplicable,” the artist can engage in
“abstaining from any attempt to explain it away” (Untimely Interventions 230). This is
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exactly the rhetorical mode that Delbo embraces in Aucun, as does Morrison in Beloved.
It makes their pieces narratively effective as well as ethically compelling.
Aucun, according to Chambers, is indeed grounded in a “declamatory mode.” For
him, “declamation is understood neither to explain nor directly address those who would
require an explanation.” Rather, Aucun functions as a literary “cry out” that presents the
strange as a writerly performance. This performance becomes the object of Delbo’s art
itself, whose aim becomes to be captured and called to attention. For Chambers, the
rhetorical “significance” of Delbo’s art as she grounds it in “apodictic” or demonstrative,
rather than in explanatory form, actually “lies in its being read” and interpreted (229).
Interestingly enough, Morrison’s text, while grounded in the unspeakable, is meant to
produce an identical effect. Likewise, Delbo’s writing manifests a profound concern with
a state of “hauntedness.” That “hauntedness,” which “corresponds to an experience of
trauma” that needs to be conveyed, can be, for Chambers, best revealed if it is
“recognized as haunting” (190). At best, this haunting can function as an “endlessly
plural specter that can’t be laid to rest, but whom, at least we can acknowledge and to
whom we can respond,” in the form of our awareness, “anxiety and phantom pain” (207).
Also, as that which “fails to end, but continues to repeat and to return, even when it is
supposedly ‘over,’” this “haunting” is what makes Delbo’s work, but also Morrison’s, so
distinct and crucial. Their texts become the potent “vehicles that relay hauntedness as a
haunting” (190).
We may be reminded that not only have writers of Holocaust testimonials been
pressured to fully comprehend and register what was experienced at the time of the
traumatic experience. They also have had to face an initial improbability at being able to
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disclose and express their experience to the fullest. Examining more precisely how
Delbo’s art successfully inscribes and artistically bears witness to her traumatic
experience in Auschwitz is thus an underlying concern of this chapter. Another is the
extent to which Morrison’s narrative can so convincingly interpellate readers in order to
involve them more deeply in traumatic experiences. These two concerns, however, apply
to both texts.
One of the stylistic techniques of Delbo’s art that make it unquestionably
convincing is her use of fragmented writing as it responds to her inclination for effecting
a disturbing outcome to our reading. Another stylistic device which has her art come out
as traumatizing, and thus approaches the inexplicable, includes the simultaneous
coexistence of apparently opposing frames of reference, such as those present in
circumstances of extreme experiences, and those located in the more habitual spaces of
reality. The presences of the obscene in the ordinary, of the familiar in the unthinkable,
of death in life, and vice versa are some instances. They reveal at best how an object of
traumatic knowledge can be, if not totally known, at least perceived and acknowledged.
The shrieks of terror in the face of death that Delbo places in her text, for instance,
eloquently speak for themselves, especially when they are followed by the freezing
silence of death itself. The manner in which she makes those silences and that traumatic
stillness meaningful is thus crucial in uncovering experiences of the out of the ordinary.
Besides, the figural language and the vivid images that she plants in her text to help to
reveal the traumatic nature of her experience are extremely effective in situating the
trauma within more familiar modes of perceiving it. Furthermore, her turning some
stylistic devices into extremely potent motifs in order to encourage readers to engage in

52

relatively intense interpretive involvement is crucial. The extent to which her art enables
access to a more subjective, almost visceralrather than cognitive albeit incomplete,
understanding of the events she came to witness in AuschwitzBirkenau, Raisko, and
Ravensbrück, are major points to examine in this chapter.
In an interview with Nellie McKay, Toni Morrison has suggested more than once
that when the reading of her books is done, “one is actually not through.” I propose that,
indeed, “one is actually not through” after reading any literary work of traumatic
significance like hers. It is so not only because “the themes” that are uncovered or
unveiled in her literary pieces “are haunting.” It is also related to the manner in which
her discourse is crafted. How it leads to a haunting effect on the reader is thus crucial in
understanding the object of Morrison’s artistic practice (“An Interview with Toni
Morrison” 403). Both Morrison’s, but also Delbo’s texts, are thus fertile grounds for
exploring forms of art that relate to what Chambers terms a literature of the “aftermath.”
With this type of literature, the narratives to which a haunted subject returns after a
traumatic experience can thus have us perceive Delbo’s and Morrison’s texts as meant to
signal not a “cessation of pain” but rather as a “return of that pain” (Untimely
Interventions 212).
Since both authors’ art functions to reveal inner and outer, yet indelible, forms of
trauma, it is interesting to open a place to engage them in dialogue. As such, the weighty
memory of an injustice done to a whole race, a recurring and potent motif in Morrison’s
text, can be placed next to the memory of an injustice done to a whole ethnic group, as
witnessed by Delbo. Likewise, the memory of utmost violence done time and again to
the black body and psyche, another of Morrison’s themes in Beloved, can be read in view
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of the physically destructive acts that were committed in Europe between 1939 and 1945
as witnessed in Aucun. Also, an utmost difficulty of surviving the psychic and physical
impact of violence done to a whole race or ethnic group can serve as a crucial cultural
index of shame and certain inability to forget. Both narratives need thus to be probed
also in light of the urgent and unresolved issues of a traumatic past that refuses to pass.
More exactly, they are fertile grounds for approaching what Thomas Trezise calls, after
the title of an article by Ernst Nolte, “A Past That Will Not Pass” (“The Question of
Community” 868).
A similarity between Delbo’s and Morrison’s texts is located, as JeanFrançois
Lyotard terms it, at the juncture where “the present is the past,” and “the past is always
presence” (Heidegger and “the jews” 17). In this regard, one indicator of violent traumas
comes through the haunting presence of immaterial and material ghosts that are present
and specific to both authors’ works. Also, the certain meaningfulness that attaches to
silence as artistic sign of cultural trauma is so eloquent in their oeuvres that it gives art, in
their cases, a profound intensity. In the words of Lyotard, their prose can cause us to be
“confronted with a silence that does not make itself heard as silence” (12). The specific
stylistic devices just mentioned, which function as literary signs of racial and cultural
traumatic pasts, can thus be read in tandem as some powerful articulations of unresolved
violence that still prevail in postmodern and postcolonial discourses.
By proposing “speech acts” that, in Felman’s words enable the narratives to
“perform their own meaning,” Delbo’s and Morrison’s testimonies reveal a specific type
of knowledge that appeals to our senses, more than to our understanding (Testimony 5).
This point is introduced by JeanFrançois Lyotard in The Postmodern Explained.
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Drawing on Lyotard’s argument in La Parole Singulière, Laurent Jenny claims that some
types of knowledge are indeed such that make us “feel” rather than “know” an object.
This somatic rather than cognitive knowledge can “open a wound in our sensitivity.”
Because they are not grounded in a linear time frame, but are traumatic accounts, Delbo’s
and Morrison’s testimonies open a “new sense of temporality” in us as well. As a result,
the traumatic sense of time that they encapsulate serves to act like a “wound” that
impinges on us with a haunting “insistence” (13).
Recalling what JeanFrançois Lyotard has said about some short pieces by Walter
Benjamin is useful at this time. As he comments on Benjamin’s One Way Street and A
Berlin Childhood, and reminds us that Adorno would call these pieces “micrologies,”
Lyotard makes a crucial point. Namely, Lyotard contends that these short pieces do not
set out to “describe” events but to “capture” them. Discussing the abovementioned
pieces in terms of what they perform, rather than what they state or claim, Lyotard insists
on the following. He writes that Benjamin’s “micrologies,” in fact, “do not describe
events from childhood.” Rather, “they capture the childhood of the events and inscribe
what is uncapturable about it.” Delbo’s and Morrison’s testimonies do not actually
“describe” traumatic events from violent times. Rather, they “capture” the violence and
the trauma of the events. Meanwhile, they also “inscribe what is uncapturable about
them” (The Postmodern Explained 90).
Lyotard has also proposed that some narratives, similar to the ones by Benjamin,
have an initiatory value about them. Rather than purposely presenting objective
description of events, Lyotard proposes, these accounts serve to instruct us. For Lyotard,
the instruction resides, however, not so much in the events themselves. Rather, it is
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located in the effect and manner in which they make themselves present when we
appraise them. Still in The Postmodern Explained, Lyotard assesses event as a form of
initiation:
And what makes an encounter with a word, odor, place, book, or face into
an event is not its newness when compared to other ‘events.’ It is its very
value as initiation. You only learn this later. It cuts open a wound in the
sensibility. You know this because it has since reopened and will reopen
again, marking out the rhythm of a secret and perhaps unnoticed temporality.
This wound ushered you into an unknown world, but without ever making it
known to you. Such initiation initiates nothing, it just begins. (91)
Delbo’s and Morrison’s texts “put into effect,” in Felman’s words, what “cannot
be understood, transmitted, in the mission of transmission of the witness.” Instead, they
have initiatory value. Both set out to activate what needs to be sensitively perceived
about events and histories of trauma. This is what makes them so innovative. Also,
while Delbo’s and Morrison’s texts reveal the burden of the witnessing that they set out
to perform, they also repeat over and again the “uniqueness” of the witnessing (Testimony
5). They do so by “initiating” in us a sense of injustice and suffering. They cut open “a
wound in our sensibility” that can “usher us into an unknown world” (The Postmodern
Explained 91). Rather than making statements about events, their prose comes to
perform and capture the violent character of these events. As testimonial, their narratives
usher us into a knowledge, which would otherwise remain less accessible. The events that
they reveal would indeed remain too remote or cognitively difficult to approach. It
would be so because their occurrence is past or distant, and beyond our present. Yet, by
working in a traumatic timeframe and by opening a new sense of temporality in us,
Delbo’s and Morrison’s texts function to initiate and recall the presence of the past
among us. The events that their texts reveal are meant to reach out to us. They are also
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meant to activate in us feelings of unease and shock. So, more than simply describing
some singular instances of bondage and extermination, Delbo’s and Morrison’s narratives
allow us to sensitively approach these events. Their narratives reveal and perform those
violent events. Yet, and importantly so, they also activate in us feelings of pain that
influence us from that point forward. As such, the violent impact of these events haunts
us.
Felman has labeled the poetry of Paul Celan a “haunting melody.” Drawing on
Celan’s urgency to awaken us to potential cultural threats is fruitful. In this instance, the
urgency of Celan’s poems is comparable and applicable to the texts of Delbo and
Morrison. Felman writes that “Celan’s verse” is not only a “compelling . . . melody,” but
it actually “returns” like a “haunting melody ... like a directed beacon, an insistent
driving force in the quest toward something which is not entirely within reach.” So
insistent and compelling is his poetry that, as a result, it becomes “haunting.” It is this
similar haunting, that is revealed through the “bearing” and the “burden” of the
testimonies by Delbo and Morrison that I will explore now

(Testimony 3).

As testimonies grounded in trauma, Delbo’s and Morrison’s texts show how
trauma interferes with, and actually shapes, forms of testimonial literature. Felman has
discussed extensively, in collaboration with Dori Laub, that materiality and centrality of
testimony outlined by a traumatic character. Felman presents her argument by first
insisting that testimony is and has become a “privileged contemporary mode of
transmission and communication” (6). Questioning the underlying motives behind the
omnipresence of testimony in “our recent cultural accounts of ourselves,” Felman makes
the following point. Namely, that testimony is a mode of bearing witness that is
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particularly in keeping with the needs of our reality. As she claims: “It has been
suggested that testimony is the literary—or discursive—mode par excellence of our
time.” Further, she acknowledges that our “era,” indeed, “can precisely be defined as the
age of testimony.” She quotes Elie Wiesel: “‘If the Greeks invented tragedy, the Romans
the epistle and the Renaissance the sonnet,’” then “‘our generation invented a new
literature, that of testimony’” (56).
The meaningfulness of testimony in our modern era is in direct relation to the
fabric of testimony itself. Testimonies draw their substance from the events witnessed.
They are a privileged mode of revealing the character of such experiences. Testimonies,
then, are to be discussed in their relation to the event. Yet, they should be placed in
relation to the witness as well.
For Felman, a “testimony” must first of all be placed in “a relation to events.”
Especially in relation to traumatic events, “testimony” seems to be composed of “bits and
pieces of a memory that has been overwhelmed by occurrences that have not settled into
understanding or remembrance.” Further, she claims that “testimony,” as grounded in
scraps of a memory that has been “overwhelmed,” is actually an “act.” That “act,”
however, cannot be “constructed as knowledge” nor “assimilated into full cognition.” As
such, “testimony” may reflect “events in excess of our frames of reference” (5).
A testimony, in other words, is a “discursive practice,” as opposed to a “pure
theory.” Testimony directly pertains not only to the person testifying or to the event. It
also involves the listener of the narrative as well. In other words, testimony involves not
only the traumatic event. It also encompasses the witness to the event, as well as the
listener to the witness who relates the event. There exist very close relations between
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these three essential components. The pivotal role of the listener in relation to the event
and to the narrator is further expounded by Felman, but also by Laub. Discussing the
necessary interconnectedness between the three components involved in the process of
testifying, Felman and Laub claim the following. Namely that “To testify—to vow to
tell, to promise and produce one’s own speech as material evidence for truth” is thus to
accomplish an obligation. This obligation to bear witness, so as to instate the potential
reception of the testimony, necessarily requires one to bear witness not only to the “self,”
Laub contends, but to the “other” as well (“An Event Without a Witness” 81). The
testimony must thus be addressed to someone, whether to an emphatic listener, reader, or
interviewer.
The centrality and omnipresence of testimony is obvious in Delbo’s and
Morrison’s work. As Felman points out, “testimony is indeed pervasive,” and
“implicated—sometimes unexpectedly—in almost every kind of writing” (7). Felman’s
remark serves as a reminder that our concern here is testimonial accounts of written
narratives. At this point, we need to understand how the gaps and silences in Delbo’s and
Morrison’s literary narratives function as activators of traumatic witnessing and
testimonials. It entails looking more closely into modes of bearing witness that have
been performed through oral testimonies, or through oral transmission recollected in
discursive practices that privilege a certain oral character of (hi)story telling. It is at stake
not only in Delbo’s work, but it is present in Morrison’s as well. It particularly shows in
Morrison’s inclination for orality as a “very special” and “very identifiable” component
of “Black literature” as it is seen in her literary practice (“Rootedness” 343). Dori Laub
and his crucial contributions as a psychiatrist, a listener, and an interviewer for the project
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“Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies” at Yale University will open this
exploration (“An Event Without a Witness” 85). Another inquiry facilitated by Laub will
also have us look more closely into how the traumatic character of the experience may
affect testimony.
For Laub, “massive trauma” precludes its registration. Trauma fails to actually
register because “the observing and recording mechanisms of the human mind are
temporarily knocked out.” As a result, these “observing and recording mechanisms
malfunction.” As such, the bearer of trauma and witness to it has to testify “to an
absence.” Indeed, she has to testify to an “event that has not yet come into existence” in
spite of the “overwhelming and compelling nature of the reality of its occurrence.” Laub
further claims that the “trauma—as a known event and not simply as an overwhelming
shock—has not been truly witnessed yet.” Actually, it has not “been taken cognizance
of.” The emergence of the narrative which is being listened to—and heard—is, therefore,
“the process and the place wherein the cognizance, the ‘knowing’ of the event is given
birth to.”
Laub keeps insisting on the inability for trauma, as “event” and as “shock,” to
register completely (“Bearing Witness” 57). He also proposes that the “reality” of trauma
resists inscription in the “real” as well. For Laub, indeed, in spite of the fact that the
trauma relentlessly and “uncannily returns in actual life,” its “reality” continues “to elude
the subject.” As such, the subject has to live in the “grip” of trauma. Another
consequence is that the subject “unwittingly undergoes [the trauma’s] ceaseless
repetitions and reenactments” (69). I will further contend, and in more detail later, that
the “eerie character” that pervades the prose of Delbo and Morrison is a major

60

manifestation of that reality of trauma that refuses to settle in the “real.” It remains,
instead, in a space, in a “borderland,” as Gloria Anzaldúa would contend, between the
real and the not totally graspable (Borderlands 99). At the fringe of the illusive and
hallucinatory, the scene featuring “the yellow sack of a woman” attacked by a Nazi dog
in Delbo’s novel is only one of the numerous instances that performs trauma by upsetting
the real. Likewise, the scene with Sethe’s mother, whose extra corporeal presence is later
assumed by Beloved while both are featured during the crossing on the slave ship during
the Middle Passage, is another example. I will come back to these forms of trauma that
unhinge the “real” later.
There is indeed another point by Laub that needs attention before we start the in
depth exploration of trauma in Delbo’s and Morrison’s first narratives of the trilogies. It
concerns Laub’s argument that investigates further and deeper into the elusive character
of trauma. This elusiveness is not far removed from what Immanuel Kant labels the
“formlessness” of the object of knowledge in his discussion of the “sublime feeling.” It
relates, in fact, to what Kant refers to as the “boundlessness” of the object (Critique of
Judgment 44). It actually deals with the lack of reference to a previously known or
perceived reality. For Kant, this elusiveness would be at the locus where “Imagination”
and “Reason” face the inadequacy of expression (59). This inadequacy, as such, is what
gives rise to a “feeling of the sublime” (47). For Laub, that elusiveness or formlessness
of the object does not give rise to a feeling of the sublime, however. Rather, it accounts
for a feeling that has a quality of “strangeness” or “otherness.” As Laub explicates in
“Bearing Witness,”
The traumatic event, although real, took place outside the parameters of
‘normal’ reality, such as causality, sequence, place and time. The trauma
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is thus an event that has no beginning, no ending, no before, no during and
no after. This absence of categories that define it lends it a quality of
‘otherness,’ a salience, a timelessness and a ubiquity that puts it outside
the range of associatively linked experiences, outside the range of
comprehension, of recounting and of mastery. Trauma survivors live not
with memories of the past, but with an event that could not and did not
proceed through to its completion, has no ending, attained no closure, and
therefore, as far as its survivors are concerned, continues in the present and is
current in every respect. The survivor, indeed, is not truly in touch either
with the core of his traumatic reality or with the fatedness of its reenactments,
and thereby remains entrapped in both. (69)
Delbo’s and Morrison’s testimonial accounts are effective because their narratives
delve into and perform the traumatic entrapment in which survivors of trauma are caught.
Also, their prose, pervaded with a feeling of the “sublime” that Kant would call “the
terrifying sublime,” serves to “stir terror” the way “deep loneliness does ” (Of the
Beautiful and Sublime 48). As such, Delbo’s and Morrison’s prose situates the survivor
or the artist in great “loneliness.” By “performing” not only the “trapping” that
necessarily comes with trauma, but also the great “solitude” encountered by the narrator
of trauma, their prose is terrifying. It is, however, in the words of Dori Laub, by
“reconstructing a history and essentiality of reexternalizing the event,” that the process
“of constructing a narrative” can take place. As Laub further contends, this re
externalization of the event can occur and take effect only when “one can articulate and
transmit the story, literally transfer it to another outside oneself and then take it back
again, inside.” As such, telling entails “a reassertion of the hegemony of reality and a re
externalization of the evil that affected and contaminated the trauma victim.” I propose
to now look more closely into how Delbo and Morrison not only “reexternalize the
event,” but also “construct” their “narratives,” and “reconstruct” their histories (“Bearing
Witness” 69).
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In his Traumatic Realism, Michael Rothberg describes Delbo’s None of Us as an
assemblage of “micronarratives.” For him, these “micronarratives,” in their isolation,
serve to “reveal the spatial closure and repetitive temporality of Auschwitz” (175). In his
contention, it is thus, “both with and against this knowledge of the untimeliness of
testimony,” that “Delbo has written None of Us Will Return” (159). Patricia Gartland
describes Delbo’s oeuvre more as an “impressionist collage of images and vignettes.”
Yet, these vignettes are also accompanied by “fairly realistically rendered episodes and
short lyric description.” As a result, Gartland claims, the overall effect is, at times, “like
that of a prose poem” whose chant keeps pounding as an obsessive melody. Also, for
Gartland, Delbo’s technique is to “write mainly in the present tense.” It is designed, in
her contention, “to show how past experience merges with present memory” (“Three
Holocaust Writers” 54). Both these statements by Rothberg and Gartland actually situate
Delbo’s prose in a larger literary context.
Aucun does not attempt to represent a reality, however truthful, of the Holocaust.
Indeed, and in the words of Lea Fridman, “Delbo does not take her reader back to a
historical account of an event.” Rather, she takes her reader “in all of the fragmentation
and instability” of the experience that she has outlived and vowed to tell. Also, Fridman
contends, Delbo makes perceptible that experience of fragmentation “in its most intimate
connection to the body, to the outer world, and to others.” In this way, Delbo depicts a
sense of “dissolution” and “collapse” in all its “lived and witnessed precision.” Indeed,
as Fridman further states, “if the unreal lies at the heart of the experience of extremity,” it
is that “unreal” that “achieves objective status” in Delbo’s account. As Fridman
concludes, “What is formidable in her writing is the precision and detail of that portrait”
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(Words and Witness 110). Equally appalling is how the reality of her experience is so
convincingly portrayed and forceful as to become haunting.
Delbo focuses on personal experiences, her own and her companions’, rather than
on historical events. This makes us perceive the depth of the suffering inflicted on the
Auschwitz inmates. But this is not the only effect produced. Delbo’s focus is also to
make us “feel” the profoundness and destabilizing character of the trauma that the
Holocaust experience brought about. One pressing instance revolves around her
experiencing thirst at Auschwitz. The episode reveals in acute manner how traumatic the
deprivation and scarcity of water was in the camp. It also exposes the depth of the pain it
inflicted, as well as its obsessive character. The episode is constructed so that we are
made to somewhat “sense” the traumatic impact of thirst in its full force. To do this as an
author, and for the reader to perceive the effect, according to Chambers, “I need not have
‘known’ the Holocaust in the sense of having been there, or in the way that a historian
might know it.” Instead, “I need only to recognize its reality and relate it to myself,
which presumably I do on the basis of personal experiences of pain that I remember.”
Chambers keeps explaining that “my response to something that is phrased for me to read
but not said, is one of anagnorisis—recognition as remembering, remembering as the
negation of my previously supposed ignorance.” It is, for Chambers, “an
acknowledgment that I did not need for this thing to be spelled out, although I did need to
be reminded of it, for it to become real to me, . . . and hauntingly so” (Untimely
Interventions 20607). In this instance, we are made to “feel” what it must have “felt
like” to go thirsty for days on end. We are also made to observe the quasi maddening
effect that intense thirst can have on the human body deprived of water. The effect
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created by Delbo’s prose is all the more dramatic and traumatic. Especially if we
remember that, in the words of Laub, the traumatic experience has “no beginning, no
ending, no before, no during and no after” (“Bearing Witness” 69). In her chapter
entitled “La soif,” Delbo makes us sense that thirst has “no beginning, no ending, no
before, no during and no after” either.
Delbo first ponders on the unending and obsessive character that being “thirsty”
can impose on the thirsty individual. To convey her resistance to water deprivation,
Delbo upsets our regular time and sensation frames. As she transgresses time references,
she succeeds in revealing unending sensations. Delbo emphasizes the endless and
persistent character of her suffering as she claims, “Il y a la soif du matin et la soif du
soir. Il y a la soif du jour et la soif de la nuit” (Aucun 11415). Then she insists on the
intensity and varied quality of the thirsty feeling. She reflects, “Mais la soif du marais est
plus brûlante que celle du désert. La soif du marais dure des semaines. Les outres ne
viennent jamais. La raison chancelle. La raison est terrassée par la soif.” Making us feel
the acuity and irremediabilty of the physical deprivation she was forced to suffer, Delbo
writes, “La raison résiste à tout, elle cède à la soif. Dans le marais, pas de mirage, pas
d’espoir d’oasis. De la boue, de la boue. De la boue et pas d’eau” (114). Delbo appeals
not only to our senses, but to our emotions as well. She not only brings to light the sheer
obscenity of the violence done to and felt by the body but also activates in us an
emotional response that makes us grasp the senselessness and absurdity of the violence
forced on the inmates. The maddening effect of the violation is all the more pressing, and
her appeal all the more pounding as she writes,
Les joues collent aux dents, la langue est dure, raide, les mâchoires bloquées, et
toujours cette impression d’être morte, d’être morte et de le savoir. Et
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l’épouvante grandit dans les yeux. Je sens grandir l’épouvante dans mes yeux
jusqu’à la démence. Tout sombre, tout échappe. La raison n’exerce plus de
contrôle. La soif. Estce que je respire? J’ai soif. Fautil sortir pour l’appel? Je
me perds dans la foule, je ne sais où je vais. J’ai soif. Faitil plus froid ou moins
froid, je ne le sens pas. J’ai soif, soif à crier. Et le doigt que je passe sur mes
gencives éprouve le sec de ma bouche. Ma volonté s’effondre. Reste une idée
fixe: boire. (116)
Delbo’s prose provides another striking example that focuses on the traumatic
experience, rather than the traumatic event, to make us relate to her suffering more
intuitively. It is an extremely potent instance also. It concerns the “livingthrough
death” experience of the infamous “roll call” that Auschwitz inmates were made to
endure twice daily on the icy plain (Aucun 105). This instance reveals another particular
aspect of trauma. Namely, it enacts, besides its “timelessness,” the loss of clear or stable
connections to the materially grounded environment in which the experience of trauma is
taking place. In the following excerpt, it becomes particularly clear how incoming
stimuli can be dulled in some ways and exacerbated in others. What is most striking,
however, is the flagrant perturbation in the sense of perception that occurs under extreme
circumstances. The partial loss of control on the surrounding environment and on the self
by the perceiving subject seems, as such, to produce the deadening of that subject. The
following excerpt enacts, along with a disruption of the sense of self, a profound
distortion, even dissolution, of boundaries. Since trauma, in the words of Laub, takes
place “outside the parameters of ‘normal’ reality,” its experience as such seems to take
place in a world that is “other” (69). The manifestation of “timelessness” and
“otherness,” enacted by the loss of time and space barriers is very salient in this passage.
As Laub has acutely perceived as a child survivor, “traumatic knowledge dissolves all
barriers.” It “breaks all boundaries of time and place.” It even invalidates the barriers of
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“self and subjectivity” (“Bearing Witness” 58). In this particular traumatic experience of
roll call, the physical disruption of self, place, and time that occurs is profoundly
disturbing. The intense cold interferes with the way people “normally” experience space,
cold, sound, and light. For Delbo, being cold becomes being part of a frozen piece of ice.
Being immobile becomes being enclosed in an immobility and fixity of time. As Lea
Fridman puts it, in this excerpt, Delbo “records the ways the body in extremity begins to
experience itself in its parts.” As a result, “the way that the parts no longer seem to be
part of a whole” enacts profound confusion. Also, the way that “vitality gives way to
numbness,” and the manner in which the “mind itself seems to shut down” add to the
temporal and traumatic confusion facing the survivor (Words and Witness 119). This
fragmentation, experienced in another yet equally traumatic context by Baby Suggs in
Beloved, epitomizes the context of sheer trauma in circumstances of extremity.
The fragmentation of the body and the disruption of time and place boundaries,
are, in this instance, paradoxically accompanied by total integration into the deadly spell
of the camp. If, indeed, for Lyotard, “‘Auschwitz was called the extermination camp’” it
was one also of total integration (The Differend 56). Delbo renders the simultaneous
sense of profound disintegration of the self and integration into Auschwitz in its full
horror. In the following excerpt, she does so in a very poetic, almost peaceful manner.
As such, she gives trauma a palpable character that verges on the “eerie,” on the
hallucinatory. The rupture from all sense of reality, and also the unusual reconfiguration
of the real that she proposes as she makes us connect to a world that has become sheer
perception is astounding:
Quinze mille femmes tapent du pied et cela ne fait aucun bruit. Le silence est
solidifié en froid. La lumière est immobile. Nous sommes dans un milieu où le
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temps est aboli. Nous ne savons pas si nous sommes, seulement la glace, la
lumière, la neige aveuglante, et nous, dans cette glace, dans cette lumière, dans ce
silence.
Nous restons immobiles. La matinée s’écoule—du temps en dehors du temps.
Et la bordure du damier n’est plus aussi nette. Les rangs se désagrègent.
Quelques unes font
des pas, reviennent à leur place. La neige étincelle, immense, sur l’étendue où
rien ne fait ombre . . .
Le temps s’écoule sans que la lumière change. Elle reste dure, glacée, solide, le
ciel aussi bleu, aussi dur. La glace se resserre aux épaules. Elle s’alourdit, nous
écrase. Non que nous ayons plus froid, nous devenons de plus en plus inertes, de
plus en plus insensibles. Prises dans un bloc de cristal audelà duquel, loin dans
la mémoire, nous voyons les vivants. Viva dit: “Je n’aimerai plus les sports
d’hiver.” Bizarre que la neige puisse lui évoquer autre chose qu’un élément
mortel, hostile, hors nature, inconnu jusqu’ici.
A nos pieds, une femme s’assoit dans la neige, maladroitement. On se retient de
dire: “Pas dans la neige, tu vas prendre froid.” C’est encore un réflexe de la
mémoire et des notions anciennes. Elle s’assoit dans la neige et s’y creuse une
place. Un souvenir de lecture enfantine, les animaux qui font leur couche pour
mourir. La femme s’affaire avec des gestes menus et précis, s’allonge. La face
dans la neige, elle geint doucement. Ses mains se desserrent. Elle se tait.
Nous avons regardé sans comprendre.
La lumière est toujours immobile, blessante, froide. C’est la lumière d’un astre
mort. Et l’immensité glacée, à l’infini éblouissante, est d’une planète morte.
Immobiles dans la glace où nous sommes prises, inertes, insensibles, nous avons
perdu tous les sens de la vie. Aucune ne dit: “J’ai faim. J’ai soif. J’ai froid.”
Transportées d’un autre monde, nous sommes d’un coup soumises à la respiration
d’une autre vie, à la mort vivante, dans la glace, dans la lumière, dans le silence.
(535455)
What makes Delbo’s experience so compellingly convincing is that she focuses in
her prose not only on the extraordinary character of extremity. She concentrates also on
actual modes of responding to a stimulus or feeling. Even though her everyday responses
to feelings and sensations took place, for her and her companions, in circumstances of
extremity, they are relevant to us. Not only do her vignettes, deliberately incomplete and
fragmented, leave room for readers to fill in with their own capacity for feeling and
responding to her testimony. The vignettes are powerful also in pointing out that the
world to be perceived, even though it actually tied into experiences of the extreme, can be
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accessed through ordinary, everyday perceptions and emotions if these are pushed to an
extreme also. Delbo’s experiences are certainly part both of the extreme and of a world
that became her everyday one. They unquestionably brought along, in the words of
Elaine Scarry, “the deobjectifying of the objects” and “the unmaking of the made”
through a process that “externalized the way in which a person’s pain causes [her] world
to disintegrate” (The Body in Pain 41). Yet, by recollecting Auschwitz so profoundly,
Delbo enables us to connect also to that very familiar world of hers by calling not only on
our own emotions, but also paradoxically, on a changed, opened up sense of perception
on our part. The audacity of Delbo’s prose thus not only encourages the stretching and
expanding of our capacity to feel. It also has us readers, not immediately and cognitively
“know” the content of her experience, or “feel” it in its most dramatic effect, but also
intimately connect to it.
Delbo’s prose operates by, at first, projecting us into a seemingly reassuring,
everyday reality. Then it has us witness the abrupt transformation of that reality into
something horrifying. This process is extremely destabilizing. The artistic process of
defamiliarization that Delbo produces in her prose is meant to act as a powerful,
traumatic fracture in our imagination. This traumatic fracture is deliberate. It is intended
to be shocking, and to function as the traumatic shock that was experienced by those who
were abruptly thrown into the reality of Auschwitz.
By destabilizing the expected environment of her discourse, Delbo has us directly
experience the impact of the absurd destruction that was dictated by the Nazis. The
episode entitled “Arrivals, Departures” that opens Delbo’s trilogy works on this process
of estrangement. In this section, Delbo makes the estrangement of the arriving Jews from
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themselves and from humanity very clear. She subtly reveals it by bringing into focus the
contrast between a “normal” train station, and the “final,” terminal station that will
remain “nameless for them,” to which they are deported and where they will be gassed to
death (Aucun 12). Delbo writes, “Mais il est une gare où ceux [celles] qui arrivent sont
justement ceux [celles]là qui partent.” She further explicates, “une gare où ceux [celles]
qui arrivent ne sont jamais arrivé[e]s, où ceux [celles]qui sont parti[e]s ne sont jamais
revenu[e]s.” To insist on the immensity of destruction, she concludes, “c’est la plus
grande gare du monde” (9). While we are constrained to face the traumatic destiny and
final destination of those “who never arrived,” because they were sent directly to the gas
chamber, Delbo allows for the hardly “imaginable,” “conceivable,” or “bearable” to be
actually imagined, sensed, or emphatically connected to.
Artistically speaking, she achieves this “tour de force” with an extremely precise
technique. It consists in locating her experience of reality at the confines where she
herself experienced these events at the border between what seems real and what seemed
unreal. Her prose comes to ”reexternalize” the trauma in a space, in a “borderland” of
trauma, where experience and the not fully registered can coincide and become
meaningful (Laub, “Bearing Witness” 69). Also, if for Felman, the traumatic experience
is “essentially, not available to its own speaker,” I propose that Delbo makes it, thanks to
her awareness and narrative, however accessible (Testimony 15). By “reconstructing” her
experience through her testimonial, and by “constructing her narrative,” she also
contributes to “reexternalize” the trauma for others, namely her readers. Her testimonial
work can be given the value of a legacy. For François Bott, and in his words, the power
of her legacy is achieved convincingly through and thanks to the strange character of her
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prose. It is so striking, he contends, that it has a quality of leaving the readers in a “land
strange to ourselves.” Discussing the ultimate impact of Delbo’s work on readers, Bott
contends,
“Une voix qui chuchote, déchirante. Un chuchotement à fleur de vie et
d’horreur. Cette voix une fois entendue vous obsède, ne vous quitte plus.
Je ne connais pas d’oeuvre comparable à celle de Charlotte Delbo, sinon
Guernica, sinon le film Nuit et Brouillard, même pudeur, même déchirure,
même atroce tendresse, chez cette femme, chez Alain Resnais. Cette
douloureuse et bouleversante incantation est de ces livres rares qui laissent
soudain le lecteur en pays étranger à luimême.” (Aucun back cover)
Thomas Trezise has also discussed the notion of strangeness that Delbo
purposefully brings into her oeuvre so as to destabilize the readers’ levels of comfort. He
has addressed the necessity of an active and attentive reading of Delbo’s work. In “The
Question of Community in Charlotte’s Delbo’s Auschwitz and After,” Trezise claims that
the minimalist restraint of Delbo’s descriptions serves a crucial purpose. For him,
Delbo’s style, “makes it clear,” how as a reader, “I must collaborate in and bear
responsibility for the act of witnessing” (“Question of Community” 876). As I have
previously proposed, Aucun does not describe or explain trauma. It manifests it and
performs it by having its impact made readable. This invitation to the readers to bring
their own sense of fear to the text is crucial. It is also vital that readers attempt to register
the shock of the horror experienced by Delbo by stretching the capacity of their
imagination. This technique of readers’ participation is grounded in Delbo’s use of
fragmented prose. As such, we are made to “fill in the blanks” and “sensitively”
apprehend, rather than “understand” her experience. Before we turn to the last stylistic
device used by Delbo to make trauma “visible” and “felt,” but also “haunting,” I propose
to look at the motive that guided Delbo in writing Aucun in testimonial form. It will help
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illuminate to what extent this form of testimonial literature, which Delbo chose in order
to reveal the trauma of her experience, is, in itself, deliberate and meaningful.
In “The Triple Courage of Charlotte Delbo,” Rosette Lamont declares that she has
been entrusted with the message of Charlotte Delbo. Delbo vowed to bring back this
message to the community of the living after putting it “to the test of time” (485). Delbo,
whom Rosette Lamont met as a “living ghost” in Delbo’s own words, saw in Auschwitz
and After the “testimony of a witness,” her own. Reflecting on the motives behind
Auschwitz and After, Delbo confided the following: “Although I did not know it at once, I
came to the realization that I wrote it so that people might envision what ‘l’univers
concentrationnaire’ was like.” Of course, “it wasn’t ‘like’ anything one had ever known.
It was profoundly, utterly ‘unlike.’” Delbo continues: “I knew I had to raise before the
eyes of a future reader the hellish image of a death camp: senseless killing labor, pre
dawn roll calls lasting for hours, deathdirected, minutebyminute, programming.” As
she further states, “We were made to stand for hours on end in the snow, on ice, envying
those of our companions who had died that night in the bunks they shared with us.” She
also claims, “I hope that these texts will make the reoccurrence of this horror impossible.
This is my dearest wish.” Delbo furthers affirms that in writing Auschwitz and After, she
“did not seek recognition, or honors” for her self. Rather, she “wanted to honor the dead”
who had “entrusted” her “with a sacred task.” As such, she wanted “to carry the word”
and make of her work a testament. Reflecting on the manuscript that she “buried” for
almost twenty years after she wrote it, she felt that it was, by not leaving it accessible to
others, like “going into hiding,” that she would respond to the task at hand. She decided
to break her long literary silence and to proceed with it. As Delbo declares, “I wanted
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above all to honor my comrades, those who did not survive.” But she also wanted to
show her reverence to “those who, having returned, were trying to build a life.”
Meanwhile, when she was in Auschwitz, she had already “become their voice,” as her
camp mates suggested she should (Lamont 48588).
Remembering that her camp companions expected her to become a bearer of
memory, she proceeded to be one. This contributed, to a large extent, to Delbo’s ability
to survive. Rosette Lamont has commented on the possibilities of individual survival
grounded in a form of communal remembrance. She has claimed that in order “to emerge
from the stifling silence of trauma,” one “must strive to reshape a community” (Lamont
488). One value of Delbo’s oeuvre, to which I already have drawn attention, is that it
functions as a literary indexer of traumatic knowledge. As such, it is meant to activate,
not only on a personal, but also on communal level, a form of awareness. That awareness
deals with the despairing realization of a human or cultural possibility to give in to
extremely destructive behavior, such as annihilation of fellow human beings. Whether
Delbo’s work can succeed in producing a wakeup call on individual or collective levels
remains open. My point, though, is that her testimony and testament are in need of being
read, or at least, made publicly known. As Lyotard would contend, Delbo’s testimony
does not work solely to “inform.” Rather, it seeks to “initiate” in us something, such as a
certain responsiveness. In this case, the pain of the initiation here would be that there
exists a “human” capacity for destruction (The Postmodern Explained 91). Delbo’s
testimony certainly initiates in us that an incredible damage can be done, not only to
certain individuals, peoples, and selected national groups but also to mankind in its
entirety. It becomes therefore all the more urgent for testimonies like Delbo’s to be
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disclosed and read as traumatic. Perceiving this type of testimonies as plausible, realistic,
and truthful is thus critical. As Felman would conclude, “to testify. . .is more than simply
to report a fact or an event or to relate what has been lived, recorded and remembered.”
Memory has to be conjured here essentially “in order to address another, to impress upon
a listener, to appeal to a community” (Testimony 204).
Felman also claims that a process of mentally revisiting a traumatic place is
necessary in gaining access to the traumatic experience. This revisiting can be initiated
through what she calls “a historical and philosophical crossing and recrossing” of the
borders of trauma. Felman contends that these crossings and recrossings, however,
should not take place solely “inside” or “outside” the site of trauma. Instead, they should
be grounded simultaneously in both the “inside” and the “outside” of the traumatic place,
and in its confines. As such, Felman encourages the artist or witness to “create a
connection.” That connection, she contends, is meant to “set both the inside and the
outside in motion and in dialogues with one another. The acts of “crossing” and “re
crossing” those thresholds, she contends, arise thus from a necessity of “recovering the
truth” (Testimony 231).
In their attempt to be plausible and truthful, rather than “historically true,”
Delbo’s and Morrison’s texts find meaning in their being grounded in testimonial
literature. In the line with thinking proposed by Michael Rothberg in his Traumatic
Realism, both texts can be considered “traumatic realist texts.” As such, they both
“point” to the real rather than claim that they “are” the real. I propose that this is what
makes both Delbo’s and Morrison’s texts plausible. It is so because the veracity of their
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experience, rather than that of the event, is what is actually revealed in their testimonial
works.
Rothberg discusses the value of testimonial, and connects it to the truthfulness at
the core of “traumatic realist texts” (129). These texts, he contends, are effective because
of the plausibility or veracity of the testimony that they offer. As such, he claims that a
testimonial form of literature allows for making its object realistic, rather than real. At
this point, we may recall Delbo’s remark regarding the veracity of her testimonial work.
As an appendix to None of Us, Delbo indeed declares the following: “Today, I am not
sure that what I wrote is true.” Yet, she further asserts, “I am certain it is truthful” (1).
Rothberg insists on illuminating the truthful character of a work, rather than
claiming it has validity as truth. He draws attention to the “realistic” quality of a
“traumatic realist text,” rather than its claim to “the real” (Traumatic Realism 129). He
contends also that “reading the detail as pointing to the real instead of claiming to be the
real (as in Barthes’s reading) is meaningful. “The detail in traumatic realist texts”
becomes then crucial. He also states that, “pointing to the real instead of claiming to be
the real” necessarily involves signs. These signs, he proposes, “may be akin to the type
of sign that Charles Sanders Peirce calls an ‘index’” (104). Rothberg claims that, in its
classical form, “an index is a sign that relates to a referent” as “an effect relates to a
cause.” Rothberg gives, in this case, the classic example of “the weathervane that points
in the direction that the wind is blowing.” Rothberg further states that “the index in
traumatic circumstances,” however, “functions differently than the traditional version.”
As such, for Rothberg, the point of the index is not “in indicating an object or
phenomenon that caused [the index]” in the first place. It is not meant to make “the
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referent present.” Rather, Rothberg contends, “the traumatic index points to a necessary
absence.” It is that “absence” in Delbo’s text that I now propose to explore (104). It
relates directly to an examination of a “voice” that breaks down and is simultaneously
relayed by a traumatic “silence.” This is our next point.
Delbo’s text makes us read an “absence.” It makes us interpret silence, not as
void, but as a meaningful break in speech. It results from witnessing an event that is so
violent and so overwhelming, that it enacts a traumatic collapse. Its impact is revealed by
a moment of silence that, so to speak, seems to be “suspended in time.” I propose to call
this silence a “figural moment,” which is comparable to Laurent Jenny’s concept of the
“figural event” (“L’événement figural” 13). I will develop this point later. My more
immediate concern for now is to establish the meaningfulness of silence in Holocaust
testimonies. It is also to illuminate how a figural moment can be revealed by the
presence of silence in a text.
For Sara Horowitz, “silence in a Holocaust text” is “a sign of trauma” (Voicing
the Void 15253). The following excerpt from Delbo functions as a trace of profound
trauma that actually attempts to voice the trauma, but not with words. Rather, it seeks to
point at trauma by voicing it with a temporary breach in language that results in
mutedness that becomes significant. Delbo’s silence performs this traumatic “trace” of
“something,” that, in the words of JeanFrançois Lyotard, “will make itself understood,
‘later’” (Heidegger and “the jews” 13). Also, for Susan Suleiman, discussing Georges
Perec’s W or the Memory of Childhood, this kind of trace can function as “the sign of
something” that “once was,” but that “has disappeared” (“The 1.5 Generation” 383). For
her, that trace “can be read as an assertion of the writer’s witnessing and life.” Yet, that
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trace or silence is “also a reminder of death.” As an indexer of atrocity, this kind of
silence is also the assertion of the traumatic “irreparable” (338). As “the sign” that says it
“cannot be phrased in the accepted idiom,” as Lyotard would contend, silence suggests
thus in this context an “unsayable” (The Differend 5657, Heidegger and “the jews” 47).
That “unsayable” becomes meaningful as silence, since silence “says that it cannot say it”
(Heidegger and “the jews” 47). This silence also testifies to an absence, and to a
disappearance. But in no way, for Lyotard, do absence and silence “act, act out, enact,”
or “represent” a void (13).
In order to make silence work as eloquence, Delbo constructs her episode on the
visual force and impact of the image. She crafts the following episode, of an attack of a
woman by a Nazi dog, in a visual, rather than cognitive register. This makes the scene
more directly, materially perceptible. This mode of perception is convincing, despite the
restraint, even absence, of words at the time of the violent occurrence. The silences by
the attacking authority, the woman attacked, and the witness Delbo are potent carriers of
meaning. The way that Delbo places in her narrative moments of silence parallels the
absence of words and reactions at the time of the episode. Silence in Delbo’s text enacts
the traumatic character of the experience in a mutually interacting manner.
Delbo produces the desired effect of speechlessness by giving us to witness,
rather than understand, the death of the woman about to be killed in the episode. As
Lawrence Langer has pointed out in his introduction to Delbo’s Auschwitz and After,
Delbo’s art is intended to “give” us “to see.” Delbo thus makes us witnesses of a more
immediate, direct, “visual” type. Claiming that Delbo’s favorite expression was “Il faut
donner à voir,” that is, “they must be made to see,” Langer contends that, with Auschwitz
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and After, Delbo attempts to make us not only feel, but also visually perceive her
experience. It is the “ruling principle of her art” (x). The following excerpt draws on the
singularity and difficulty of having to bear witness to and express the trauma of
transgressive acts of violence. It also frames the deliberate and gratuitous viciousness of
these violent acts as they were then randomly determined and committed in the camp.
The excerpt illustrates Delbo’s intention to “make us see,” and to “make us hear
the silence” that surrounds death. By arranging the vignette as a silent sequence of
photographic memories that pass in rapid succession, slow motion, or freeze in front of
our eyes, Delbo captures our attention. She actually captures our gaze in such a way that
we are “made to” imagine, feel, and see. The staying power of the image, as previously
mentioned, is thus the technique of the following episode. As Derrida notes in another
context, such a technique brings “the body” back in “visible scenes.” It does so by
enabling the image to “transcend or replace a body that cannot be located” in a more
permanent or physical manner (The Work of Mourning 159). The vignette is forceful. It
brings back the body in its temporary, visible, living presence. It spells, not the total
annihilation that was intended by the Nazis, but the call or duty to remember it. As we
are unable to avert our gaze, we are also unable to avert the necessity of remembrance.
Delbo writes,
La femme s’avance. On croirait qu’elle obéit. Face au SS, elle s’arrête. Son dos
est secoué de frissons, son dos arrondi avec les omoplates qui saillent sous le
manteau jaune. Le SS tient son chien en laisse. Lui atil donné un ordre, fait un
signe? Le chien bondit sur la femme—sans rugir, sans souffler, sans aboyer. C’est
silencieux comme dans un rêve. Le chien bondit sur la femme, lui plante ses
crocs dans la gorge. Et nous ne bougeons pas, engluées dans une espèce de
visqueux qui nous empêche d’ébaucher même un geste—comme dans un rêve.
La femme crie. Un cri arraché. Un seul cri qui déchire l’immobilité de la plaine.
Nous ne savons pas si le cri vient d’elle ou de nous, de sa gorge crevée ou de la
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nôtre. Je sens les crocs du chien à ma gorge. Je crie. Je hurle. Aucun son ne sort
de moi. Le silence du rêve.
La plaine. La neige. La plaine.
La femme s’affaisse. Un soubressaut et c’est fini. Quelque chose qui casse net.
La tête dans la boue de neige n’est plus qu’un moignon.
Les yeux font des plaies sales. (Aucun 4849)
Delbo’s sentences are brief, succinct, precise and to the point. In the terms of
Chambers, they are “paratactically disconnected.” Delbo’s concise writing is voided of
unnecessary artifice. It serves to sketch, not describe in abundant terms, the woman’s
gestures and her body surface. “Severely shorn of connectives” as they are, Delbo’s
sentences are meant to be abrupt and striking (Untimely Interventions 213). They are
intended to solicit our interpretative work. They are also meant to prompt in us and from
us an emotional response. Delbo’s point is to make resonant what Lawrence Langer
terms the horror of “man’s creatureliness.” This “creatureliness,” is attained, for Langer,
by emptying a human body from its human character. It tends to prevail in forms of
literature dealing with an imminence of physical destruction and atrocity (The Holocaust
and the Literary Imagination 289). This is so, I contend, so that the immediacy of
destruction and annihilation is all the more evident, even exacerbated. It is also meant for
us to face a grave responsibility. Namely that of having to confront our own ethical sense
of justice in the face of murderous acts. Delbo’s technique to solicit our ethical response
is as follows.
The figure of the woman, “avec les omoplates qui saillent sous le manteau jaune”
is first projected into a bundle of powerlessness and fragility. It is also surrounded by a
deceiving absence of violence whose immediacy, however, is powerfully alluded to, and
about to surge. The scene is made up of abrupt, fast and silent images. Once connected
by our interpretative work, we get to experience the episode as in a long and silent dream.
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This facilitates our perceiving the whole event as traumatic. It reads as an almost eerie
and dreamlike occurrence, disconnected and severed from reality. Delbo solicits our
attention, however, towards the imminence of the woman’s death. She does so through
her anticipatory use of a prolepsis in the sentence: “Lui atil donné un ordre, fait un
signe? Le chien bondit sur la femme” (Aucun 48). The now foreseeable event of the
woman’s looming and absurd death leaves no possible doubt as to the outcome of the
woman’s destiny. Delbo’s incisiveness of style, similar to the dog’s jaw planted in the
woman’s, in Delbo’s, and, after all and finally, in our own throat opens a wound in our
sensitivity. It reaches at the physical core of our anguish. “Given to see,” we are
overwhelmed by a sense of uselessness of suffering, immediacy of pain, randomness of
death, and precariousness of life (Auschwitz and After x). The secret of how Delbo
achieves this is locked in her ethical vision and literary skills. Eminent at evoking
atrocity by artistically rendering it through a language bare to the core, her poetry is
strangled at the same time as it erupts. An indicator of trauma and pointer to our own
responsibility as witnesses, her language meets with the “here,” the “now,” and “us,” at
the point of its rupture. Delbo produces, what Patricia Gartland calls, a “more vivid and
full[er] meaning than simple description of the reality itself” (“Three Holocaust Writers”
47). It is the response we can bring to her reality, traumatic to the core that brings full
significance to Delbo’s art.
Made to feel the trauma, we indeed have become suspended in the silence and
immobility of what Chambers calls “the unmeasured time” of Auschwitz. This
“unmeasured time” of Auschwitz is actually the traumatic moment, the suspended time of
death and genocide, the moment of the irreparable, that Delbo renders so delicately
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(Untimely Interventions 212). She is a master at revealing a time “that is without
measure,” grounded in pain and suffering. In order to “connect” to the trauma and feel
its presence, as exposed by Delbo, all we have to do is connect to Delbo’s narrative and
narrative time. The before mentioned passage reads as follows: “Et nous ne bougeons
pas, engluées dans une espèce de visqueux qui nous empêche d’ébaucher même un
geste—comme dans un rêve (Aucun 48). Before we can return, however, and after
Delbo’s momentary silence, into the measured time of her narrative, a pause is
announced. She has signified a powerful fracture in our habitual frames of references.
As she creates a moment such as this, we, readers, become suspended, unable to move, in
a state of profound immobility and stupefaction. Delbo is plunging us in what I have
previously named a “figural” moment. This “figural” moment, lived throughout an
occurrence of traumatic character is forceful to us, as it ushers us into an unknown world.
While the wound of the figural moment need not only be opened, but reopened,
and reactivated ceaselessly, a newly shared sensibility to it can recur as “an insistence”
that delays forgetting (“L’Événement Figural” 13). Also now that, in Lyotard’s words,
the “labor of writing” of the author, “allied to” a “work of love,” has inscribed the traces
of the initiatory event in language,” we should, as readers, continue to feel compelled by
the fracture in our sensibility that has been initiated (The Postmodern Explained 97). As
Laurent Jenny contends, “[le figural] et [l’événement du figural] détient le secret de la
répétition d’un ébranlement en nous.” Jenny further proposes that this figural moment
actually operates on us without our active decision. As he closes his argument, he
proposes that “le figural,” which secretly unhinges our perception of the real, and to
which our sensitivity is exposed, actually does so, while we are not fully aware of it. He
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writes that “l’événement du figural détient le secret de la répétition d’un ébranlement en
nous, à laquelle notre chair même est soumise, mais sur laquelle nous sommes aveugles”
(“L’événement Figural” 13). Delbo’s experience will not let itself be totally known or
understood in terms of its historical or personal significance. The figural character of her
prose, however, should keep us attending to the factuality and horror of her experience.
It should also keep us attentive to what Derrida calls “the spirit,” the “ghost” of injustice
that “comes” by “coming back [revenant]” after “the end of history.” As the testimonial
of one of the “witnesses of history,” who “fear and hope for a return,” Aucun enacts thus
the presence of the “dead who come back” (Specters of Marx 10). By being grounded in
the “ghost of history,” whose expected return “repeats itself again and again,” Delbo’s
sharing of her traumatic experience with us through her testimonial should thus remain
“insistent” (“L’Événement Figural” 13). This way, her experience should not be, nor
come to be, forgotten. Just as nobody, in her claim, “should have returned from
Auschwitz,” so “should” nobody be made to forget or “have forgotten” about it either
(Aucun 183).
Toni Morrison employs a similar technique of “figural moments” in her art. She
also plants numerous and meaningful indexes of trauma in her text. This accounts for the
ethical and aesthetic strategies that she shares with Delbo. As I have previously
discussed concerning Aucun, the artistic device of the figural is meant to activate pain.
Yet, in Morrison’s prose, it is the pain not of senseless extermination but of insensible
bondage that is the point. Also, as in Delbo’s work, the pain surfaces and permeates her
art so as to become an “insistence” as well (“L’Événement Figural” 13).
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Toni Morrison uses the ghost of Beloved in Beloved to signify the horrors of a
denied or repressed past that is, however, still virtually present to many African
Americans. Morrison, however, does not attempt to fill the abyss produced by the
feelings of pain that a long history of slavery has produced with univocal or historical
formal content. Nor does she fill in the hole made by intense grief around experiences of
bondage with determined concepts. Rather, I propose that, similarly to Delbo, Morrison
resorts to figural writing and to a form of “hauntology” to reveal, in this case, the effects
of the horrors of slavery. As such, and in the words of Derrida, she thus sets out to
“ontologize remains” and make them “present.” She achieves this end “by identifying the
bodily remains” of slavery and “by localizing the dead.” At this point, we may also recall
that, for Derrida, “all ontologization, all semanticization—philosophical hermeneutical,
or psychoanalytical—finds itself caught up in [a] work of mourning.” This work of
mourning, since it “does not yet think” of itself “as such,” necessarily anticipates,
however, the posing of “the question of the specter” (Specters of Marx 9).
The specter of Beloved is a literary means, for Morrison, to initiate a work of
mourning while the ghost activates the scraps, traces, fragments, and residues of various
traumatic experiences. Along with the specter, Morrison also uses the figural to
“capture” and “reveal,” rather than “describe,” the horrors of the traumas produced in
bondage (Lyotard, The Postmodern Explained 90). While her writing inscribes itself in a
“borderland” of trauma, in which “the unspeakable” and the “unpresentable” ask to be
actively read, her art also functions as a reminder, in the words of psychiatrist Judith
Herman, that “certain violations of the social compact are too terrible to utter aloud
(Morrison, “Unspeakable Things Unspoken” 201). This is, in Herman’s claim, precisely
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“the meaning of the word unspeakable.” While for Herman, the “ordinary response to
atrocities is to banish them from consciousness,” it is not this commonplace response that
Beloved exposes (Herman, Trauma and Recovery 1). Recalling Lyotard’s claim about
the role of postmodern art and artists is, at this point, instructive. For Lyotard, the artist,
who, indeed, clearly “invents allusions to what is conceivable but not presentable,” has
“to constantly inquire into new presentations.” This search for new forms of
presentations, for Lyotard, is not so that the artist can “take pleasure in them.” Rather, it
is intended “to better produce the feeling that there is something unpresentable” and that
that unpresentable must be made meaningful (The Postmodern Explained 15). Morrison
makes the unpresentable signify in Beloved in the following terms.
For one, Morrison makes us “perceive” rather than “understand” experiences of
slavery. She activates for her readers some of the signs and traces that living in bondage
has enacted and left by making these signs visual and perceptible through the senses. In
the following instance, Morrison makes physically visible the marks that slavery has
imprinted on the enslaved body of Sethe. The signs of the violence that Morrison gives
us to read and decipher are, however, very discreet and subtle, even poetic. Intended to
encourage, not discourage, the reading of troublesome, even outrageous, events, her
technique is meant to be inviting. Morrison symbolizes, or metaphorically reveals, the
“real,” in order to point at its senselessness and brutality. But actually, as she comments
herself, she does so “in a manner in which it can be digested” (“In the Realm of
Responsibility” 248). In the following instance, she constructs symbolic images around
the cruelty of beatings that had to be endured in captivity. The network of scars that
disfigure Sethe’s back as the result of flogging is a significant example of this technique
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while it serves as a key symbol in the novel. The nonprovocative reading of Sethe’s
pain that Paul D produces when he first sees the backside of Sethe’s body has us perceive
her back as a “wroughtiron maze” that Paul D explores “like a gold miner pawing
through pay dirt.” But seen in its crude reality, Paul D contends, Sethe’s back is a
“revolting clump of scars” that indexes the cruelty of the white man (Beloved 21).
Morrison, however, symbolically and realistically identifies Sethe’s back with either
version. She rewrites some of the traumatic beatings experienced by Sethe in a poetic
manner. Yet, she also points at the floggings endured during slavery from a less aesthetic
and more provoking perspective. Through dual images like this one, Morrison invites us
readers to become more personally involved in Sethe’s ghastly experiences. We can
follow in Paul D’s footsteps, and become more attuned to Sethe’s “sorrow” (17). By
being made to “feel” the maze on her back, as Paul D does through his gesture, rather
than the clump of scars, we are made to perceive the profoundness of Sethe’s pain in an
inviting way. But we are also given less opportunity to forget that it is a series of
revolting beatings that led to it.
In The Feminine Sublime, Barbara Freeman makes a point similar to the one just
made. Indeed, Freeman sees in the marks on Sethe’s back an act of “aestheticizing
wounds” that “have nothing whatever to do with beauty.” Freeman proposes that this act
of “aestheticizing” by Morrison is actually in keeping with an act of “survival.” Freeman
grounds her argument in the following terms. Amy, the white girl who helps the
escaping Sethe, “can find in Sethe’s scars and wounds something other than the cruelty
of the white man: she finds the outline of a tree in bloom.” As Freeman proposes, “the
master’s meaning,” then, “need not be dominant.” In Freeman’s contention, the function
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of “the aesthetic of reading” in Beloved is thus actually meant to “deanesthetize” these
terrible inscriptions. Also, the “aesthetic of reading” in Beloved is meant to “bring dead
feelings back to life.” Morrison’s poetics, far from eradicating trauma, thus nonetheless
“bears witness to its horrifying and ineluctable facticity” (The Feminine Sublime 131).
The figural and artistic fabric of Beloved is what enables Morrison to succeed in
“presenting” the “unpresentable” (The Postmodern Explained 15). Another potent motif
that achieves this goal relates to the testimonial character of Beloved. While Morrison’s
prose successfully reveals trauma, it does so thanks to Beloved’s narrative technique. This
technique is efficient because Beloved activates and enacts the individual stories of
traumatized former slaves. These stories, however, do not limit themselves to those of
Sethe’s, Paul D’s or Baby Suggs’. Indeed, Morrison makes a point of not only
suggesting trauma among individuals who have been directly exposed to the shock and
pain of slavery at the time set in the novel: Cincinnati, 1873. Morrison also suggests that
Sethe, Paul D, and Baby Suggs are capable of suffering from the remote workings of
slavery’s past as well. In that regard, she has these characters become mediums in
enacting some sequels of the trauma that affected not only themselves, but their ancestors
as well. By exposing slavery as an “excessive” event that defies time and space, in the
words of Lyotard, Morrison thus succeeds in revealing its longlasting impact (Heidegger
and “the jews” 16). The “timelessness” of the traumatic event, which was so crucial to
our reading of Delbo, is thus very present in Morrison’s Beloved also. Morrison seems
indeed very intent in revealing slavery, not only in its “qualitative” terms, through the
enormous pain it inflicted, but also in a “quantitative” manner. This entails revealing
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slavery beyond the contingency of its “present” witnesses and survivors. It is the point I
propose to develop now.
Morrison activates the trauma of slavery not exclusively through those who
witnessed it in the immediacy of the narrative time. Morrison is equally concerned with
revealing how slavery impacted preceding generations as well. The “Sixty Million and
more,” to whom the novel is dedicated, are instances of this particular group of slaves for
whom Morrison seeks acknowledgement (Beloved 1). Likewise, those who died during
the Middle Passage, even though they went unrecognized, were, nonetheless, part of
slavery’s traumatic experience. Among those who died during transport or in captivity
before they even reached the New World, some are intentionally made to surface in
Beloved. Morrison deliberately has them “come back” as “revenants,” or ghosts
(Specters of Marx 10). In this manner, their trauma is also made to be provoking as well.
One mode in which Morrison points at the traumatic impact of these “revenants”
is by focusing on the distressing intermingling with the living of the dead or dying.
Another is by disrupting the physical boundaries that ordinarily separate the sick from the
healthy. In the scene of the crossing of the slave ship during the Middle Passage,
Morrison paints for her readers a chaotic scene that brings together corpses, survivors,
sufferers, and enslaved. This way, she makes their coexistence, not only visible, but
insistent and ongoing as well. She grounds the scene on the ship in sheer confusion and
profound dislocation. In order to render the suffering of the slaves in a more personal
manner, and to make it pervasive, she brings in ghosts from different generations. She
also has them come from different geographical places. She brings in the specters of
Sethe’s daughter, Beloved, and of Sethe’s mother, Ma’am, in one single scene. As
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Morrison focuses on conjuring their outbound quality, she displaces them from their
original era and location. As ghosts, they cross and recross our expected or habitual
barriers of time, space, and physical being. In the contention of Deborah Horvitz, for
instance, the ghost of Sethe’s mother indeed comes from the “geographic ‘other side’ of
the world,” namely Africa. Sethe’s daughter, on the other hand, comes from the
“physical ‘other side’ of life,” that is death. In the words of Horvitz, as ghosts and
women from “the other side,” both Sethe’s mother and Sethe’s daughter are thus
“invulnerable to barriers of time, space, and place” (“Nameless Ghosts” 157).
In the scene on the ship, both women are physically abused, raped, dehumanized,
and almost discarded as dead (Beloved 210). Both women act, feel, speak, and think
through the spirit of Beloved. Both women freely associate their thoughts in the face of
their horrifying experience. The horror of it surges in the language that they speak
through Beloved. In the interview she gave to Marsha Darling, Morrison actually refers
to the language of Beloved as a “traumatized language.” As such, Beloved enacts the
trauma, in Morrison’s words, not only “of her own experience,” but of others’ as well
(“In the Realm of Responsibility” 247). Beloved’s language is all the more fragmented,
disarticulated, and full of confusion. The lack of punctuation and the directness of
associations that Morrison activates in the quotation below figure the break in physical,
spatial, and temporal boundaries of the scene and forcefully point at the trauma of the
whole experience:
All of it is now it is always now there will never be a time when I am not
crouching . . . I am always crouching the man on my face is dead his face is
not mine his mouth smells sweet but his eyes are locked . . .
the men without skin bring us their morning water to drink we have none . . . I
am not big small rats do not wait for us to sleep someone is trashing but there is
no room to do it if we had more to drink we could make tears we cannot make
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sweat or morning water so the men without skin bring us theirs one time they
bring us sweet rocks to suck we are all trying to leave our bodies behind the
man on my face has done it it is hard to make yourself die forever you sleep
short and then return in the beginning we could vomit now we do not . . .
someone is trembling I can feel it over here
We are not crouching now we are standing but my legs are like my dead
man’s eyes I cannot fall because there is no room to I am not dead the bread is
seacolored I am too hungry to eat it the sun closes my eyes those able to die
are in a pile . . . the little hill of dead people a hot thing (Beloved 21011)
With this scene, Morrison awakens in us awareness of unbearable cruelty and suffering
that defy ordinary expectations. Yet, she makes also present in our mind the grief felt not
only by Sethe’s mother and daughter Beloved. She also hints at the sorrow and anguish
of all those to whom she refers as the “unburied, or at least unceremoniously buried” (“A
Conversation” 209). The problematic at the heart of the novel lies thus in knowing how
to read the traces of a people whose death left no trace. Yet, by interpreting Morrison’s
indexes of trauma, which remind us of those who are “disremembered and unaccounted
for,” we can approach what Morrison names our “responsibility” (Beloved 274, “A
Conversation” 209). This means that we need to interpret Beloved beyond its aesthetic
character. Beloved as such invites us to remember, through and thanks to the spectral
character of their presence, the discarded, the forgotten, the nameless. As such, with
Beloved, Morrison testifies against forgetfulness. In “In the Realm of Responsibility,”
Morrison uses the phrase “nobody knows,” to refer to the silence that has been made or
kept around the Middle Passage. As she attempts to bring this reality to our attention, she
also asks for remembrance of those who died in it. Morrison contends that, “nobody
knows their name, and nobody thinks about them” (247). Pulling them out of the
anonymous character of their death is thus the crucial act to which Beloved attends.
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As Morrison explains the act of testimonial that Beloved performs, she grounds it
both in the ethical and aesthetic considerations that prompted her literary decisions. She
claims that “the gap between Africa and AfroAmerica . . . does not exist.” Likewise,
“the gap between the living and the dead,” and “the gap between the past and the present”
do not either. She further claims that it is such because “it’s bridged for us by our
assuming responsibility for people no one’s ever assumed responsibility for.” As she
refers to those who are in danger of remaining anonymous in death, she contends that
“they are those that died en route.” As such, Morrison claims, “they never survived in
the lore” (247). As she puts it, “there are no songs or dances or tales of these people.”
Also, as Morrison concludes, “The people who arrived—there is lore about them. But
nothing survives about . . . that” either (“In the Realm of Responsibility” 128). Yet,
through the presence of the ghosts in Beloved, Morrison makes it a duty to bring them
back and make them come through. Thus lies what Chambers labels the double “burden”
that attaches to Beloved (Untimely Interventions xx). Morrison makes it her
responsibility to pick that burden up through a forceful testimonial act of literature. She
does so, not only with honesty, but with grace as well. As she contends, there exists a
“necessity for remembering the horror.” Yet, she further claims, “there is a necessity for
remembering it . . . in a manner in which the memory is not destructive.” As she
concludes her remark about her “responsibility” in writing Beloved, she claims that, “as
such, the act of writing the book, in a way, is a way of confronting [the horror] and
making it possible to remember” (“In the Realm of Responsibility” 24748).
The horror of slavery is not only manifested through the traumatic experiences of
Beloved, Ma’am, and those who died en route or in captivity. It is also activated through
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Sethe. Because the plurality of these stories by Sethe, but also by Paul D and Baby
Suggs, ensures that they are personal as well as personally activated, these stories are
likewise resonant. As such, we are made to access and perceive the full significance of
the trauma of slavery not only on a collective, plural basis, but also on a more individual
and personal level.
Sethe enacts the lived story of Margaret Garner, an Ohio fugitive slave who
murdered her child rather than see it returned to bondage. As it is, Beloved makes of
Sethe one of slavery’s most direct witnesses. She is one of the characters who appears
most burdened and affected by trauma. Not only because her past seems permanently
inscribed in the present state of her life. She is troubled also because the trauma of the
past which haunts her appears suddenly, and in unexpected thoughts and occurrences. As
Judith Herman contends, “traumatic experiences become encoded in an abnormal type of
memory that spontaneously erupts into consciousness in the form of flashbacks and
nightmares.” But “because even apparently insignificant reminders can provoke these
memories,” what would otherwise “seem a safe environment” can “end up feeling
dangerous to survivors” (Trauma 37). This may explain why Morrison combines in
Beloved an at times seemingly ordinary reality with numerous instances and signs of
trauma’s presence. The acts of the noncorporeal ghost of Beloved as a baby “throwing a
powerful spell” are flagrant indexers of that type of recurring trauma (Beloved 4). The
“two tiny hand prints” that appear in cakes, or the “mirror” that “shatters by ‘merely
looking’ in it are just two other among the many instances of how reality gets to be
perturbed and deranged in the world of Beloved (3). Even though it is not a physical
being, the baby ghost has spells so powerful that it eventually comes to send away
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Sethe’s sons, Buglar and Howard. Its unseenyet destructivepresence is frightful to
even the most resilient person. As it comes to be seen in the “pool of red and undulating”
and “pulsing” red “light” that spreads at the entrance of Sethe’s and Denver’s house, it is
terrifying. It shakes Paul D so much on his arrival, that it makes him “tremble” as a man
who “had not trembled since 1856,” when he was “locked up and chained down”(8).
The ghost of the baby enables the trauma of the past to be made forcefully
perceptible. As it acts as a powerful, disruptive force in the living present of Beloved’s
protagonists, the baby ghost actually comes to signify what Lyotard calls the “excess”
that is produced by “the double blow” of the traumatic experience. This “excess,” by
defying “chronological” time and “localized” place, is not only pervasive, but
“uncontainable” as well (Heidegger and “the jews” 16). In Beloved, the ghost of the
baby comes to signify that this “excessive” presence can, in this instance, neither be
contained nor discarded (16). It keeps intruding into the lives of the occupants of the
house. Not only does it upset their lives, but it also disturbs their mental processes in
trying to survive the shocks of their pasts. Also, as a narrative device, the ghost of the
baby explodes the barriers that may conventionally enclose a narrative’s times and
places.
The ghost of the baby plunges protagonists and readers alike into an a
chronological time that Beloved makes insistent and obsessive. Traumatic thoughts come
to resurface and impinge on the sufferer of trauma time and again. Whatever has been
individually experienced by Sethe, Paul D, and Baby Suggs is, in fact, so shattering, that,
at first, it makes them mute with loss and pain. It encloses them in a profound silence
about the past. Also, it prevents in them any thought of the present. For Baby Suggs, for
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instance, “her past had been like her present—intolerable” (Beloved 2). She remains
“suspended between the nastiness of life and the meanness of the dead.” Unable to forget
the pain of her past, Baby Suggs lets herself die of sorrow. As Morrison writes: “Since
she knew death was anything but forgetfulness,” [Baby Suggs] used “the little energy”
left in her “for pondering color” (3). For Paul D, the impossibility of facing the present is
symbolized by his putting into a “tobacco tin buried in his chest,” that nothing “could pry
open,” a major portion of his head and heart (72, 113). As such, “working dough.
Working, working dough,” in Paul D’s contention, comes to figure as “nothing better”
than “to start the day’s serious work of beating back the past” (73).
Paul D’s refusal to break the silence around his traumatic experience is related to
what Shoshana Felman describes as the “impossibility” of “testifying from inside
Otherness.” Paul D’s silence is more precisely grounded in the impossible character of
“testifying from the absolute constraint of a fatal secret.” In fact, Paul D’s enclosing his
heart in a buried part of his memory has us view his experience as a “fatal secret” felt to
be so “binding, so compelling and so terrible that it often is kept secret even from
oneself” (Testimony 228). In that case, Felman contends, “the inside is unintelligible, it
is not present to itself.” As such, she claims, “the inside has no voice” (231). With his
heart and mind enclosed in the “tobacco tin, its lid rusted shut,” Paul D remains in a
traumatic state of secrecy (Beloved 72, 113). It is only later, prompted by Beloved, that
he will be able to start listening to his own and Sethe’s traumatic stories. Only then, will
he be able to start to voice his own trauma.
Sethe’s past imprisons her life to such an extent that, to her, an ordinary life is not
even conceivable at all. In fact, her present existence, in her contention, is just “a matter
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of keeping the past at bay.” In her motherly concern for Denver, and in regards to the
trauma of her past experiences, all that “matters” to Sethe is actually “keeping [Denver]
from the past that was still waiting for her” (42).
The past to be kept at bay for Baby Suggs, Paul D, and Sethe are unwanted
memories of “unspeakable” events (“Unspeakable Things Unspoken” 201). These
memories of “unspeakable” events continually surge into Sethe’s consciousness, so as to
impede on her everyday living. These reminiscences constantly disrupt, through their
sudden and unexpected irruption, Sethe’s capacity for living the present moment. By
being spontaneous and uncontrollable, Sethe’s memories are so imprisoning that Sethe
can neither forget nor escape their effects (Beloved 36). As such Sethe’s “past error,” her
act of infanticide, takes “possession of the present” and refuses to let go (256). This
memory is so impacting into Sethe’s life that, “in eighteen years . . . before and since, all
[Sethe’s] effort was directed not on avoiding pain but on getting through it as quickly as
possible” (38).
Through Sethe’s reminiscing her past, Morrison brings back the horror of the
infanticide. Interestingly enough, though, Morrison succeeds in revealing the tragic
character of the murderous act without insisting on its occurrence. Rather, she has Sethe
experience and go through its effects. Morrison achieves this literarily by leaving blank
spaces that she creates in her text around Sethe’s actions. Here, the infanticide is alluded
to by the silence that Morrison intentionally places around it. Leaving a gap after the
time prepositions “before and since” of the previously quoted sentence, Morrison inserts
here a pause, a “figural moment.” By not naming the referent—infanticide Morrison
succeeds in “speaking” the “unspeakable.” She does so by making the silence, the pause,
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the “figural moment” inscribed around the crime bear the meaning of the act. And yet,
she does not need to name the action for us to sense the full impact that this deliberate act
of murder has had on Sethe and her family.
Our concern with the “unspeakable” is not unrelated or far removed from what
Gloria Anzaldúa proposes with her Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza.
Anzaldúa, however, deals with the notion of “unspeakability” or “unpresentability,” not
in an attempt to reveal the shock of an event as massive as slavery, but rather to reveal
the “unpresentability” of a culturally complex identity (Morrison, “Unspeakable Things
Unspoken” 201, Lyotard, The Postmodern Explained 15). Anzaldúa’s work is pertinent
at this point because it enables the location of “unpresentability” in a site of “border
crossing” (Borderlands/La Frontera 100). In our case, it is the crossing between voice
and silence that the “borderland” enables to explore (101). In that space, as Anzaldúa
stresses, the self seeks to ground its identity. Yet, that identity is unable to be presented,
Kant would contend, in “unity” or “totality” (Critique of Judgment 55). Likewise, the
“borderland” revealed by Anzaldúa is a place in which meanings, events, and cultures
collide and transform one another. As these events and identities continually come into
contact and permeate each other, the meanings that attach to them constantly change.
Feelings of “ambiguity” and “ambivalence,” legitimated in Anzaldúa’s “borderland,”
come thus to attach to these culturally evolving identities (101). Grounded in unresolved
conflicts, these newly formed identities resist or even preclude clear definition or
“presentability” (The Postmodern Explained 15). This is so, partially, because some
issues, and legitimately so, resist the possibility of attaining harmonious, total, or absolute
(however illusionary) unity or consensus. As such, the “borderland” becomes potent in
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the possibilities it offers to signify these unresolved conflicts as legitimately “ambiguous”
and not totally “presentable” (Borderlands/La Frontera 100, The Postmodern Explained
15).
The “borderland” as a site for ambivalence is meaningful also in stressing the
importance for readers to experience, by “feeling,” rather than “identifying,” the
“unpresentable” or “unspeakable” character of trauma. It is how “the borderland” can be
explored here in connection with Morrison’s work. One of Morrison’s narrative
techniques for enacting trauma in Beloved relates to the ambiguity of “thinking” in
rational terms an event as massive as slavery. In this case, the “borderland” enables us to
inquire into what Morrison regards as a necessity to reveal, rather than visually present,
slavery. In Women Writers at Work, Morrison discusses her choice of deliberately setting
out to reveal what it must have “felt like,” rather than what it must have seemed like, to
live in a time dictated by slavery (357).
Morrison has expressed in critical terms the motive that is behind her “making
feel,” rather than “visually present” the horrors of bondage. In the interview she had with
Claudia Brodsky Lacour, Morrison reviews some of the aesthetic devices that she uses in
Beloved. She discusses these devices in terms of how to make slavery meaningful to her
readers. She specifically discusses her decision to approach slavery, not as a historical
period to be described, but as an experience to “be felt” (Women Writers at Work 357).
Morrison makes her point with the specific instance of the “bit,” that Sethe’s mother was
made to wear so many times. In Beloved, the cruelty and poignancy of the experience of
the shutting of the slave’s mouth and the muting of her speech is revealed in very
sensitive terms. We come to learn that the “bit” disfigured the face of Sethe’s mother.
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Yet, it did not do so in the physical manner that we would expect. Surprisingly enough,
the “bit” worked on Ma’am’s face, so as to make her face constantly “smile.” The despair
comes through, when we learn that Sethe has never seen her mother’s “own smile” (203).
As a sign of disfigurement and separation, the figure of the “bit” is thus meant to subtly
“reveal” how painful the estrangement that slavery produced must have felt. Morrison’s
technique here lies in exposing, through the narrative she constructs around the “bit,” the
personal relevance of the experience. In Writers at Work, she asserts that the
dehumanizing process of the “bit” carried with it a “very personal quality for the person
who made it, as well as for the person who wore it.” As Morrison further contends, “I
realized that describing [the bit] would never be helpful.” Rather, as Morrison continues,
“I realized that the reader didn’t need to see it so much as feel what it was like.” As such,
for Morrison, it became “important to imagine the bit as an active instrument, rather than
simply as a curio or an historical fact” (357).
The feeling created around the “bit” is very strong also in the following scene. It
is grounded in a memory by Sethe, and sensitively revealed through a conversation
between her and Paul D. As Sethe reflects on the effect of the “bit” put on slaves she
knew, she can perceive and feel Paul D’s profound pain around it. During the
conversation with Paul D, she thinks and says the following,
He wants to tell me, she thought. He wants me to ask him about what it was
like for him—about how offended the tongue is, held down by iron, how the need
to spit is so deep you cry for it. She already knew about it, had seen it time after
time in the place before Sweet Home. Men, boys, little girls, women. The
wildness that shot up into the eye the moment the lips were yanked back. Days
after it was taken out, goose fat was rubbed on the corners of the mouth but
nothing to soothe the tongue or take the wildness out of the eye.
Sethe looked up into Paul D’s eyes to see if there was any trace left in them.
“People I saw as a child,” she said, “who’d had the bit always looked wild after
that. Whatever they used it on them for, it couldn’t have worked, because it put a
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wildness where before there wasn’t any. When I look at you, I don’t see it. There
ain’t no wildness in your eye nowhere.” (Beloved 71)
Morrison closes her discussion of her narrative choice and technique around the
“bit” by making a more generic statement about her art. As she concludes her
conversation, she asserts that, “And in the same way I wanted to show the reader not only
what the bit could do to an individual, I also wanted to show in general what slavery felt
like, rather than how it looked” (Writers at Work 357).
As Morrison grounds Beloved in the individual stories of Sethe, Paul D, Baby
Suggs, and others, she contends that her point is for her readers to “listen, participate,
approve, disapprove, and interject” their own traumatic stories, as much as she does.
She writes her novels, not as a resolution of conflicts, but as a site for discussing some of
the issues that pertain or have directly affected the AfricanAmerican community. As
such, she intends her artistic productions to be openended. In her words, “there is
always something more interesting at stake than a clear resolution in a novel.” Morrison
claims that she is likewise “interested in survival,” as she wants to see “who survives and
who does not, and why.” Also, she claims, she does not want “to bow out with easy
answers to complex questions.” This is so because “it’s the complexity of how people
behave under duress that is of interest” to her. Especially, she claims, “the qualities they
show at the end of an event when their backs are up against the wall” is what is
meaningful (“An Interview 402). As such, she contends, she wants from her readers “a
very strong visceral and emotional response as well as a very clear intellectual response”
(40304). The “haunting,” which Morrison admits she deliberately performs on her
readers through her fiction, is “testimony” to that effort (404). The responses in readers
that Morrison attempts to elicit are thus not only related to Beloved being an act of
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witnessing that exposes traumatizing memories. They are also connected to how we can
reply to Beloved as a ghostly narrative.
As previously explored, Morrison grounds Beloved in an obsessive recurrence of
unresolved conflicts and silences that she inscribes in individual, racial, and cultural
“borderlands” (Borderlands/La Frontera 100). These unresolved conflicts, which
necessarily need to remain unresolved, are made “substance” and become “presence”
among others, through some memories of the past. Yet, Morrison also makes the
personally unresolved conflicts of slavery signify through disrupting presences of
immaterial life forms in Beloved. This is the point for now.
Barbara Freeman develops an insightful argument around the presence of ghosts
in AfricanAmerican literature, particularly in the oeuvre of Toni Morrison. In
Freeman’s view, the feeling of the sublime can enable one to read an apparent “absence”
as an actual “presence.” This “crucial absence,” the result of something that has been
discarded or dismissed with whatever personal, historical, or cultural intent in mind, is
actually the “concretization of a missing presence” (The Feminine Sublime 116). As the
“sign of what is there by not being there,” the sublime, for Freeman, is thus like “a
ghost,” in that “it marks what has been excluded from the main body of the work.”
Likewise, it returns in “an attempt to make up for its loss” (117).
Freeman makes her point by organizing it around “ghosts who come back to
haunt the living.” For Freeman, the coming back of ghosts actually occurs to trouble the
mind of those who have survived. More precisely, ghosts “come back” if “proper
attendance was refused to them while they were living.” To make her point, Freeman
reviews the following, commonly held belief around ghosts. Namely, that ghosts appear
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“when someone’s departure from this life has not been accompanied by the rites that it
calls for.” The “unceremoniously buried” that Morrison compels us to remember through
Beloved would be among those who were actually refused “proper attendance” (“A
Conversation” 209, The Feminine Sublime 116). It is, among others, what actually
prompts ghostly returns in Beloved.
Also, in Freeman’s words, ghosts “come back to keep us in touch with a history
we can neither remember nor forget.” They actually keep us in contact “with a past that
refuses to die.” Freeman further claims that ghosts can only be laid to rest only when,
“the labor of mourning begins to transmit the silence they signify into speech.” So if “the
sublime appears to mark a trauma that exceeds language,” she claims, it simultaneously
“motivates symbolization while it also resists it” (The Feminine Sublime 116). In our
case, Morrison’s symbolic attempt at finding expression for “unspeakable things
unspoken” is thus grounded not in words as such (“Unspeakable Things Unspoken” 201).
The search for the inexpressible is revealed in the haunting presence of the ghosts that
overwhelm Beloved.
Instead of filling in “unspeakable things” with historical forms of discourse,
which Toni Morrison has obviously resisted doing, she proposes, instead, to haunt her
characters and readers. Also, her use of an Anzaldúan “borderland” permits her to fill
“unspeakable things,” not with speakable things, but with indexers of pain and confusion.
Morrison’s art, grounded in silences and figural moments, serves then to reveal, and
insistently so, not so much an object, but a sorrow and a trauma deeply ingrained. This
particular form of ghostly presence specific to her art comes to be a mode of signifying in
itself.
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In “Shakespeare’s Ghost Writers,” Marjorie Garber develops a similar argument
around silence in connection to ghosts. She draws on Derrida to make her point. She
claims that a ghost, in her instance, the ghost of Hamlet’s father, is like a “signature” for
Derrida. Both are “signs” that request attention, even if they come across as an
“empirical nonpresence.” A “signature,” then, as Derrida has shown, “is simultaneously
a present absence and an absent presence.” It is, in fact, “something that must be iterated
to be recognizable.” The signature “stands for its signator in that person’s absence”
(140). In “Signature, Event, Context,” Derrida contends that, “by definition,” a “written
signature” indeed “implies the actual or empirical nonpresence of the signer.” The
signature also “marks and retains his havingbeen present.” As Derrida insists, a
“havingbeen present in a past now,” is also, however, one “which will remain a future
now.” With the signature thus, a “havingbeen present” in the past can be inscribed and
evidenced, not only in “a now,” but in a “future” as well. As such, the signature iterates a
presence in what Derrida calls a “transcendental form of nowness,” or “maintenance”
(328). For Garber, a “signature,” such as claimed by Derrida, is “very like a ghost”
(“Shakespeare’s Ghost Writers” 140). As such, both signature and ghost stand for
something that is recognizable, despite the empirical absence of the signator or death of
the person. In Morrison’s text, the ghost, as evidence of the violence done to the mind
and the body under slavery points also at the “nowness” or “maintenance” of that trauma
(“Signature, Event, Context” 328). The ghost reiterates then that the potency of the
signifying trauma is there even if it is located in an “empirical nonpresence”
(“Shakespeare’s Ghost Writers” 140).
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The ghost asks not to forget what may have been omitted, forgotten, remained
undisclosed, or kept secret. As Lyotard contends, we must indeed always “remember”
that “there is the Forgotten” (Heidegger and “the jews” 4). As a cultural marker of
absence and loss to remind us of the forgotten, the ghost of Beloved also serves the
following purpose. It operates to explore further and “descend deeply into the dark and
noisesome caverns of the hell of slavery.” These words, by Henry Box Brown, quoted by
Morrison in “The Site of Memory,” reveal another facet of Morrison’s purpose in writing
Beloved. Through these words, Morrison alludes to “the dark and noisesome” site of
slavery as a place that does not let itself be forgotten nor revealed exclusively in words,
but in “noise” and in “darkness.” Her overall narrative’s call to attention, then, draws on
that often unarticulated, even dismissed presence, of the “hell” that “slavery” was (90).
But in Morrison’s Beloved, this often dismissed presence of slavery, which, in Lyotard’s
words, would stand as that which remains “‘immemorial, unthought and unthinkable’ as
such,” is thus concretely taken up by the narrative alternating with the silence made
around it (Heidegger and “the jews” xx). The following example illustrates how.
In the number of the house that Sethe, Denver, and also Paul D inhabit, namely
124 Bluestone Road, we sense that the third term—the one for Beloved is missing
(Beloved 3). Because number 3 in 124 cannot be named does not mean that number 3
does not exist, or that it cannot mean or signify. It actually signifies, and very
traumatically so. I suggest that the missing number, the silenced number 3 in124, figures
not the absence, but the return and presence of Beloved. As that which cannot be
contained, or satisfactorily told or spoken, number 3 comes to signify that it must not be
forgotten, despite the fact that it is seems to have been erased. In “Unspeakable Things
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Unspoken,” Morrison explains her technique of opening Beloved by giving Sethe’s street
and house address. She also discusses her purpose in opening the novel through “a
sentence” that “is not one” (228). As she writes the first line of her narrative, she
indicates that, “124 was spiteful. Full of a baby’s venom.” Morrison explains that she
intentionally meant the first two lines of Beloved to be dramatically impacting. Reading
“124 was spiteful. Full of a baby’s venom” is indeed a very puzzling and defamiliarizing
way of starting a narration. For one, how can a baby be associated with venom, and how
can it be spiteful? But then we quickly come to realize that the first two lines of Beloved
prefigure the pain and the depth of the trauma that is enclosing in grief its inhabitants (3).
In “Unspeakable Things Unspoken,” Morrison describes in critical terms her narrative
choice, the expected effect, and the meaning of the puzzlement of her opening lines:
Whatever the risk of confronting the reader with what must be immediately
incomprehensible in that simple, declarative authoritative sentence, the risk of
unsettling him or her, I determined to take. Because the in medias res opening
that I am so committed to is here excessively demanding. It is abrupt, and should
appear so. No native informant here. The reader is snatched, yanked, thrown into
an environment completely foreign, and I want it as the first stroke of the shared
experience that might be possible between the reader and the novel’s population.
Snatched just as the slaves were from one place to another, from any place to
another, without preparation and without defense. No lobby, no door, no
entrance—a gangplank, perhaps (but a very short one). And the house into which
this snatching—this kidnapping—propels one, changes from spiteful to loud to
quiet, as the sounds in the body of the ship itself may have changed. A few words
have to be read before it is clear that 124 refers to a house, . . . and a few more
have to be read to discover why it is spiteful, or rather the source of the spite. By
then it is clear, if not at once, that something is beyond control, but is not beyond
understanding, since it is not beyond accommodation by both the “women” and
the “children.” The fully realized presence of the haunting is both a major
incumbent of the narrative and sleight of hand. One of its purposes is to keep the
reader preoccupied with the nature of the incredible spirit world while being
supplied a controlled diet of the incredible political world. (22829)

As Morrison further contends,
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The subliminal, the underground life of a novel is the area most likely to link arms
with the reader and facilitate making it one’s own. . . . Here I wanted the
compelling confusion of being there as they (the characters) are; suddenly,
without comfort or succor from the “author,” with only imagination, intelligence,
and necessity available for the journey. (229)
While Morrison compares Beloved to the less subliminal, more explicitly articulated
novels that she has written, she underlines that the “rawness” and “vulnerability” of the
language in Beloved actually serve to draw on an accrued involvement of the readers.
She concludes that, with Beloved, there is indeed
No compound of houses, no neighborhood, no sculpture, no paint, no time,
especially no time because memory, prehistoric memory, has no time. There is
just a little music, each other and the urgency of what is at stake. Which is all
they had. For that work [Beloved], the work of language is to get out of the way.
This not only serves to enact “the fully realized presence of the haunting” in Beloved, but
it does so forcefully (“Unspeakable Things Unspoken” 229). Also, while both
Morrison’s and Delbo’s proses enact “the fully realized presence” of trauma, they also
pose as underlying question the possibilities for trauma to be potentially or eventually
“undone” (201). Exploring a possible “undoing” of trauma is the major point I propose
for the coming chapter.
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Chapter 3. Discursive Memory
Chacune se sent mourir et se décompose en images brouillées, déjà morte à ellemême,
elle n’a plus ni passé, ni réalité, ni rien.
Elle est rentrée chez elle, elle n’est pas rentrée dans la vie. La vie a glissé sur elle
comme l’eau du ruisseau sur les cailloux qu’elle polit, l’a usée jour à jour. Son regard
s’est terni, sa voix s’est décolorée, ses cheveux sont devenus gris. Combien d’années
maintenant? Elle les a comptées mais le compte n’est pas juste. Auschwitz, c’était hier.
Cette nuitlà, c’était la nuit dernière.
Depuis toutes ces annéeslà, elle fait les menus gestes, les menus pas du quotidien, elle
écoute le bruit de la vie qui passe à côté d’elle. Elle n’entend rien que le vent sur la
plaine glacée, les cris des gardiennes qui surveillaient les détenues dans les marais gelés,
les aboiements des chiens. Elle ne sent rien que l’odeur du crématoire. Elle entend les
voix des camarades qui l’ont arrachée à sa sœur morte : “Viens! Viens! Il faut aller à
l’appel”, qui l’ont entraînée, qui l’ont soutenue dans les rangs, qui lui ont dit : “Pleure”,
mais elle n’a pas pu pleurer, ni ce matinlà, ni depuis. Faute de larmes, son regard s’est
terni.
Charlotte Delbo, La mémoire et les jours
Every dawn she saw the dawn, but never acknowledged or remarked its color. There
was something wrong with that. It was as though one day she saw red baby blood,
another day the pink gravestone chips, and that was the last of it.
 Toni Morrison, Beloved

With Aucun de nous ne reviendra, Delbo plunges us in a time that, in the words of
Chambers, is “a time without measure” (Untimely Interventions 212). It is the traumatic
time of Auschwitz. A time of death and destruction, its devastating spell is as “hard” and
“solid” as the mortal cold and the frozen light of the camp. With it, we are transported in
“a time outside of time” (None of Us 32). Its deadly force ongoing, that time limits the
possibilities of life at the camp. Likewise, it constricts the memories of life outside the
camp. As importantly, as I will propose as the focus of this chapter, the frozen time of
Auschwitz not only points at a past that has disintegrated. It also signals, for sufferers of
trauma, that the future has been impeded as well.
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In her trilogy Auschwitz and After, Delbo addresses the challenges of a
tormenting and tormented lifetime. Similar to the torment perceived in Sethe and other
characters in Beloved, an ongoing and significant existential anguish is continually
sensed, overwhelming Charlotte. Once it takes possession of her life, it keeps dominating
it. It plagues her continually. But actually, it afflicts not only her present life. It is
reductive of her past one and it is threatening of her future as well. The point of this
chapter is to demonstrate how losing touch with a present life and getting disconnected
from a past existence can affect and threaten the future in profound ways.
An initial sign of emotional unsettlement manifests itself early in Aucun. In the
first work of the trilogy, it comes across as Charlotte’s entanglement in the present and in
the fading of her past memories. In Une connaissance inutile, the second volume, it takes
the form of an incapacity to imagine a future life different from the one at the camp.
Both works, then, can serve as literary bases for exploring the intricate connections
between traumatic past, present, and future that so upset Charlotte’s life. It is also the
aesthetic design of the trilogy that reveals how much Delbo’s life expectations have been
reduced. Likewise, it is through Beloved and Jazz, Morrison’s first two volumes in
another trilogy, that I will inquire into how a dislocation of time in a life narrative can
disarticulate the self. These works will thus enable examination of to what extent some
protagonists are able to cope with a deranged time frame and a disadjusted self produced
by a tragic past. The critical works of Susan Brison, Henry Krystal, JeanFrançois
Lyotard, and Jacques Derrida provide the analytical backgrounds for our discussion.
Delbo observes that her torment about her existence in Auschwitz does not simply
come from knowing that “le passé ne nous était d’aucun secours, d’aucune resource.” To
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her, the past is not only an item, useless to possess. Its loss also gives her present
experience an unreal, almost surreal character. As she claims, “[le passé] était devenu
irréel, incroyable.” As she further admits, “Tout ce qui avait été notre existence d’avant
s’effilochait” (Une connaissance inutile 91). Delbo thus implies that the fragmenting of
her life is meant to be devastating in more than one regard. It is destructive not only to
her past and present prospects. But, as it is assumed in Une connaissance inutile, it is
negatively impacting the conditions of her future as well.
Intuitively, Delbo knows already, and early on, that living after her release from
Auschwitz will not be an actual release. Life will remain challenging. So, not only does
Delbo choose to reveal how the experience at the camp has indelibly marked her
imaginary with a deadly reality. She also insists on how tainted, contaminated, and
senseless living after Auschwitz has become. As Lawrence Langer observes, from
Delbo’s survival from Auschwitz to her lifelong entrapment in it, Auschwitz has claimed
its toll. The remark that he makes about Delbo’s struggles with her existence after
Auschwitz is very insightful. He declares, Delbo’s “endeavors to leave [Auschwitz]
behind now prove as futile as attempts to escape from its reality into an imagined future
then” (Holocaust Testimonies 4).
Being bereaved of one’s future is made very apparent in the selfdeclared
shattering of Delbo’s subjective sense of identity. As she notices quite often, the trauma
of the camp has kept pulling her emotional life to an unstable, warfarelike zone. As such,
her entire oeuvre is obsessively charged with the presence of the camp. Not only does it
reveal how much her sense of living, and reality, have been obscured. It is also
illuminating of her doubts and selfquestioning about living after Auschwitz. As she

107

claims in Spectres, mes compagnons, “L’enfer d’où je reviens n’était guère favorable au
rêve.” Wondering if her capacities to dream or imagine can still function after
Auschwitz, she also asks, “Étaitce rêver que recomposer un monde de l’imaginaire qui,
parfois, devait devenir plus réel que le réel où je vivais?”
For Delbo, not only is the interiority of a human clearly threatened by the
destructive force of a concentration camp. A capacity to think a life outside of trauma is
also problematic. In that regard, she has contended, more than once, that, “she died in
Auschwitz,” even though “no one knows it.” Yet, at some point, she also doubts an
ability to reconstruct an inner world. She questions being able to have a sense of self that
does not involve Auschwitz. Besides, her experiencing Auschwitz has made her engaged
in a world and a self, in Auschwitz and after, that were so much unlike hers that either
seems now more real than reality itself. As she eventually comes to ask, “Étaitce rêve, .
. . ce monde de l’imaginaire . . . qui subsiste en moi aujourd’hui tandis que je commence
à douter de l’autre, le vrai, celui où j’étais? Et cette prisonnière au regard sans espoir,
étaitce moi? Ou cette Électre insensible? Je ne sais plus” (7). As she keeps on doubting
her own sense of existence, she ponders, “J’étais là . . . Là
. . . Ailleurs, nulle part. Dans un monde autre. Comment? Je ne sais pas. Étaisje moi?
Étaisje
. . . Quoi? J’étais là.” She further asks, “Combien de temps suisje restée ainsi en
suspension d’existence?” Uncertain of the answer, she tentatively replies, “longtemps.
Enfin, on m’a dit que mon absence au monde avait duré longtemps.” Able, however, to
vaguely remember the physical condition of her absence to the world, she claims that,
“Mon corps était sans poids, ma tête sans poids. . . . Je flottais dans un présent sans
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réalité.” Ultimately, she also explains that she spent, “des jours, des jours, sans penser,
sans exister, tout en sachant cependant—mais je ne me souviens plus aujourd’hui
comment je le savais, tout en ayant quelque sensation, à peine définissable, que
j’existais.” As she concludes how estranging her physical separation from her own self
and from the world has felt, she writes that, “Je ne parvenais pas à me réhabituer à être, à
me réhabituer à moi. Comment me réhabituer à un moi qui s’était si bien détaché que je
n’étais pas sûre qu’il eut jamais existé?” As she hints at the emotional destruction of her
previous life, she also points at the tainted color of her future. She asks, “Ma vie
d’avant? Avaisje eu une vie avant? Ma vie d’après? Étaisje vivante pour avoir un
après? Je flottais dans un présent sans réalité” (4445).
Delbo’s survival of Auschwitz and her return to life after her liberation are acts
that demanded great resilience and courage. This resilience, however, did not liberate her
from her traumas. As she claims in Mesure de nos jours, “Tout est pareil. C’est en nous
que rien n’est pareil. Je sais ce qui en moi n’est pas pareil à ce que j’étais avant, ce qui
fait que je ne suis pas pareille aux autres.” For Delbo, this difference lies in, “cette
montagne de cadavres entre eux et moi” (59). So for Delbo, not only can trauma
preclude the release of the imagination from destruction. Trauma may seclude a person
also in a permanent state of senselessness and suffering. Also, trauma seems to have
annihilated her sense of reality. As a result, it has predisposed her past, her present and
her future to an engulfing existential void.
Auschwitz but also the shed of 124 Bluestone Road, Sweet Home, and the ship of
the Middle Passage do thus not only function as places of physical or emotional death.
They metonymically stand as places of trauma in which the imagination of a future has
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been suspended. With these places, the prospects of past and present, but also future,
have disintegrated, in a “time” that is “abolished” (None of Us 32). Sweet Home and the
camp have contributed to reduce the self to a state of mind that forecloses emotional
growth. They have spelled a time of survival that is not so much celebratory of life.
Rather, they indicate that life, after all, has been deeply damaged.
Susan Brison has explored the centrality of a temporal component in appraising
trauma. In “Trauma Narratives and the Remaking of the Self,” she discusses the collapse
of time as a major component of trauma. She claims that the “undoing” of the self is
closely related to an “undoing” of time. Brison asserts that the undoing of time and self
involves various components. Two are of special interest to us. One deals with a self
that is fragmented. The other pertains to a time that is subjectively framed. For Brison,
the splitting of the self first entails a “severing of past from present.” It is a time element
that indeed plagues and confuses Delbo’s and Morrison’s protagonists. It also relates to
both protagonists’ profound desire, willful or not, of severing the self from a hurtful state
of existence. In the cases of Charlotte and Sethe, the necessity for release from their past
is actually such that it takes control of their lives. It shuts out in them a capacity to live
life to the fullest. Instead, a timeless and obsessive presence looms over them. It is so
strong that it partially incapacitates them. Their existences, so disfigured and impaired,
are frozen in time. Trauma has taken control of their lives. It comes as no surprise that
Charlotte’s and Sethe’s existences, at these crisis points, make up the aesthetic
frameworks of Delbo’s and Morrison’s trilogies.
Along with a “severing of past from present,” there exists also for the traumatized
individual “an inability to envision a future.” This, for Brison, also contributes to shatter
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the sense of self in the survivor. As Brison claims, “the ability to envision a future, along
with the ability to remember a past” is crucial. They enable a person to “selfidentify as
the same person over time.” But, she adds, when these abilities are lost, the “ability to
have or to be a self” is lost as well. In trauma, not only are “one’s connections with
memories of an earlier life” lost. Also gone is “the ability to envision a future.” With
this loss comes the possibility that “one’s basic cognitive and emotional capacities” are
destroyed.” Or in the least, the capacities to think or feel may be “radically altered.” For
Brison, this “epistemological crisis” leaves the survivor with virtually “no bearings to
navigate by.” The sufferer of trauma experiences great difficulty at feeling “at home” in
the world (39).
Signs of a shattered subjectivity embedded in a traumatic time are prevalent in
Delbo’s work. Likewise, a life not free of emotional damage is strongly suggested in
Morrison’s oeuvre. As a matter of fact, Morrison’s trilogy does not exactly revolve
around the despair of slavery. It reveals, rather, the forms of dejection that keep some of
her characters in bondage despite their emancipation. As a matter of fact, her work
points at forms of traumatized existence that mainly keep the self imprisoned in quasi
hopelessness. This is especially evident with Baby Suggs, Sethe, and Paul D. Not only
do these protagonists struggle to cope with trauma. They also strive to live an existence,
which they simply wish removed from despair. As a result, they try to loosen the grips
that slavery has claimed on them. But their confrontations with trauma, and their personal
negotiations for release, pull them back, over and over again, into challenging
predicaments.
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With Beloved, Morrison transports us with Sethe, the ghosts of Beloved, and the
“Sixty Million and more,” to places such as the shed of 124 Bluestone Road, Sweet
Home, or a ship. These places, in their “cold sunlight,” appear to displace, not only “the
dark.” They dislocate “the fabric of life itself.” Also, in Beloved, there is present not
only a sense of time shattered because of trauma. Trauma disrupts a sense of place also.
Particular places are transgressed and infused with traumatic memories, or “rememory,”
as Sethe calls them, as she experiences spontaneous recurrences of the past (36). Yet,
these places are transgressive also. They are particularly so on two levels. One displays
the intense torment that is placed on the subjectivity of the protagonists when they are
thinking of those places. The other index of transgression entails the protagonists’
reduced life prospects because of the events of these places. What is more, not only have
these places come to emotionally imprison the characters traumatized. They are also
threatening to hold in bondage these protagonists who, at some point, and even remotely,
come into contact, directly or not, with those places. In the instance of Sethe, the shed in
which she committed her act of infanticide is a mentally disturbing site. It is the place of
a deep emotional disturbance resulting from her murdering her child. Yet, not only does
the shed come to signify the loss of life and death of Sethe’s “crawlingalready?” baby
girl (159). It also turns out to be the place where the generation following Sethe’s, in this
case, Denver’s, has lost a physical connection to a sister. In turn, I suggest that Denver’s
loss takes up, in Beloved, the form of a repressed desire for a sibling. The impulsive, yet
destructive, connection that Denver will eventually form with the ghost of Beloved
clearly testifies to that desire. The shed thus comes to stand not solely as a place where

112

“loss” is “ungovernable.” It is also a place where loss is transgenerationally destructive
as well (122).
As readers, we may ask ourselves if these places can eventually come across as
safe. After being so traumatizing, can these sites actually be perceived as less
threatening? Or are they, on the other hand, to remain emotionally disturbing? Set in a
new context, such as Sethe’s emancipation, are these places to keep retaining the memory
of their traumatic past? Or can they give way to more promising prospects? “Full of a
baby’s venom,” as 124 was, or where “life wasn’t sweet and it sure wasn’t home,” as at
Sweet Home, or even where “life was dead,” as in Alfred, Georgia, I propose that these
places not only prefigure a despairing present (3, 14, 109). They anticipate a desolate
future as well. While Sethe confides in Denver one day, she makes the point particularly
clear. As she explains,
“I was talking about time. It’s so hard for me to believe in it. Some things go.
Pass on. Some things just stay. I used to think it was my rememory. You know.
Some things you forget. Other things you never do. But it’s not. Places, places
are still there. If a house burns down, it’s gone, but the place—the picture of it—
stays, and not just in my rememory, but out there, in the world. What I remember
is a picture floating around out there outside my head. I mean, even if I don’t
think of it, even if I die, the picture of what I did, or knew, or saw is still out there.
Right in the place where it happened.”
“Can other people see it?” asked Denver.
“Oh yes. Oh yes, yes, yes. Someday you be walking down the road and you
hear something or see something going on. So clear. And you think it’s you
thinking it up. A thought picture. But no. It’s when you bump into a rememory
that belongs to somebody else. Where I was before I came here, that place is real.
It’s never going away. Even if the whole farm—every tree and grass blade of it
dies. The picture is still there and what’s more, if you go there—you who was
never there—if you go there and stand in the place where it was, it will happen
again; it will be there for you, waiting for you. So Denver, you can’t never go
there. Never. Because even though it’s all over—over and done with— it’s
going to always be there waiting for you.” (36)
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At some point during, or after, a traumatizing experience, a witness is in need of
figuring or reconfiguring a sense of self or a sense of identity. This is thus the
challenging task that Charlotte, Sethe, and Paul D were facing after their release into
presumed freedom. (Re)constructing a life, for them, was to take place, however, in
dramatically altered conditions. Their (re)building a life turned out to be an extremely
probing experience. It was so because they were unable to return to supposedly normal
forms of existence. Return to life, for them, was inscribed in an aftermath. Besides, not
only had their experience been fracturing to a sense of self. It had damaged their
community and their sense of belonging to it also. That is, if they had felt a sense of
communal self in the first place. In fact, (re)insertion was to be made in conditions that
had not only been extremely shattering for the individual. It was to be accomplished in
relation to a profoundly changed community also. Charlotte’s and Sethe’s returns were
thus not only painful processes to them as individuals. Their return posed a socially and
communally based challenge also.
The question of (re)constructing an identity in an aftermath calls for first looking
deeper into the shattered sense of time. The contexts of Aucun and Beloved will provide
grounds for this. Probing these narratives and their deranged times is fruitful. Not only
does it enable a closer examination of “time” as a functional device of trauma. It also
permits examining how to deal with the memory of a traumatic event. The dilemma that
these questions pose is as follows. How can both Delbo’s and Morrison’s narratives go
about remembering a trauma which took place in a “time without measure”? (Untimely
Interventions 212). More specifically, how can Delbo’s and Morrison’s narratives
proceed to remember and inscribe in memory what was experienced in circumstances so
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estranging and so unfamiliar, that the experience itself did not seem to take place in the
real? That is, if it was even reminisced at all. But also, how do the second novels of
Delbo’s and Morrison’s trilogies repeat or escape the very fabric of trauma of Aucun and
Beloved? What possibilities of a future do Delbo’s and Morrison’s narratives open?
Finally, how do they set about reconstructing a life in an aftermath through a necessary
process of mourning?
Marianne Hirsch has posed these questions, albeit in different terms and about
other narratives. She has asked whether narratives, such as Delbo’s or Morrison’s, open
spaces that facilitate a “coming to terms with” trauma. Or do they rather attempt to “gain
distance from” a traumatic past? (“Marked by Memory” 74). Posed in the terms of
Dominick LaCapra, “gaining distance from” or “coming to terms with” trauma would
read as follows. Namely, do Delbo’s and Morrison’s narratives involve an “actingout”
of trauma? Or do they rather suggest what LaCapra terms a “working through” trauma?
If the former is the case, how does an “actingout” enact a “compulsive,” unhealthy
“repetition” of trauma? Also, how do Delbo’s and Morrison’s texts ground trauma in
“repetitive temporality”? Likewise, if the narratives serve as an “actingout” of trauma,
is the past “compulsively repeated as if it were fully present”? If so, why are “the
resistances” of the traumatized subject not “confronted”? Are “memory and judgment
undercut”? Or, on the other hand, are the narratives organized around a “working
through”? If so, is the repetition of trauma a “critically controlled process”? If so, then,
for LaCapra, writing a traumatic text can be a process of healing. It can positively and
“significantly change a life” that was originally marked by trauma. It can make possible
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a “selective retrieval” of the past. It can also encourage a “modified enactment of
unactualized past possibilities” (Representing the Holocaust 48, 174).
By posing literary acts that are magnifying, but also silencing of traumatic
ordeals, Delbo’s and Morrison’s texts seem to suggest, in the cases of Charlotte and
Sethe, that trauma keeps repeating itself without being confronted. Sethe clearly
anticipates this resistance and non confrontational stance in the face of trauma.
Especially when she “rememories” her act of infanticide, and is able to recall it solely by
“circling, circling . . . the subject . . . instead of getting to the point.” This approach,
which is commonly seen in survivors and victims of extreme trauma who go about their
somewhat ungraspable and hurtful stories of shame, represents for Sethe her only chance
to face the memory of the event. As she aptly puts it, “the circle” that she is making
around the subject will “remain one” that she cannot “close in.” Neither can she “pin it
down for anybody who had to ask.” She further contends that, “If they didn’t get it right
off—she could never explain” it to them (Beloved 16263).
Another presumably nonconfrontational actingout of trauma is revealed through
the technique of detachment that is at play in Delbo’s and Morrison’s narrative
techniques. It becomes apparent when both authors purposely detach their protagonists
from trauma. In this regard, both writers’ testimonial works not only parallel the
workings of trauma, and point at the incomplete character of trauma. They actually seem
to hint at the difficulties of completely facing or dealing with, much less accepting, the
traumatic event. Morrison refers to “the white space” of her text. The detachment in the
face of trauma that she endorses at times can be read as follows. By pointing at what “is
not written,” Morrison insists on the unfinished character of trauma. She may also be
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intently pointing at a never ending and unfinished process of grieving in the face of
trauma. Whether this grieving process is at an initial stage of melancholic sorrow, or in a
mourning phase, matters little at this point. Morrison opens spaces for readers to infer
“what is left unsaid.” And as such, these spaces are meant to insist on the emotional pain
of experiencing and reliving trauma. Morrison’s blanks thus not only indicate a certain
impossibility of grasping the character of trauma completely. They also suggest that a
potential processing, much less healing, from trauma is a process that necessarily remains
incomplete (Toni Morrison: A Critical Companion 9).
(Re)actions by witness in the face of trauma can illuminate ways in which
traumatic experiences can be approached, and possibly processed. One attitude,
prevalent in Delbo’s and Morrison’s works, is of interest here. It involves a pseudo
indifference, or a purposeful distancing, from the traumatic event. It usually happens in
witnesses who attempt to remove themselves from the traumatic occurrence. A need for
emotional protection is mainly the underlying motive behind this withdrawal. Witnesses
to trauma respond that way because trauma would be too overwhelming if they kept
facing it. Its impact would be extremely destructive. This stance is the “protective
numbing” that Saul Friedlander sees in many survivors. Friedlander argues that, like the
“disruptive emotion” that is caused by trauma, the “protective numbing” is not entirely
accessible to consciousness. Both decisions, however, testify to crucial ways of
responding to trauma. Not only do they make apparent a certain, though not fully
conscious, capacity of the self to think, and even react, in traumatic circumstances
(“Trauma, Memory, and Transference” 261). They are also very revealing of Delbo’s
and Morrison’s distinctive literary stances in their cultural dealings with trauma.

117

The idea that survivors engage in protective numbing does not necessarily mean
that they, after all, experience a minimized impact of the traumatic event. Rather, and it
is crucial to remember at this point, they still acutely perceive trauma. Also, despite
their distancing from it, trauma may be no less impacting. Delbo’s and Morrison’s works
reveal this point well. The protective numbing, in which both authors engage, is meant
not to be silencing. Paradoxically enough, it points at a culturally active and responsive
form of dealing with trauma.
In the following excerpts, both reactions by Charlotte and Sethe initially testify to
the responsibility that the witnessing of trauma places on them. At first, Charlotte’s and
Sethe’s responses come across as refusals of that responsibility. Delbo’s attempt to avoid
looking at the woman clinging to the slope of the camp is one instance of that refusal.
Delbo’s sense of the “unbelievable,” watching with “eyes that cry out,” but do not
“believe,” is another (None of Us 34). Sethe’s effort at freezing her mind to the
“rememory,” because it is endangering her future, is another example.
Refusing to acknowledge a traumatic event can be a momentary act of survival. It
is especially so when it takes place in deadly conditions, not fully graspable by
consciousness. This nonacknowledgement, however, is also connected to another, less
fundamental and more conscious form of refusal. It relates to what Henry Krystal defines
as the refusal to accept or “integrate” the traumatic event into one’s life. According to
Krystal, this nonintegration by the witness can be extremely problematic. It is so,
because it greatly diminishes the chances of the survivor to work through trauma.
Actually, the difficulty of the survivor to “integrate” the traumatic event also parallels
another difficulty: that of accepting the traumatic event as an event that was “necessary.”
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In Krystal’s contention, the resistances, psychological or cultural, that surge from not
accepting the traumatic event as “necessary” can be extremely damaging. They can
greatly delay the process of mourning. This form of refusal is thus very critical. Not
only does it make it difficult for the trauma sufferer to move beyond the pain and
suffering of the experience. It also delays and hampers the processes involved in coming
to terms with it. Integrating and accepting the traumatic aspect of one’s life is thus
necessary in starting a process of healing. It is especially so since it lays out, for the
survivor, possibilities of regaining “feelings of identity.” It is thus crucial, for a survivor,
to be able to (re)capture, along with a sense of identity or “selfhood,” a feeling of “self
sameness”over time (“Trauma and Aging” 87). For Morrison, this process would be
significant in enabling characters as well as readers to learn “how to survive whole in a
world where we are all of us, in some measure, victims of something” and “in no position
to do a thing about it” (“The Seams Can’t Show” 40).
The following instance points at Delbo refusing to look at the dying woman on
the slope. This refusal is twofold. On the one hand, she will not witness a particular
death, that of the woman. On the other, she will not witness the general conditions of
dying and death in circumstances imposed on all camp prisoners, including Delbo.
Forced by a third party, these circumstances of death open no alternatives or choices to
the witnesses. Both refusals also suggest another, correlated, form of rejection. It is the
refusal, on Delbo’s part, to integrate the dying woman, and her traumatizing death, into
her emotional spectrum. Not only does this excerpt make us aware of Delbo’s emotional
distress. It also makes us face another type of traumatic predicament. It is the difficulty
of having to accept the death, not chosen, of millions of concentration camp prisoners, in
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events that overwhelmed Europe between 1939 and 1945. In this scene, there is thus not
only torment at the thought of the absurdity of the woman dying. There is also anguish at
confronting the idea that her death, avoidable in some circumstances, is not in the context
we know. As we perceive Delbo’s misery at witnessing prevailing death and desolation,
we read,
Je ne la regarde plus. Je ne veux plus la regarder. Je voudrais changer de place,
ne plus voir. Ne plus voir ces trous au fond des orbites, ces trous qui fixent. Que
veutelle faire? Veutelle atteindre les barbelés électriques? Pourquoi nous fixe
telle? N’estcepas moi qu’elle désigne? Moi qu’elle implore? Je tourne la tête.
Regarder ailleurs. Ailleurs.
Ailleurs—devant nous—c’est la porte du bloc 25. (Aucun 44)
The next excerpt reveals another emotionally distressing predicament. It is that of
Sethe’s. As in the instance of Charlotte’s look, Sethe’s dilemma deals with the refusal to
accept or integrate the traumatic event. In the scene, there is, likewise, a sense of the
unavoidable, of the inexorable. The scene exposes Sethe in a disturbing selfquestioning
about the meaning of her experience as a mother under slavery. At first, Sethe is tempted
to think of her new emancipated life in promising terms. But she quickly rejects the
initial trust that prompts her first encouraging thought. Instead of attempting to integrate
a new, more affirmative approach to her life, Sethe keeps thinking of the future in
hesitant and mistrusting terms:
[Sethe] thought also of the temptations to trust and remember . . . Would it be
all right? Would it be all right to go ahead and feel? Go ahead and count on
something? She couldn ‘t think clearly . . . Every dawn she saw the dawn, but
never acknowledged or remarked its color. There was something wrong with that.
It was as though one day she saw red baby blood, another day the pink gravestone
chips, and that was the last of it. 124 was so full of strong feeling perhaps she
was oblivious to the loss of anything at all. (Beloved 3839)
As I proposed in chapter 2, the types of narratives that actually “perform” trauma
are meant to reveal some of the emotional damage that attaches to trauma. Delbo’s and
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Morrison’s texts do so in an urgent manner. Their texts, however, also activate another
aspect of trauma. Paradoxically enough, and unlike their protagonists at times, Delbo’s
and Morrison’s narratives offer little possibility for a distancing from trauma. Even
though the protagonists of the works willfully attempt to escape trauma, the narratives
seem unable to do so. The texts retain in the writing the inexorable suffocating of
trauma. Both novelists seem to suggest that accepting or integrating trauma in the
continuum of life, and within the self, is extremely challenging, if at all possible. The
narratives, then, reveal a continual and atemporal reliving and reexperiencing of
trauma. This is so even when the narratives fail to disclose or purposely silence some of
these times of witnessed horror and emotional suffering. Because then, within these
times, Charlotte and Sethe are perceived to unwillingly visit, revisit, and reminisce about
the times and the places that have indelibly marked them with pain. Whether Delbo’s
and Morrison’s narratives do so in patterns that attempt to be liberating from trauma is a
valid question. Indeed, their narratives sometimes seem to enact trauma compulsively, as
a repetition of its horror. In that case, Delbo’s and Morrison’s narratives point more
specifically at the inescapable character of trauma. This is true even if their protagonists
want to escape from its grip. Our question thus becomes the following. Do Delbo’s and
Morrison’s narratives make trauma unescapable to suggest that trauma and its workings
actually foreclose healing? Do their narratives, then, work as a Freudian “return of the
repressed”? For Krystal, this return would involve for the sufferers forms of “denial” and
“psychic splitting” of the self, because that trauma has not been thoroughly worked
through. If this is so, one question arises. Does a “psychic splitting” of the self apply to,
and assail, Charlotte and Sethe? Or, do the partial silencing, displacing, and even
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euphemization of trauma in Delbo’s and Morrison’s texts, rather point at an active, albeit
painful attempt of “integrating” and “accepting” trauma? If this is the case, do the
narratives suggest an acceptance of the past by the protagonists? Are Charlotte and Sethe
inclined to accept their “traumatized self,” and the “representation” of that “self”? Are
they willing to integrate that suffering self, along with the “other” one, in events that may
have been “evitable” and “unnecessary,” within their processes of reconstruction?
(“Trauma and Aging” 85). Or is the dilemma, between an inability to forget and put
behind, and a necessity to remember and transmit experiences of trauma, simultaneously
at work in Delbo’s and Morrison’s testimonies? If so, how do their texts suggest it?
Lyotard has discussed the processing of the traumatic event in a very illuminating
manner. Like Cathy Caruth, he has done so by linking trauma to the lack of immediate or
direct registration by the perceptive subject. He has actually discussed this connection
between effect and event in the context of Auschwitz. Importantly also, he has framed
his discussion of trauma around an idea of time.
Lyotard grounds the core of the traumatic encounter in the Freudian
“Nachträglichkeit,” or “belatedness” (Heidegger and “the jews” 5). His reading of
belatedness enables an indepth inquiry into the specific types of narratives that interest
us here, not only because of the structural and temporal framing of trauma that
Nachträglichkeit brings to light, but also because Nachträglichkeit enables looking into,
and appraising, possibilities for closure in the face of traumatizing events. This notion,
thus, does not only facilitate exploring “time” in the traumatic realist texts of Delbo and
Morrison. It permits inquiring into how, or if, the narratives offer a way out of their
traumatic character. Eventually, Nachträglichkeit also allows exploring possibilities, if
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any, out of a time that has been disarticulated. At this point, our concern can be posed in
the following terms. What is involved in engaging in a process of Freudian “mourning”?
Also, what is at stake in a “melancholic” longing for an unscathed self?
According to Freud, “the affects” or occasions for “melancholia” are similar to
those of “mourning.” In either case, the affects reveal “a longing for something lost.” In
the case of melancholia, however, Freud insists that the loss is located in “instinctual
life.” The “objectloss” in melancholia is an “unconscious” one. That loss is mainly
impacted at the level of the “unconscious.” Freud further makes the following comment.
He claims that, in the case of melancholia, “one cannot see clearly what it is that has been
lost.” As a result, “the patient,” when observed in a state of melancholia, “cannot
consciously perceive what he has lost either.” This, Freud adds, “might be so even if the
patient is aware of the loss which has given rise to melancholia.” This awareness, Freud
clarifies, comes only from “the sense that [the patient] knows whom he has lost.” Yet, he
does not know “what he has lost in him.” Charlotte and Sethe know indeed who they
have lost in their traumatic experiences. Viva, Alice, Halle, and Beloved are only a few
among their lost ones. However, neither Charlotte nor Sethe precisely voices what they
have lost in themselves. We can never get to learn directly from them whether their loss
is the loss of an ideal, such as a basic reliance on one’s community. Neither do they
explicitly state if the loss was caused by the destruction of a basic trust in humanity. The
question remains unanswered. In any case, their loss remains unspoken. My point here
is that Charlotte’s and Sethe’s feelings of melancholia corroborate the type of
melancholia that Freud discusses here. It is located in an atemporal and unlocalizable
site of the unconscious. At this point, Freudian melancholia, in the form of “severe
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anxiety” appears to present us with a challenging task. It confronts us with the
impossibility of ever being able to locate the object of melancholia precisely in the
psychic life of the subject. It also makes it difficult to grasp the loss in more personal
terms. The suffering subject has difficulty locating her pain after the experience has
ended. Actually, some of the ache could even originate in the unlocalizable character of
the distress. It could even derive from being unable to frame, or directly address,
melancholic emotions. By the same token, attempts at discarding anxiety would be
problematic. Freud’s point importantly illuminates how, even though melancholia is
actually grounded in the hardly localizable and atemporal realm of the unconscious, it is
perceptible. It is detectable and can be traced through the “affects” of the suffering, and
in the “here” and “now” of the survivor (“Mourning and Melancholia” 24360).
Lyotard has insightfully explored melancholia in the case of human disasters,
such as at Auschwitz. He has done so by relating melancholic affects to an idea of “a
temporality.” This notion enables us to look back at traumatic realist narratives in a more
incisive way. It permits us to inquire into how trauma can possibly be processed. It also
enables us to appraise a traumatic text, which is not exclusively a reenactment of trauma.
Likewise, it allows us to view it not solely as a controlled process. Rather, Lyotard’s
argument encourages us to approach trauma in Delbo’s and Morrison’s texts from both
angles at the same time. Indeed, Lyotard claims that trauma is not to be inscribed in
conscious chronology exclusively. Nor is it framed solely in immemorial time. Rather,
Lyotard traces trauma back to a “disjoined temporality” that the sufferer of trauma
experiences and that the text reveals, along with other symptoms. The manner in which
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Lyotard’s “disjoined temporality” can be seen at work in Delbo’s and Morrison’s texts is
extremely revealing.
For Lyotard, Nachträglichkeit, in the Freudian sense, has two components. One
relates to a “double blow” that is “constitutively asymmetrical.” The other element of
Nachträglichkeit engages a “temporality that has nothing to do” with “consciousness.”
For Lyotard, both the asymmetrical blow and the disjoined temporality are at work in the
experiencing of trauma. When activated, both are present in the mental processing of
trauma as well.
Lyotard contends that, with the double blow, the following happens. The psychic
apparatus receives a “first blow.” It is the first excitation. It “upsets the apparatus with
such ‘force’ that it is not registered.” Lyotard compares it to “a whistle” that is
“inaudible” to humans, but not to dogs. He also refers to the first blow as a force, an
energy. This energy, he claims, is simply “deposited there.” Once put in the psychic
apparatus, the energy just stays there. For Lyotard, at that point, it is in “unusable form.”
It resists transformation. It cannot be “‘bound,’ composed, or neutralized.” In Lyotard’s
contention, neither can it be “fixed,” in accordance “with other forces ‘within’ the
apparatus.” For Lyotard, then, the “deposit left behind” by the first blow, by the
“excessive” excitation, is not “a localizable object in the topology of the soul.” As such,
it “strikes the apparatus without observable internal effect.” It does not “affect” it. In
Lyotard’s words, the first blow constitutes thus “a shock without affect.” Lyotard further
contends, that, with the second blow, something else takes place. What happens is “an
affect without a shock.” In this instance, he explicitly refers to Freud’s classic account of
individual trauma. He describes the scene enacted by Emma in the candy store. He
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elaborates on the evidence, that she is caught in a sudden, apparently inexplicable, crisis
of anxiety. He connects the second blow to the following reaction. She claims, “I buy
something in a store, and anxiety crushes me.” Then she says, “I flee, but nothing had
really happened.” At this time, however, something has happened. The energy, so far
formlessly dispersed in an “affective cloud” by the first blow, “condenses.” It “gets
organized,” and it “brings on action.” It “commands a flight without a ‘real’ motive.” As
Lyotard further explains, “this flight,” however, and “the feeling that accompanies it,”
inform consciousness of “something” that has been happening. It is what Lyotard’s
names the “quod.” For Lyotard, the notion “that there is something, the quod, comes
first. It happens before the “quid.” Even though consciousness remains, however,
unable, to tell exactly “what it is” there is, it knows that, “there is” something.
Consciousness “indicates the quod,” but it does not designate the quid. It just knows that,
“this excitation need not be ‘forgotten,’ repressed according to representational
procedures, nor through acting out.” Even though consciousness is made aware, not of
“what there is,” the quid, but of the quod, it knows of something crucially disturbing. Its
“‘excess’ (of quantity, of intensity) exceeds the excess that gives rise (presence, place,
and time) to the unconscious and the preconscious.” It is “in excess” like air and earth
are in excess for the life of a fish” (Heidegger and “the jews” 12, 1516).
For Delbo, consciousness may have been informed more immediately, yet
belatedly, of a quod through directly witnessing a quid. Perception may not have been as
direct in the case of Morrison. Actually, the moment or mode of perception matter little
in our instances Indeed, regardless of the accessibility of the witnessing, and of its
immediacy defined in temporal terms, the shocks and affects of destruction have, in
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either case, been tremendous. Even though it may not even have registered at the time of
occurrence, trauma has, however, struck in a profound manner. In both cases, the shock
of an incredible violence and violation of the self, and of the other, has certainly been
“deposited” there. Lyotard’s construct around the temporal and belated character of
trauma is thus central to our argument. It enables me to claim that not only do Delbo and
Morrison inscribe the achronological time of the traumatic event of extermination and
slavery into the temporal form of their narratives, but also, that the time of their traumatic
realist texts is actually to be thought of as “constitutively asymmetrical.” The possibilities
for the readers to perceive the traumas of the life stories that the narratives expose are not
limited to specific times. The texts are indeed constructed in such a way that the
perception of the traumatic events and their affects can be achieved independently of the
time of occurrence. Little does it matter whether the events are distant or remote in the
past.
What matters is that their major impact is the continued shock and disturbing of
consciousness. Just as important, what is significant, in Brooks Bouson’s terms, is that
readers also “feel compelled and unsettled, if not emotionally distressed, by what they
read.” As Bouson implies in Quiet As It’s Kept, “if Morrison sees her role as a writer to
bear witness,” our role as reader is to bear witness as well. Our reading is meant to be
active and participatory. For Bouson discussing Morrison’s work, our reading should be
“not unlike that of listeners of reallife shame and trauma stories.” These listeners,
indeed, must not only “uncover the shameful secret.” But they must also “reconstruct the
fragmented narrative of the trauma sufferer.” Yet Bouson adds, “because Morrison is
aware that she risks hurting—that is vicariously shaming and traumatizing—her readers,
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she, not unlike the therapistlistener, must create a safeholding environment for her
readers.” While both Delbo and Morrison do so through the fragmented aesthetics of
their narratives, their testimonial acts remain compelling. Both authors enable readers to
“both experience and process the shame and trauma driven stories” of their protagonists
in a profound manner (20, 223).
In Lyotard’s contention, some narratives organize or enact a “chronologization of
time that is not chronological.” It is especially true of traumatic texts. For Lyotard, these
narratives, then, are able to perform, the “retrieval of a time” that “is lost.” It is the time
around the first blow that these narratives attempt to actually retrieve. Even though it
does not have a conscious “place and time in the psychic apparatus,” the traumatic time
can, for Lyotard, be probed for recovery. Usually, it is through the “affects” of trauma
that the process is initiated. Even though the recovery of that time may only be partial or
incomplete, the affects circling that traumatic time may not be without full impact. I thus
suggest this. With Delbo’s and Morrison’s texts, the immemorial time of transgression
and violation of the individual cannot be completely recovered, but it can still be
perceived, while it is incompletely revealed. Its revelation, somehow, is a way of re
connecting to the moments of trauma. Hence, in Morrison’s and Delbo’s narratives, it is
precisely this time of loss, or collapse of ideal or trust, that needs to be, and is being,
reiterated. It is also that time that either narrative seems reluctant to put behind.
Delbo’s and Morrison’s texts engage in various literary processes. A distancing
from trauma, a suffocated voice, and a partial silencing of the traumatic times are just
some of them. Paradoxically, these are intended, so that the traumatic times may not be
put behind or forgotten. These devices are indeed meant to have reminding effects,
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however subtle. One of these, on which Lyotard insists, paradoxically consists in
attempting to “neutralize” an “initial violence.” In that case, the “narrative organization”
of the traumatic text enables to “represent a presence without representation.” For
Lyotard, it serves another purpose. It “stages the obscene” more compellingly. Also, for
him, by literally disassociating the past from the present, the text can better attempt to
activate a “recollection” of the trauma witnessed. Delbo’s and Morrison’s texts do not
disassociate the past from the present. Rather, they engulf them in uncertain, at times
unreal, and confused spans of traumatic awareness. Yet their texts activate the unfinished
processing of their respective traumas. For Lyotard, this type of writing serves as an
individual or cultural “reappropriation” of an “improper.” Also, the traumatic text that
purposely frames a diachronic time may do so in order to “reclaim” an “achronological
affect.” But in any case it sets off, for Lyotard, from a “realistic decision.” This decision,
made by authors, is one that can possibly open the idea of a working through, or closure.
The idea of working through, on a more theoretical level, would consist in literally
bringing together the times of the first and second blow. It would have the text inscribe
the time of the two blows in socalled “real time.” For Lyotard, this process of
narrativization constitutes a “historical decision” in itself. This “decision,” for him,
“occults what motivates it.” But likewise, “it is made for this reason.” What first
prompts it, Lyotard contends, is the “discrepancy between time 1 and time 2.” Yet a
narrative may set out to bring these two times together. It can inscribe the time of the
traumatic experience, along with the time of the nontraumatic one. Whether the text
reveals these two times, and fuses them on the line of “a single and uniform history” is
thus a crucial dilemma for the author (Heidegger and “the jews” 16). It poses the
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following inquiry for us: with their texts, do Delbo and Morrison attempt to write these
two times on the line of a single and uniform history? If not, how are the texts indicative
of remaining imprisoned by trauma? How tentative are they of being redemptive? Also,
how can a reinsertion into a nontraumatic, nondiachronic time engage the witness of
trauma in therapeutic processes of healing?
The literary manners in which Delbo and Morrison are bringing the fractured past,
traumatic present, and disfigured future of their protagonists into socalled real time are
crucial. Further, whether, or how, both authors attempt to align their characters’ lives on
a single and uniform history line is meaningful. One instance in Morrison’s work is
extremely revealing in this regard. Her point concerns how some individual elements of
hurt and grief in protagonists can hamper the rewriting of a life story as a continuum. It
pertains also to how much the merging of “time 1” and “time 2” can be made more
difficult, if particularly afflicting personal circumstances are at play. The instances of
Sethe, Paul D, and Baby Suggs are very useful at this point. They shed light on the
difficulty of merging “time 1” and “time 2” because of a persistently negative perception
of the self. This less than positive view of themselves, as a matter of fact, hampers the
pulling together of their existence. As slaves, Sethe, Paul D, and Baby Suggs were
indeed made to perceive themselves as less than human. This came mainly through
degrading treatment and allusions made to them by “others,” mainly their masters. Yet,
for Krystal, the process of working through by “making peace” with one’s self and one’s
past, involves a crucial element. It requires a specific sense of acceptance. For a
traumatized subject to engage in processes of healing, there are thus some requisites to be
met. One is the need to be able to see oneself as “owning up to all of one’s living as
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[one’s] own.” Another involves a necessity of accepting, “one’s object representation,”
however negatively it may have been projected. In other words, if an inability of positive
(re)claiming of the self persists, the “successful completion of mourning, and/or the
successful integration of one’s life” becomes, to a certain extent, “impossible.” In that
case, mourning remains impeded. It cannot proceed to completion. It remains a process
solely experienced as one that “brings back the helplessness and the shame of the past.”
Or it reduces itself to reexperiencing the feeling of despair, lack of control, and
“helplessness” that was felt at the time of the trauma. Accepting “the past as it was,” as
“unavoidable,” and “justified by its causes,” is thus one of the most challenging tasks
facing Sethe and Paul D. It is the major obstacle that hampers their attempts to integrate
their traumatic time within the continuum of their lives. So is it for Charlotte.
By maintaining their narratives in a “traumatic” time, Delbo and Morrison
indicate little hope for their protagonists’ recovery. More exactly, they point at
possibilities for incomplete and partial recovery only, if recovery is even an option. The
continued surges of trauma in Charlotte and Sethe keep them indeed, and in the words of
Krystal, in a state of misery. It is a position that Krystal describes as a state of
“impoverishment of the areas of one’s mind.” It holds them in a condition in which an
“‘I’ feeling” of destructive “selfsameness” is predominant. Besides, it also leaves them
in frequent and recurring moments in which a “hypertrophied” and “alienated” state of
the “notI” is prevailing. As such, they suffer from what Krystal calls “pseudophobia.” It
leaves both Charlotte and Sethe in a “posttraumatic depletion of the consciously
recognized spheres of selfhood.” This state of not being able to feel like their own selves
constitutes the major impediment to their working through.
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Also, for Krystal, one “feels anger, guilt, or shame” in specific conditions of
trauma. One instance is when one is unable, or unwilling, to accept the “necessity,” and
the “inevitability” of what has “happened.” Both oeuvres, as I have suggested, point at
these forms of nonacceptance. Another form of denial comes across, even though it is
partially silenced. It is revealed through a recurring feeling of offense. It relates, in this
case, not so much to the “inevitable” character of the events. Rather, it suggests that the
events were made even more painful than they should have been. Through absence of
understanding from a community of outsiders, the experiences of Sethe and Charlotte
were made radically and excessively hurtful. Namely, their grief was exacerbated due to
the lack of support that Charlotte’s and Sethe’s respective communities displayed. This
lets us suppose, then, that the concentration camp or slavery experiences were, somehow,
not inevitable. But experiencing them could, at least, have been more generative of
empathy and compassion. Delbo’s and Morrison’s works subtly assume that Charlotte’s
and Sethe’s ordeals would have been no less devastating. But they might have been more
bearable. Also, the trauma at stake actually moved beyond individual experience and
suffering. The trauma, by being also interpersonal, reached a tremendous social
dimension of catastrophe. So much so, that some attempts at “restoring a feeling of
intimacy” with the world may have been further hampered. Potential healing, if any,
was, and then remained, nourished by suspicion. By producing a feeling of “counterfeit
nurturance,” a sense of disbelief in Charlotte and Sethe was also opened. Neither Sethe
nor Charlote was able to reintegrate with their community completely on their return.
This lack of integration and upheld mistrust only added to their process of estrangement
(“Trauma and Aging” 8385).
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As we posed that the traumatic experience is bound to a fragmentation of time,
the next inquiry is this. Do Delbo’s and Morrison’s narratives presume that time can
eventually be readjusted? If so, do attempts at reintegrating a supposedly
chronologicallybased life encourage or affect the traumatized subject in her process of
reconstruction? Problematic as it is, this question leads us to turn first to Derrida and to
his critical understanding of time in the context of “the readability” of the “legacy” of
trauma (Specters of Marx 16).
In the words of Hamlet prince of Denmark, a time of devastation, that unhinges
time, is a “time” that is “out of joint” (Hamlet 1.5). Likewise, for Derrida, a “time” that
is “out of joint” is a time that is “disarticulated, dislocated, dislodged.” It is a time “on
the run and run down.” It is a time that is “traqué et détraqué,” besides being
“deranged.” It is also a time, “out of order and mad.” It is the “unmeasured time” of
Auschwitz, Sweet Home, and 124 Bluestone Road. A time such as this, “off its hinges”
and “off course” is a time of disruption. For Derrida, it is a challenging time, because it
can resist integration into one’s life narrative. By being a time “beside itself,
disadjusted,” it only exists “besides” the self (Specters of Marx 18).
For Derrida, attempts to bring and “maintain together that which does not hold
together,” can be tried. This stance, however, poses challenges. It is extremely
problematic because it implies maintaining “the disparate itself.” In our case, “the
disparate” in question would be more than the unmeasured time of annihilation and death.
It would be the time lived “after” the trauma. It would thus be a time that involves
experiencing trauma’s effects. It is, as such, not only a time of troublesome confrontation
for a self returned to life in an aftermath. It is also a time for painful reinscription of an
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existence in a continuous life narrative or in a literary one, or both. Derrida claims that
the “maintenance of the disparate” should be thought in the following terms. First, it is
to be grasped not in the context of the present. But it should be grasped in the “dis
located time of the present.” Besides, Derrida poses a crucial question around the
“disparate,” as to probe if it can “join.” He also asks if it can “be dialectically
transformed” (17). Also, can “that which does not hold together” eventually join? Since
the disparate in our case is made up of separate and completely disjoined components,
our inquiry becomes this: can the elements of the disparate meet on one single lifeline?
Can they possibly connect? Relating the question to Delbo’s and Morrison’s
understanding of memory as individual and cultural components of the disparate is useful
at this point.
Forms of memory at work in Delbo’s and Morrison’s trilogies are very revealing
of various ways of remembering. One facet of memory entails a memory of personal but
also collective experiences of death and suffering. It is the form of memory that has
attached to traumatic histories of extermination and slavery. Another form of
remembrance, located at the other end of the spectrum, is also relative to memory. That
form of recollection, however, is connected to a longstanding cultural memory. That
memory has not been informed by a past necessarily traumatic. This memory is
grounded in various histories of longstanding communal experiences. Whether oral or
written, official or unofficial, some of its (hi)stories are ingrained in the collective, but
also individual mind. Actually, these stories have somewhat defined the selves over time,
through a specific or particular sense of belonging. The memories of this collective
heritage may even have brought individuals together. They may have strengthened their
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sense of selves. This cultural memory is, however, at risk, sometimes. It is especially so
when it is threatened with crashing into a traumatic one.
Stories of extermination and exclusion unhinge the cultural memory of
individuals. More than likely, they affect the cultural memory of entire communities as
well. Because they resist being fully confronted, traumatic histories of individuals or
communities need to be thought in terms of “spectral” presence. In Delbo’s and
Morrison’s works, this spectral presence reveals what Derrida labels, the “dislocated
time of the present.” With it, the memory of death comes to surface in the “radically dis
jointed time” rendered by the narrative. This resurfacing thus takes place, for Derrida’s,
in a time “without certain conjunction.” He further asserts that, with the idea of a “dis
jointed time,” he does not refer to a time whose joining is simply “negated.” When time
is “disjointed,” then, it is not solely “broken, mistreated, dysfunctional.” Time is not
“disadjusted,” either, in Derrida’s words, according to “a dys of negative opposition.”
Neither is it “disjointed” through a dialectical disjunction.” Rather, he argues, the “out of
joint” character of time refers to a “time without certain joining or determinable
conjunction.”
Derrida claims that, “what is said here about the time is also valid, consequently
and by the same token, for history.” For him, history then, when it is “out of joint,” is a
history, “without certain joining” (Specters of Marx 18). It is also “without determinable
conjunction.” We may then ask if times and forms of memory in Delbo’s and Morrison’s
works exist “without certain joining”? Are they “disjointed”? Also, can some
memories of the traumatic past be left out and disposed of? Eventually, can leftbehind
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traumatic fragments be joined to other memories, and be inscribed in a history line made
at last bearable?
An absence of joining between traumatic histories and cultural histories is
suggested in both Delbo’s and Morrison’s oeuvres. This absence of joining is what
actually reduces the traumatized subjectivities of the protagonists to a continued state of
despair. It makes them continually exist in a life that remains grounded in a
“hauntology,” rather than in an “ontology” of being. Also, the traumatized subjectivities
of Charlotte and Sethe are destined to live in a mental state of undecidedness. They exist
at the confines between “life” and “death,” neither “here” nor “there” exclusively, but
present in both times and places simultaneously. By mentally occupying these times and
places chaotically, they are unable to embrace life to a full extent (Specters of Marx
xviii).
Histories of extermination and slavery thus remain haunting. Not only solely
because of the traumatic traces that the first blow left. These histories remain haunting
also, because of the continued activation of trauma, and the ongoing existence of the
disparate. Once inscribed, the traumatic traces cannot be assimilated, absorbed, or
dialectically resolved. For Derrida, this is impossible and necessarily so. Also, the
“excess” that these traumatic encounters have produced cannot, in the words of Lyotard,
be “detached by cutting.” Nor can they be “excised.” As such, they are to remain as
nonassimilated, and they are nonassimilable. At this point, I propose that the continued
tormenting revealed in Delbo’s and Morrison’s works is meant to be read as such. It is
the sign of the unassimilable character of trauma. It is that pain that Charlotte and Sethe
are unable to digest.
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Lyotard contends that “the time of the unconscious affect,” with the first blow, is
invested with traumatic traces and fragments. He further observes that the time of
trauma, by “being there,” will “remain there” (Heidegger and “the jews” 17). It certainly
does so in the cases of Charlotte and Sethe. Similar to the “rememory” that Sethe
unsuccessfully attempts to escape, that time, in Sethe’s words, “is going to always be
there.” She adds that, it will even be, “waiting for you,” even though “it’s all over—over
and done with.” As Sethe further comments, “That’s how come I had to get all my
children out. No matter what” (Beloved 36).
The time of the “unconscious affect” remains within the individual. It becomes
an inescapable and irremediable component of her emotional life to the extent that it
continues to exist as “a bit monstrous, unformed, confusing, confounding,” besides being
“ungraspable by consciousness.” As a result, Lyotard contends, “the soul is exceeded.”
It is “dispossessed, passed beyond, excised through by this something.” As Lyotard
concludes, “this is the constitutive infirmity of the soul, its infancy and its misery”
(Heidegger and “the jews” 1617).
Derrida has inquired into this “infirmity of the soul” in view of appeasing the
trauma of its misery. For him, history can, however, also consist in “repairing,” with
“effects of conjuncture,” the “temporal disjoining.” For Derrida, this repairing would be
operated and enacted through what he names “the world.” Delbo’s Une connaissance
inutile and Morrison’s Jazz can, at this point, be appraised with the following concern in
mind: how, for Delbo and Morrison, can the “temporal disjoining” that was enacted
through the traumatic character of Aucun and Beloved come to be “repaired” with
“effects of conjuncture?” A question, underlying the concern just formulated, would be,
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if such repair of “temporal disjoining” is even possible at all (Specters of Marx 18).
Probing further into the question of memory will prove useful.
In La mémoire et les jours, Delbo makes a crucial distinction between two types
of memory. One memory she calls, “la mémoire profonde.” It is the memory that
Lawrence Langer discusses as “deep memory.” It is the memory that “tries to recall the
Auschwitz self as it was then.” Delbo distinguishes it from “la mémoire ordinaire,” a
form of “common memory ” (La mémoire et les jours 13). Common memory has a dual
function. As Langer has it, it attempts to “restore the self to its normal pre and post
camp routines.” It also “offers detached portraits, from the vantage point of today, of
what it must have been like then.” As such, for Langer, deep memory “suspects and
depends on common memory.” It knows “what common memory cannot know but tries
nonetheless to express” (Holocaust Testimonies 56). These two kinds of memory
intrude on each other. They constantly disrupt the flow of Charlotte’s experiences of
living and narrating. The distinction between these two ways of remembering is closely
related to the memory framework that Morrison’s work also suggests. An argument by
Sam Durrant, in his appraising the work of mourning in the postcolonial novel, makes
this particularly clear. His point is extremely revealing. It revolves around memory and
ways of remembrance as well. It also leads to a question that I will pose here. Namely,
can traumatic memory and nontraumatic memory somehow join? Can they be inscribed
in a single line of history? If so, can there possibly be points of juncture in personal
narratives? Even though the argument that Durrant makes concerns Morrison’s work
more specifically, it is of relevance to Delbo’s project also. Both texts, indeed, testify to
personal stories that seem to remain unintegrated. They also reveal a complex interplay
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between forms of memory unable to leave the pain of the past to the past. Both texts,
however, contemplate eventualities for at least confronting trauma in a manner that does
not completely exclude attempts to grow out of it.
For Sam Durrant, Morrison’s novels function at two levels. On one level,
Morrison’s novels engage in what he labels the “narrativization of African American
experience.” Durrant relates this narrativization of African American cultural history to
what he coins a “cultural memory.” For him, this cultural memory can be integrated and
“assimilated” into “the individual consciousness.” It usually acts as a “complement to the
individual’s sense of identity.” It is a “healthy” mode of remembrance. It suggests a
form of commemoration that is mainly “selfcentered.” It informs and develops, but also
reinforces, a sense of individual and social subjectivity. It aligns the identity of the self
with a mutual sense of communal belonging. For Durrant, this form of “cultural
memory” is not only critical for the self. It is also crucial for the community. It
comprises, in all its forms, the “verbal accounts” of a “community’s history.”
On the other hand, Durrant claims, Morrison’s novels encompass another form of
memory. It deals with the reality of what he labels “the racial memory” of the African
American experience. That racial memory, according to Durrant, remains
“nonverbalized” even though it “passes itself on from generation to generation” as if “it
were secretly encrypted within the cultural text.” Indeed, for Durrant, the “weight of the
whole race” cannot actually “be accommodated within consciousness.” But the presence
and traces of that racial memory can, however, be made perceptible.
Morrison’s racial memory and Delbo’s deep memory are very closely related.
They are linked to the traumatic memory that we have traced in their texts. It is a
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memory that “passes itself from generation to generation” as a “symptom” or “affect.” It
crosses barriers of times and places. Also, for Durrant, it transmits itself through the
“memory of the body.” It is, in fact, the memory of the violence inflicted on a “racially
marked body.” So, in Durrant’s claim, a racial memory is “a bodily memory.” By bodily
memory, Durrant means that it is a memory that “takes on a bodily form.” It does so
“precisely because” of this. Namely, for Durrant, it “exceeds” both the individual’s and
the community’s “capacity for verbalization and mourning.” As such, it functions, in the
words of Krystal, as some of the “undifferentiated, mostly somatic, unverbalized affect
responses” that can adversely affect both individuals and communities (“Trauma and
Aging” 87). For Durrant, all subjects are in possession of a cultural memory. Only the
“racially marked” are truly in possession of a racial memory. To him, this racial memory
amounts then to an “inherited memory of collective negation” (Postcolonial Narrative
80).
The theoretical or critical ways in which reconfigurations or configurations of
identity can take place for sufferers of trauma have nourished some of the discussion so
far. So have the literary manners in which Delbo’s Aucun and Morrison’s Beloved
anticipate the desolation of the future. I now propose to look into Une connaissance
inutile and Jazz to inquire into how both authors project the possibilities of a life to be
(re)built in the circumstances of an aftermath. It implies examining if or how their
second volumes not only inscribe, but also transcend, in the forms of a collective and
cultural memory, their subjectively traumatized ones.
The forms of memory at stake here, if we follow Derrida’s argument, suggest that
both “deep memory” and “racial memory” are ingrained in a time that can have no
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“joining” (Specters of Marx 18). Delbo’s deep memory and Morrison’s racial memory do
indeed relate to forms of a more generally speaking traumatic memory. The question
about their reality concerns whether “racial” or “deep” memory can be “un”registered
and “dys”inscribed, to use Derrida’s wordplay. Can a “temporal disjoining,” after all,
lead to a joining or rejoining? Or more precisely, can “racial” or “deep” memory be re
inscribed in cultural or ordinary memory with “effect of conjuncture”? (Specters of Marx
18).
In Une connaissance inutile, Delbo discusses a fear of losing her memory. More
specifically, she expresses an anxiety at losing the memory that we earlier posited as her
“common” or ordinary memory (Holocaust Testimonies 5). This fear is actually
embedded in another dreadful presumption. It is grounded in the eventuality of losing
connection, or joining, with an “ordinary” reality, or what Derrida calls “the world.” Une
connaissance inutile insists at first on the challenges facing camp inmates in trying to
retain a memory of almost erased forms of existence. It also points at the spectacular
endeavors that some prisoners did take upon themselves to keep a sense of connection to
their histories. Delbo was one of them. She tried to contain and push back a hideous
specter, that of annihilation. It led her to keep alive a common memory and a sense of
reality of which she would not let go, nor see lost, or disconnected. For Derrida, Delbo’s
efforts served to “maintain” and keep “together” something crucial. Something that was
meant to be destroyed without leaving traces. (Specters of Marx 18).
A fear of losing one’s memory is also grounded in a fear of losing a sense of self.
It is useful to remember here that, for Susan Brison, trauma can bring along an “undoing
of the self.” It does so by “breaking the ongoing narrative” of the traumatized person.
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For Brison, by “severing the connections among remembered past, lived present, and
anticipated future,” trauma shatters one’s sense of “personhood.” Also, as Brison
claims, “the ability to form a plan of life,” then, and after, is considered by some to be
essential to personhood. But it “is lost when one loses a sense of one’s temporal being.”
Besides, it also shatters one’s “fundamental assumptions about the world.” Trauma, by
fracturing one’s “sense of safety” in the world, also shatters one’s “sense of existing” in
that world (“Trauma Narratives” 4041). Besides, for Judith Herman, when “the human
system of selfdefense becomes overwhelmed and disorganized,” as in the case of
trauma, neither “resistance nor escape” becomes possible. Traumatic events, then,
“confront human beings with the extremities of helplessness and terror.” They also
“evoke responses of catastrophe.” And because they are traumatic, these events
“overwhelm the ordinary human adaptations to life” (Trauma and Recovery 34). The
threats of annihilation, continually posed to Delbo at the camp, were, indeed,
overwhelming. They induced, however, a chain of responses that were actually acts of
resistance.
In the following excerpt, Delbo explains how acts of survival can take the form of
mentally exercising her memory. By sustaining forms of common memory, Delbo was
capable of remaining partially connected to a sense of self that was not totally
dehumanized. Delbo remembers the thought processes that kept her going:
Depuis Auschwitz, j’avais peur de perdre la mémoire. Perdre la mémoire, c’est se
perdre soimême, c’est n’être plus soi. Et j’avais inventé toutes sortes d’exercices
pour faire travailler ma mémoire : me rappeler tous les numéros de téléphone que
j’avais sus, toutes les stations d’une ligne de métro, toutes les boutiques de la rue
Caumartin. J’avais réussi, au prix d’efforts infinis, à me rappeler cinquantesept
poèmes. J’avais tellement peur de les voir s’échapper que je me les récitais tous
chaque jour, tous l’un après l’autre, pendant l’appel. J’avais eu tant de peine à les
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retrouver! Il m’avait fallu parfois des jours pour un seul vers, pour un seul mot,
qui refusaient de revenir. (Une connaissance inutile 12425)
As long as she continued to remain attuned to an ordinary sense of self, she
retained a sense of personhood. As such, not only did Delbo come to think up of mental
devices to remain attached to the world. Not only did she apply mnemotechnical
stratagems to prevent erasure of a nontraumatic emotional life, such as the one she used
to know in France. She also succeeded in preserving common forms of memory, from
which, for Lyotard, “the SS did everything possible to remove all traces” (Heidegger and
“the jews” 25).
The survival acts in which Delbo engaged are what Chambers calls movements of
“relay.” These movements, vital in increasing Charlotte’s chances of return, became her
own way of remaining attached to a sense of the real. These relays occurred at a place
where “death and life are likewise not separate.” They verged along the borders where
death and life are actually “closely joined.” These relays, however, enabled her to
maintain connection to the world of the living. Delbo courageously performed her acts of
survival around the living in the camp, who were living on such “intimate terms with the
dead” that they actually felt they were inhabiting “the space of death” already. She kept
going back and forth between the disparate places, selves, and memories of the camp
(Untimely Interventions 215). By taking place between a common memory and a
traumatic one, the relays thus served the following purpose. They enabled points of
conjuncture between Delbo’s self, an ordinary or common one, and her traumatized one.
The relaying movements that Delbo narratively exposes and performed at
Auschwitz, Raisko Laboratory, and Ravensbrück, are numerous. One particular instance
involves the carrying of the dead bodies of Delbo’s companions, Berthe and AnneMarie,
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back to the concentration camp. In this episode, Delbo brings together a heritage of
ordinary ways of being with traumatic ones. By cojoining the world of the dead with
that of the living, she emotionally succeeds in bridging the gap between these two.
Indeed, she initially acknowledges that “d’abord, c’est Berthe et AnneMarie que nous
portons.” But then, she forcibly has to admit that the movements of relay necessarily
involve, at some point, a oneway passage to the world of the dead. As such, this passage
eventually comes to exclude the initial joining to the world of the living. She contends
that soon, it is not “Berthe and AnneMarie that we are carrying” (Auschwitz and After
80). She writes that, “Bientôt ce ne sont plus que des fardeaux trop lourds, qui nous
échappent à chaque mouvement” (Aucun 129). At this point, Delbo actually
“contaminates” the world of the living with that of the dead. She narratively brings the
living into the spaces where the dead force their coexistence with them and confuse
them. In this instance, the relay concomitantly operates on another level. It
metaphorically prefigures a new form of knowledge. This knowledge, likewise, is
confusing and contaminating to the living. As such, the knowledge that Delbo and her
companions gathered in the face of death as “carriers of the dead” actually turns out to
be, not instructive or didactic, as one might expect. Rather, it turns out to be hopelessly
“useless.” This knowledge, whose “uselessness” Delbo reveals through the title of her
second work in the trilogy, is despairingly so (Une connaissance inutile 185). In the
instance discussed, it leaves the four actual carriers of the dead Berthe and AnneMarie
astounded with helplessness and despair. Generally or metaphorically speaking, it points
also at leaving any carrier or relayer of death confounded with hopelessness also.
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Brison contends that an “undoing of the self by trauma” can actually be “remade”
through “acts of memory.” In that perspective, “the self” can be projected in a
“narrative,” with a “beginning, middle, and end.” As such, for Brison, the survivor
becomes, “at the same time and once again,” a “second person.” Most importantly, the
survivor/narrator is also, however, “dependent on the listener in order to return to
personhood.” Telling one’s narrative can thus contribute to recovery. Significantly
enough, though, the “survivor’s testimonies must thus be heard, if recovery from trauma
is to be possible” (“Trauma Narratives” 4149).
Delbo claims that the knowledge she gathered at the camp was not only “useless.”
It was also ineffectual and to no avail (Une connaissance inutile 185). As she writes in
Auschwitz and After,
I came back from the dead
and believed
this gave me the right
to speak to others
but when I found myself face to face with them
I had nothing to say
because
I learned
over there
that you cannot speak to others.
(228)
The manner in which her own and other prisoners’ testimonies were received after
liberation dictated, to a certain extent, the success or failure of their process of recovery.
The title of Delbo’s second work, as well as the words just quoted, let us assume that the
reception to her testimony at the time was, if not indifference, at least incomprehension.
Moved by a desire to forget as soon as possible the war era, postwar audiences revealed
themselves inattentive or inhospitable to the prisoners’ stories. Yet, as Brison contends,
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in order to enter an experience of unlearning of trauma, the “survivors’ testimonies must
be heard” (“Trauma Narratives” 41). In this case, the inattentiveness on the part of the
living actually infringed on the survivors’ processes of recovery.
As Delbo further writes, “Les larmes coulent de fatigue et d’impuissance. Et
nous souffrons dans cette chair morte comme si elle était vivante.” Along with the
expression of the uselessness of knowledge that Delbo expresses in Auschwitz and After,
she also skillfully initiates a movement of reversal. That reversal figuratively returns the
two dead bodies to the world of the living. Her point here is to insist on the absurdity of
the whole experience. Indeed, and strangely enough, Delbo literally reinscribes the
corpses in the world of survivors. She does so even though her companions, at the time,
are already dead. Delbo writes, “La planche sous les cuisses les écorche, les coupe.
Berthe. AnneMarie” (Aucun 129). Insisting on the suffering of corpses onto which she
projects human qualities, Delbo facilitates the movement of relay to be actually reckoned
as useless. It is so because the world of the living, to some extent, is metaphorically dead
and deaf to her plea. In this passage, Delbo thus acts, in the words of Michael Rothberg,
as the bearer of an “uncanny double heritage” (Traumatic Realism 153). As such, the
knowledge she brings to us through relay is as somber and as useless as the devastation
that sustained it. As she writes in Une connaissance inutile,
La mémoire m’est revenue
et avec elle une souffrance
qui m’a fait m’en retourner
à la patrie de l’inconnu
C’était encore une patrie terrestre
et rien de moi ne peut fuir
je me possède toute
et cette connaissance
acquise au fond du désespoir
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Alors vous saurez
qu’il ne faut pas parler avec la mort
c’est une connaissance inutile.
Dans un monde
où ne sont pas vivants
ceux qui croient l‘être
toute connaissance devient inutile
à qui possède l’autre
et pour vivre
il vaut mieux ne rien savoir
ne rien savoir du prix de la vie
à un jeune homme qui va mourir
J’ai parlé avec la mort
alors
je sais
comme trop de choses apprises étaient vaines
mais je l’ai su au prix de souffrance
si grande
que je me demande
s’il valait la peine
(18485)
Another movement of traumatic relay, in the words of Rothberg that “contaminates”
the receiver of knowledge that is “useless” is enacted in the following example
(Traumatic Realism 153). It concerns an exchange of gifts that takes place at the Raisko
Laboratory during a Christmas party. At that point, Delbo interrogates how to spend
Christmas at a death camp. She also brings to light the chasm that separates the common
Christian act of rejoicing at a birth, that of Christ, and the traumatic reality of having to
witness the extermination of millions of human beings. At this point, Delbo asks,
“Comment passaiton Noël au camp de la mort.” In this instance, the death processed by
an extraordinary genocide is relayed through a doll, a teddy bear. The teddy bear arrived
at Auschwitz “dans les bras d’une petite fille.” It was then left in the antechamber of
death. The teddy bear is first pictured next to the little girl’s clothing, which she has
neatly folded. She put it there while she was getting ready for the deadly shower. It is, as
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such, depicted with “ses vêtements bien pliés à l’entrée de la douche.” In this instance,
the bear relays the knowledge of a criminal death at a time of celebration of life and birth.
Recovered by a prisoner of the “Sondercommando” working at the crematorium, the bear
eventually comes to be given as a gift at the Christmas party. As Delbo writes, “Au bout
de la table, une jeune fille caressait un petit ours qu’elle avait reçu. Un ours de peluche
rose avec une faveur au cou.” Hailed by Madeleine, one of her companions, Delbo
writes, “‘Regarde, me dit Madeleine, regarde! C’est un nounours! Un nounours
d’enfant.’” As Delbo and her group remembered the arrival of the group of Jews and the
little girl that morning, gassed to death on their arrival, she writes, “Et sa voix s’altéra. Je
regardai l’ours de peluche. C’était terrible” (Aucun 8687).
Two other examples of relay are worth examining. They both focus on instances
in which life and death are cojoined, and also result in fruitless and hopeless knowledge.
These instances, however, do not solely focus on the uselessness of knowing and
witnessing death. They point at the vitality of Delbo’s memory. Yet, the two excerpts
also point out the extent to which Delbo’s ordinary memory risks being destroyed and
overwhelmed by her traumatic one.
One example inscribes itself around Le Malade imaginaire, a play by Molière. It
is the play that former theatre assistant Delbo and her companions decided to rewrite
from memory, and set up for performance. It indicates the force of memory that Delbo
and her companions used as a tool of survival. The play, performed at Raisko on the
Sunday after Christmas in 1943, was, in the words of Charlotte, “magnificent” in the
“human generosity” that it captured. Its rehearsals required, however, such efforts of
memory on the part of its producers and actors as to be astounding. Even though Delbo’s
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conditions of living had slightly improved by then, the whole undertaking remained
amazingly painstaking. As she remembers,
On a beau avoir une pièce bien en tête, en voir et en entendre les personnages,
c’est une tâche difficile à qui relève du typhus, est constamment habité par la
faim. Celles qui pouvaient aidaient. Une réplique était souvent la victoire d’une
journée. (Une connaissance inutile 91)
The second instance of her going back and forth between an ordinary
representation of the world and a traumatic one took place, on an every day basis, at roll
call. It incited Delbo to daily recite Molière’s Misanthrope, so as to keep her ordinary
memory alive. Both instances point to the following question: how does or did Delbo’s
ordinary memory succeed in “maintaining together,” with “effects of conjuncture,” that
which had been “disjoined”? (Specters of Marx 18). As Delbo remembers,
J’ai appris Le Misanthrope par coeur, un fragment chaque soir, que je me répétais
à l’appel du lendemain matin. Bientôt j’ai su toute la pièce, qui durait presque
tout l’appel. Et jusqu’au départ, j’ai gardé la brochure dans ma gorge. (Une
connaissance inutile
12425)
Delbo’s attempt at maintaining connections with an outside world is grounded, in
both cases, in an ordinary memory that wants to live on. For Michael Rothberg, this
conscious undertaking by Delbo and her companions at remaining connected were acts of
the will to survive. These acts, he contends, represented the desire to preserve the self
through the community. Actually, they were sustained through connections to a sense of
the real through communal efforts. For Rothberg, these conscious acts of survival were
also mainly grounded in the preservation of “some modicum of continuity between the
every day and the extreme.” In his words, it is precisely this relative preservation of a
sense of continuity and solidarity within a community established in extreme
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circumstance that actually “resulted in an ‘exceptional, unique’ survival rate” for the
women of Delbo’s group (Traumatic Realism 150).
In another instance of Delbo’s inscribing an experience of normality at the heart
of extremity, the experience does not make a cognitive or verbal statement. But it
appeals to the memory of instinctual or learned gestures used in ordinary life that, Delbo
confesses, she had to relearn in extreme circumstances. The episode has her reconnect
to ordinary gestures that a traumatic memory has threatened to destroy. This episode, set
sixtyseven days after her arrival in Auschwitz, has Delbo do some simple gestures that
she has forgotten because of the living conditions at the camp. It also has Delbo savor,
for an extremely short moment, a reprieve from camp life. In this episode, Delbo
describes her opportunity of cleaning her body. It makes her realize how dreadfully
meager and filthy it has become. Delbo recalls the bathing session she experienced in the
cold water of the river by the death camp in the month of April. Her memory insists on
the extraordinary corporal changes that have occurred since she has arrived. It also
expresses feelings of astonishment at thinking of how simple gestures of life can be easily
forgotten in changed circumstances. Delbo performs them with a sense of rediscovery.
She writes,
Après avoir rangé chaussures, jaquette et foulard, j’ai enlevé mes bas. Je ne les
avais pas enlevés depuis l’arrivée, depuis soixantesept jours. Je les ai retirés en
les retournant. A la pointe du pied, j’ai senti une résistance. Les bas étaient
collés. J’ai tiré un peu fort et les bas sont venus à l’envers, avec un drôle de
dessin au bout . . . J’ai regardé mes pieds. Ils étaient noirs de crasse, et, au bout,
d’un noir particulier, plutôt violet, avec des épaisseurs séchées aux orteils et mes
orteils étaient bizarrement déguisés; sauf les deux gros, ils avaient perdu leur
ongle. Et c’étaient les ongles qui, détachés et collés aux bas, y faisaient ce
curieux dessin. Après, j’ai compris que mes orteils avaient dû geler. . . Voir ses
ongles de pied incrustés dans ses bas, je vous assure que c’est étonnant.
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C’est mystérieux, l’odorat. Il y avait longtemps que j’étais rentrée, et je prenais
alors au moins deux bains chaque jour—une vraie manie—en me frottant avec un
bon savon, il y avait des semaines que j’étais rentrée, que je sentais toujours sur
moi l’odeur du camp, une odeur de purin et de charogne. Et ce jourlà, près du
ruisseau, j’ai ôté ma culotte empesée par la diarrhée séchée—si vous croyez qu’il
y avait du papier ou quoi que ce soit, avant que l’herbe repousse… et je n’ai pas
été écœurée par l’odeur.
Je suis descendue dans l’eau. Elle était froide et j’en ai été saisie. Elle venait à
peine audessus des chevilles et c’était un surprenant contact, le contact de l’eau
sur la peau.
Maintenant, je commence par où? . . . je me suis passé de l’eau sur la figure.
D’abord doucement, parce que cette sensation de l’eau sur le visage était si
nouvelle, si merveilleuse, mais je me suis vite reprise. Il n’y avait pas de temps à
perdre. (Une connaissance inutile 6061)
Despite the efforts that Delbo made to remain connected to an ordinary reality in
the camp, she admits, however, that she never totally succeeded in doing so. As such,
she declared that in the camp, one could never pretend or take refuge in the imaginary. In
La mémoire et les jours, Delbo writes, “au camp, on ne pouvait jamais faire semblant,
jamais se réfugier dans l’imaginaire.” Likewise, her friend and companion Yvonne
Picart, in an attempt to alleviate her own suffering once wondered why she could not
picture herself carrying her books to one of her classes on boulevard SaintMichel,
instead of bricks from the marsh. As she replied to herself, “Les mains bleues de froid,
les lèvres fendues par les gerçures,” she claimed that a distancing from reality was utterly
impossible. She remembers, “C’est impossible.” At the camp, “on ne peut s’imaginer,
ni être autre, ni être ailleurs” (12). In Holocaust Testimonies, Langer contends that
“Endeavors to leave [the camp] behind now prove as futile as attempts to escape from its
reality into an imagined future then” (4). As Delbo herself claims in La mémoire et les
jours
Quand je récitais un poème, quand je racontais un livre ou une pièce de théatre à
mes camarades autour de moi, tout en bêchant la boue du marais, c’était pour me
garder en vie, pour garder ma mémoire, pour demeurer moimême, m’en assurer.
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Cela ne réussissait jamais à annuler, même une seconde, le moment que je vivais.
C’était une grande victoire sur l’horreur que penser, se souvenir, mais cela n’en
atténuait rien. La réalité était là, mortelle. Impossible de s’en abstraire.
As Delbo further contends,
A Auschwitz, la réalité était si écrasante, la souffrance, la fatigue, le froid si
extrêmes, que nous n’avions aucune énergie de reste pour cet effort de
dédoublement.
The weight of the trauma of the past, indelible and profound, eludes coherence
and attachment to an ordinary life. It also prevents, as in the case of Delbo, a total
reconnection to the self, present, and future. Upon her return, Delbo wondered about the
ways available to get away or withdraw from the reality of Auschwitz. She confessed, in
fact, an incapacity to give a satisfactory answer on how to avoid the camp’s presence.
Not only were her chances of escaping Auschwitz limited then. The potentiality of a
complete return from it are also limited and remain scarce now. As she writes,
Comment aije fait pour m’en dégager au retour, pour vivre aujourd’hui? Une
question qu’on me pose souvent, à laquelle je cherche une réponse, sans la
trouver. (12)
She further declares,
Auschwitz est si profondément gravé dans ma mémoire que je n’en oublie aucun
instant. – Alors, vous vivez avec Auschwitz? –Non, je vis à côté. Auschwitz est
là, inaltérable, précis, mais enveloppé dans la peau de la mémoire, peau étanche
qui l’isole de mon moi actuel. (13)
To make her point even clearer, Delbo metaphorically uses the image of a snake’s skin.
Through the metaphor of a skin that she cannot shed, Delbo insists on the inalterability of
the presence of Auschwitz in her memory. At first, she sets out to explain that a serpent
can renew its skin. It sheds the old skin by leaving it behind. That way, it can start
afresh as a new organism fitted and protected by a new body envelope. Unlike the
serpent, Delbo claims that she, however, was unable to shed her traumatic skin. Neither
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could she renew her memory. As she contends, “A la différence de la peau de serpent, la
peau de la mémoire ne se renouvelle pas.” Eventually, she hoped that the skin of her
memory, since it could not shed, would grow thicker and harder. She prayed that it
would also keep her separate from her experience at Auschwitz. As such, she begged for
the skin of her memory to remain strong and impermeable. She pleads “Oh! Qu’elle
durcisse encore.” Fearing, however, that her distancing from Auschwitz would only be
an illusion, she comments, “Hélas! Je crains souvent qu’elle s’amincisse, qu’elle craque,
que le camp me rattrape. Y penser me fait trembler d’appréhension” (La mémoire et les
jours 13).
While at the camp, Delbo was faced with the impossibility of escaping the reality
of Auschwitz. She could not distinctly separate a traumatized self from an ordinary or
common one either. What Lawrence Langer calls a protective movement of “de
doubling” of the self was thus impossible for Delbo at the camp (Holocaust Testimonies
5). Through an interesting movement of reversal, however, this dedoubling of the self
that Delbo claims was absent at Auschwitz is what actually made her life tolerable upon
her return. As she asserts,
C’est une grande chance, sans doute, que ne pas me reconnaître dans ce moi qui
était à Auschwitz. En revenir était si peu probable, qu’il me semble n’y être pas
allée. Au contraire de ceux dont la vie s’est arrêtée au seuil du retour, qui depuis
vivent en survie, moi, j’ai le sentiment que celle qui était au camp, ce n’est pas
moi, ce n’est pas la personne qui est là, en face de vous. Non, c’est trop
incroyable. Et tout ce qui est arrivé à cette autre, celle d’Auschwitz, ne me touche
pas, moi, maintenant, ne me concerne pas, tant sont séparées la mémoire profonde
et la mémoire ordinaire. Je vis dans un être double. Le double d’Auschwitz ne
me gêne pas, ne se mêle pas de ma vie. Comme si ce n’était pas moi du tout.
Sans cette coupure, je n’aurais pas pu revivre. (La mémoire et les jours 13)
This dedoubling that Delbo describes obviously invalidates the question of re
writing a life history in a continuum. It also preempts reinscribing the time that Delbo
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experienced as traumatic in her everyday life. Reintegrating continuity in time, a time
with “conjuncture” was thus, if not impossible for Delbo, very unlikely (Specters of Marx
18). As such, the self that Delbo attempted, in Morrison’s words, to “remake” after
Auschwitz was not only damaged (Jazz 229). It remained fragmented and fragile as well.
In her case, a remaking of self distinct from a traumatized one could not be durably
accomplished (“Trauma Narratives” 39). As she claims,
La peau dont s’enveloppe la mémoire d’Auschwitz est solide. Elle éclate pourtant
quelquefois, et restitue tout son contenu. Sur le rêve, la volonté n’a aucun
pouvoir. Et dans ces rêveslà, je me revois, moi, oui, moi, telle que je sais que
j’étais : tenant à peine debout, la gorge dure, le coeur dont le battement déborde la
poitrine, transpercée de froid, sale, décharnée, et la souffrance est si
insupportable, si exactement la souffrance endurée làbas, que je la ressens dans
tout mon corps qui devient un bloc de souffrance, et je sens la mort s’agripper à
moi, je me sens mourir. Heureusement, dans mon agonie, je crie. Le cri me
réveille et je sors du cauchemar, épuisée. Il faut des jours pour que tout rentre
dans l’ordre, que tout se refourre dans la mémoire et que la peau de la mémoire se
ressoude. Je redeviens moimême, celle que vous connaissez, qui peut vous
parler d’Auschwitz sans marquer ni ressentir trouble ou émotion. (La mémoire et
les jours
1314)
In this excerpt, Delbo refers to the possible rupture of the skin that envelops her deep
memory. She also, however, points at the inalterability of the traumatic feelings and
sensations forever grounded in her. These sensations, leaving her little respite, always act
as traces that remain indelible. As she claims, “dans cette mémoire profonde, les
sensations sont intactes” (13). Not only do theses sensations resist erasure from her
traumatic memory. They remain irrevocable and unalterable. She likewise admits that
they have contaminated her ordinary memory also. As she claims,
Parce que, lorsque je vous parle d’Auschwitz ce n’est pas de la mémoire
profonde que viennent mes paroles. Les paroles viennent de la mémoire externe,
si je puis dire, la mémoire intellectuelle, la mémoire de la pensée. La mémoire
profonde garde les sensations, les empreintes physiques. C’est la mémoire des
sens. Car ce ne sont pas les mots qui sont gonflés de charge émotionnelle. Sinon,
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quelqu’un qui a été torturé par la soif pendant des semaines ne pourrait plus dire :
“J’ai soif. Faisons une tasse de thé.” Le mot aussi s’est dédoublé. Soif est
redevenu un mot d’usage courant. Par contre, si je rêve de la soif dont j’ai
souffert à Birkenau, je revois celle que j’étais, hagarde, perdant la raison,
titubante; je ressens physiquement cette vraie soif et c’est un cauchemar atroce.
Mais, si vous voulez que je vous en parle…
C’est pourquoi je dis aujourd’hui que, tout en sachant très bien que c’est
véridique, je ne sais plus si c’est vrai. (La mémoire et les jours 14)
Delbo closes the second volume of her trilogy with a long poem that evokes her return to
the world. This world to which she returned is actually ours, the one that we think we
know. We think of it as one that we presuppose ordinary in its present state of existence.
The excerpt illustrates, however, the confusion between the two worlds that Delbo has
come to know. The poem indicates an impossible return to a world exclusively ordinary.
As Delbo writes,
Je reviens d’un autre monde
dans ce monde
que je n’avais pas quitté
et je ne sais
lequel est vrai
ditesmoi suisje revenue
de l’autre monde?
pour moi
Je suis encore làbas
et je meurs
làbas
chaque jour un peu plus
je remeurs
la mort de ceux qui sont morts
et je ne sais plus quel est vrai
du mondelà
de l’autre monde làbas
maintenant
je ne sais plus
quand je rêve
et quand
je ne rêve pas.
(Une connaissance inutile 184)
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Not only does the excerpt pose an impossibility of return for Delbo. Une
connaissance inutile actually also posits the existence of a world that is not left intact
after Auschwitz. Delbo makes this clear in the last poem of the book. In it, she addresses
a plea to the living. More precisely, she appeals to a community of readers. She
demands their attention on the necessity of grounding one’s life, not in a useless
knowledge, but in a worthy one. While she interpellates her readers, Delbo invokes the
worth of an uncontaminated, ordinary, useful life. More specifically, she illuminates the
potential value of a life that has been spared the atrocity of her own experience. She also
reinstates the uselessness of the knowledge that she gathered at Auschwitz by insisting
on its devastating character. She also reminds us of the futility of her experience,
because it has left the living in a state of indifference towards the survivors. In the poem
entitled “Prière aux vivants pour leur pardonner d’être vivants,” Delbo writes,
Je vous en supplie
faites quelque chose
apprenez un pas
une danse
quelque chose qui vous justifie
qui vous donne le droit
d’être habillés de votre peau de votre poil
apprenez à marcher et à rire
parce que ce serait trop bête
à la fin
que tant soient morts
et que vous viviez
sans rien faire de votre vie
*
Je reviens
d’au delà de la connaissance
il faut maintenant désapprendre
je vois bien qu’autrement
je ne pourrais plus vivre
*
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Et puis
mieux vaut ne pas y croire
à ces histoires
de revenants
plus jamais vous ne dormirez
si jamais vous les croyez
ces spectres revenants
ces revenants
qui reviennent
sans pouvoir même
expliquer comment.
(Une connaissance inutile 19091)

In the context of African American experiences, cultural memory, for Durrant,
can be assimilated into the individual consciousness as a complement to the individual’s
sense of identity. Racial memory, however, threatens to destroy this sense of identity.
This form of memory is “unhealthy” because it envelops the self in an experience of
negation. Also, for Durrant, racial memory yields along “a melancholic identification
with the dead.” It constitutes a “lifethreatening, othercentered mode of being claimed
by the dead.” It marks the individual with a “mode of beingfordeath.” Like
melancholia, Durrant claims, “racial memory” is a way of “identifying with the way in
which one’s ancestors have been forgotten,” even while they were alive. For African
Americans, it is a mode of recognizing oneself as a victim, nameless and
unacknowledged, of the Middle Passage or slavery. As such, “racial memory” involves
recognizing that the “the institution of slavery was founded on the foreclosure of the
slave’s humanity” (Postcolonial Narrative 80).
Morrison’s novels reveal and lay bare the logic of repetition of trauma, violence,
and negation. For Durrant, this can constitute a mode of working through. In that case,
the traumatized self chooses to take action that can affect the outcome of events that are
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emotionally disturbing. She wants to change the course of her history. Yet, Morrison’s
novels, including Jazz, also point at a certain mode of actingout. Indeed, in Morrison’s
oeuvre, as in Jazz, the responses to disturbing events do not actually have protagonists
confront their dilemmas in a constructive way. Rather, they mostly repeat a logic of
violence whose structure seems inalterable. To use Delbo’s metaphor of the serpent’s
skin, the memory of a negated humanity which cannot be shed, and the
unacknowledgment of the pain that it caused threaten to keep intruding time and again.
When it ruptures, acts of violence surge in uncontrolled negativity. This type of violence
comes across as extremely destructive. This destructive behavior is not exclusively
aimed at the self. It is aimed at others as well.
Even though the events that damage Morrison’s characters are different from
those experienced by Delbo, a similar type of splitting of the self seems to have taken
place as a result. Disturbing memories, such as those that disconnect the protagonists
from an ordinary perception of the self, are indeed at work in Jazz. Like Delbo’s,
Morrison’s second volume of the trilogy thus suggests that little can be done to push back
the despairing memories of the past, and get on with life. Not only does a profound life
disturbance negatively affect those characters who have survived slavery and violence.
More insidiously, impaired selves disconnected from reality are found in the generations
following Emancipation and Reconstruction as well.
In the case of Violet, nicknamed “violent” by her peers in Jazz, the reenactment
of violence is grounded, among others, in a lack of connections to a supporting
environment (75). Not only does this absence of generational nurturing in Violet inscribe
itself in missing a foundational family in the first place. It is also grounded in Violet’s
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unwillingness, then inability, to start a family of her own. As she indeed promised
herself “to never never have children,” she realized that it was “the most important thing,
the biggest thing” she could do. “Whatever happened,” she would never want to see a
“small dark foot rest on another” while “a hungry mouth” would say “Mama?” (102). As
a matter of fact, Violet feels not only disconnected from a past and future history of
familial benevolence. She is disconnected from an emotionally balanced self as well. It
comes as no surprise, thus, that she also feels very distant from Joe, her unfaithful
husband. Even though they are still a couple, they are “barely speaking to each other,”
let alone “laughing together” or acting like “the ground” is “a dancehall floor” (36).
Violet’s quasi absence from the world has only added to the psychological entrapments in
which she has confined her self. These have nourished in Violet some forms of restraint,
but also of anger and excess, in the face of life, and in her relationships. She is unable to
“do the things worth doing,” and to feel “supported by the core of the world” (63). As
previously mentioned, this lack is mainly rooted in an absence of motherly care during
her adolescent years. It is also due to the violent death of her mother, who committed
suicide after a degrading dispossession of their meager belongings. The internalized
feelings of trauma, helplessness, and shame that Violet felt then made her want to think,
at first, of her life in different, more promising terms. As she first recalls the scene of
dispossession, she reflects on
Her mother. She didn’t want to be like that. Oh never like that. To sit at the
table, alone in the moonlight, sipping boiled coffee from a white china cup as long
as it was there, and pretending to sip it when it was gone; waiting for morning
when men came, talking low as though nobody was there but themselves, and
picked around in our things, lifting out what they wanted—what was theirs, they
said, although we cooked in it, washed sheets in it, sat on it, ate off of it. That
was after they had hauled away the plow, the scythe, the mule, the sow, the churn
and the butter press. Then they came inside the house and all of us children put
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one foot on the other and watched. When they got to the table where our mother
sat nursing an empty cup, they took the table out from under her and then, while
she sat there alone, and all by herself like, cup in hand, they came back and tipped
the chair she sat in. She didn’t jump up right away, so they shook it a bit and
since she still stayed seated—looking ahead at nobody— they just tipped her out
of it like the way you get the cat of the seat if you don’t want to touch it or pick it
up in your arms. You tip it forward and it lands on the floor. No harm done if it’s
a cat because it has four legs. But a person, a woman, might fall forward and just
stay there a minute looking at the cup, stronger than she is, unbroken at least and
lying a bit beyond her hand. Just out of reach. (9798)
What made Violet’s mother jump into a well to end her life may not have been clear.
It can be related, however, to the “one and final thing [Rose Dear] had not been able to
endure or repeat.” The humiliations and negative projections, as well as dispossession,
that African Americans endured in slavery and in the Reconstruction era may certainly
offer some grounds in uncovering Rose Dear’s motivation to end her life. Yet, there is
present also, in the depiction of this drama, the enduring feelings of helplessness in the
face of trauma and shame that arose in the aftermath of the event. Impacting the
following generation, including that of Violet, the shame that transmitted itself then
through what Durrant calls the “racial memory” endured (Postcolonial Narrative 80).
Inalterable and impossible to erase, it definitely stayed with Violet. It is encrypted in
Morrison’s text, as the narrator of Jazz further speculates on Rose Dear’s suicide. We are
asked to wonder:
Had the last washing split the shirtwaist so bad it could not take another mend and
changed its name to rag? Perhaps word had reached her about the fourday
hangings in Rocky Mount: the men on Tuesday, the women two days later. Or
had it been the news of the young tenor in the choir mutilated and tied to a log, his
grandmother refusing to give up his wastefilled trousers, washing them over and
over although the stain had disappeared at the third rinse. Might it have been the
morning after the night when craving (which used to be hope) got out of hand?
When longing squeezed, then tossed her before running promising to return and
bounce her again like an Indiarubber ball? Or was it that chair they tipped her
out of? Did she fall on the floor and lie there deciding right then that she would
do it. Someday. Delaying it for four years while True Belle came and took over
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but remembering the floorboards as door, closed and locked. Seeing bleak truth
in an unbreakable china cup? Biding her time until the moment returned—with
all its mewing hurt or overboard rage—and she could turn away from the door,
the cup to step toward the limitlessness beckoning from the well. What could it
have been, I wonder? (101)
Rose Dear’s suicide does not only have the narrator of Jazz relate the fracture that it
provoked to Violet’s “crazy” behavior. The narrator also implies that Violet’s troubled
history and affected present are actually symptomatic of her perturbed and shameful
family past in general. Yet, this lack of coherence in Violet’s life does not seem to have
receded later on in life, at times of improved financial situation or affective involvement
with her husband. As the narrator comments on Violet’s lack of stability and coherence,
she poses the question as to whether “the children of suicide” are not, after all, “hard to
please” and “quick to believe no one loves them,” just because “they are not really here”
(4).
Violet’s emotional life, impaired first by the loss of a mother in distress, then by
withdrawal from life, Joe, and even herself, thus seems at a dead end. It has Violet being
content to live just in the presence of her birds, especially with the parrot who says “I
love you” (3).
The profound need for love and care that Violet did not receive is paralleled by
the story of Golden Gray, the illegitimate son of wealthy Miss Vera Louise and Henry
Lestroy (143). The “yellow curled” child that True Belle, Violet’s grandmother, helped
raise was provided in abundance with motherly care, servant’s love and material
possession. While True Belle did take care of him at the cost of her own family, she
projected onto the child a model of love and nurturing. Investing him with the most
desirable qualities, Golden Gray became the epitome of the perfect child not only to True
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Belle. He came to represent, for Violet also, a model of childhood freed from racial
consciousness. Yet, as it took Golden Gray’s mother “eighteen years to get around to it”
and say that “his father was a blackskinned nigger,” it took as long to biracial Golden
Gray to discover the truth, trace, and find his father (143). While Golden Gray’s absence
of fatherly connections is very similar to the missing of maternal bonds in Violet, but also
in Joe, it points to the despair and trauma that overwhelm children, and later adults, of
parentless heritage. The following excerpt reveals how Morrison aesthetically discloses
the irreparable sufferings that followed the explosion of family bonds in the postbellum
South due to slavery, racism, poverty, or violence. While this form of loss touches
practically every character in Jazz, it comes as a racial memory that becomes ingrained in
Golden Gray, Joe, and Violet, with great despair. In the following instance, Golden Gray
offers a poignant view of the destructive forces that have resulted from his being an
orphan:
Only now, he thought, now that I know I have a father, do I feel his absence: the
place where he should have been and was not. Before, I thought everybody was
onearmed, like me. Now I feel the surgery. The crunch of bone when it is
sundered, the sliced flesh and the tubes of blood cut through, shocking the
bloodrun and disturbing the nerves. They dangle and writhe. Singing pain.
Waking me with the sound of itself, thrumming when I sleep so deeply it
strangles my dreams away. There is nothing for it but to go away from where he
is not to where he used to be and might be still. Let the dangle and the writhe see
what it is missing; let the pain sing to the dirt where he stepped in the place where
he used to be and might be still. I am not going to be healed, or to find the arm
that was removed from me. I am going to freshen the pain, point it, so we both
know what it is for.
And no, I am not angry. I don’t need the arm. But I do need to know what it
could have been like to have had it. It’s a phantom I have to behold and be held
by, in whatever crevices it lies, under whatever branch. Or may be it stalks
treeless and open places, lit with an oily sun. This part of me that does not know
me, has never touched me or lingered at my side. This goneaway hand that never
helped me over the stile, or guided me past the dragons, pulled me up from the
ditch into which I stumbled. Stroked my hair, fed me food; took the far end of the
load to make it easier for me to carry. This arm that never held itself out,
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extended from my body, to give me balance as I walked thin rails or logs, round
and slippery with danger. When I find it, will it wave to me? Gesture, beckon to
me to come along? Or will it even know who or what I am? It doesn’t matter. I
will locate it so the severed part can remember the snatch, the slice of its
disfigurement. Perhaps then the arm will no longer be a phantom, but will take its
own shape, grow its own muscle and bone, and its blood will pump from the loud
singing that has found the purpose of its serenade. Amen.
As Golden Gray further reflects on the damage done to him, he also wonders if it can
ever be made up somehow. He asks,
Who will take my part? Soap away the shame? Suds it till it falls away muck at
my feet to be stepped out of? Will he? Redeem me like a pawn ticket worth little
on the marketplace, but priceless in retrieving real value? What do I care what the
color of his skin is, or his contact with my mother? When I see him, or what is
left of him, I will tell him all about the missing part of me and listen for his crying
shame. I will exchange then; let him have mine and take his as my own and we
will both be free, armtangled and whole. (15859)
In the words of Bessel van der Kolk and Onno van der Hart, “memory is an active
and constructive process.” As such, “memory” enables a mental reexperiencing, or at
least rethinking, of previous experiences. This rethinking can thus open for the subject
spaces of mental or emotional confrontations, which have been left unexplored. In this
regard, the mental reenacting of previously unsolved traumas and losses can entail some
form of positive confrontations. These can lead towards acceptance of the image of the
self in negating experiences. This process is visibly at work with Golden Gray, but also
with Joe and Violet. Her conversations with Alice Manfred, the aunt of orphaned
Dorcas, her husband’s lover, testify to that. Alice’s and Violet’s emotional exchanges are
in fact an active rethinking of reactions to past events and experiences that have been
shattering. The unfinished business of slavery marks all of Jazz’s characters with
absences of fathers, losses of mothers to racial violence, and disruption and dislocation of
the family unit. Yet, for van der Kolk and van der Hart, this “remembering,” which
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operates within an “organic response,” should be “adaptive.” In Morrison’s Jazz, the
“organic response” to parental abandonment and loss of marital bonds does not, however,
take the form of positive sorting out of emotions. Rather, Violet’s response to pain
remains a status quo of negation and wrongdoing. Not only does this perpetuating of
violence remain enduring and permanent. It also hinders Violet’s process of working
through (“The Intrusive Past” 170).
The same process of negative repetition has hampered Joe as well. It has
prevented him from growing out of his feelings of shame, pain and loss for his mother
Wild. A fugitive woman living in a cave, “powerless, invisible, wastefully daft.
Everywhere and nowhere,” Joe’s mother, presumably Beloved, abandoned Joe “without a
trace” (Jazz 179). “Shaming him before everybody,” she is so “brainblasted” that she
has not done “what the meanest sow managed: nurse what she birthed” (Jazz 17879).
Maternal abandonment has marked Joe so deeply as to cast him in a deep emotional
unrest that he seems unable to put behind.
Both Violet and Joe, however, once expected to eventually change the course of
their lives. First through improving their economic situation by migrating North. They
also hoped to grow emotionally, and socially, by starting afresh in a new city, New York
City. As the narrator of Jazz states,
Even if the room they rented was smaller than the heifer’s stall and darker than a
morning privy, they stayed to look at their number, hear themselves in an
audience, feel themselves moving down the street among hundreds of others who
moved the way they did, and who, when they spoke, regardless of the accent,
treated language like the same intricate, malleable toy designed for their play.
(32)
Yet, for Violet and Joe, “part of why they loved it” so much was because of “the specter
they left behind” (33). Their need to “run from want and violence” was only exacerbated
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by their desire to escape the “sad stuff. The bad stuff. The thingsnobodycouldhelp
stuff. The way everybody was then and there.” Full of drive to leave the past behind,
they were eager to “forget that History is over, you all, and everything’s ahead at last.”
Yet, the positive outcome they expected from their move from Vesper County,
Virginia, to the “City,” has not, however, fully materialized (7). Rather, the intrusion of
their painful past into the present has actually become for Joe and Violet a main source of
negative impulses and poor choices. The grief that they felt at the absence of parents, due
to lack of economic opportunities and racist outbursts, has not departed from them, or
receded over time. Instead, it has become even more obsessive. It has kept them
enclosed in a pattern of repetition of transgressive behavior. As Joe declares,
He had struggled a long time with that loss, believed he had resigned himself to
it, had come to terms with the fact that old age would be not remembering what
things felt like. That you could say, ‘I was scared to death,’ but you could not
retrieve the fear. That you could replay in the brain the scene of ecstasy, of
murder, of tenderness, but it was drained of everything but the language to say it
in. He thought he had come to terms with that but he had been wrong. (29)
For Sam Durrant, Joe and Violet Trace’s lives clearly testify to the claim that
Morrison’s narratives are unable to “offer closure.” He makes his point through the
following assertion that Morrison clearly demonstrates in Jazz. For one, Durrant posits
that, “the injustices of slavery and its aftermath” can actually “never be fully worked
through.” Also, Morrison’s oeuvre cannot offer complete healing because, for Durrant,
“racial oppression remains a contemporary reality.” Likewise, “because the cycle of
abuse and selfabuse and violation is still playing itself out in black communities across
the United States,” the narratives are locked in repetition, and they are unable to bring
“closure.” For Durrant, Morrison’s novels, marked by racial memory as they are, thus
serve to indicate how the history that they infiltrate “threatens to collapse into itself.” As
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such, Morrison’s novels point at how African American history threatens to remain a
history of trauma, since Morrison’s oeuvre “refuses to close the wound of African
American history.” Her novels actually testify to “the impossibility of ever fully coming
to terms with the history of racism.” Also, the origin of the trauma in Morrison’s work is
not to be located at the confines of the” individual case history” only. It positions itself
“within a collective history of racial abuse” as well. As such, closure remains thus even
more hypothetical. For Durrant, it is so because Morrison’s work deals with a history
that is “not so much a history.” The history that she reveals is rather a “suspension of
history.” It is made of “an infinite repetition of an original scene of molestation” that
keeps being reenacted. For Durrant, such a “history” can never be properly “abreacted
or adequately mourned” (Postcolonial Narrative 83).
The unrest that permeates Joe and Violet’s life stories hinders their progression
towards emotional liberation. The musical playing of jazz in their lives is testimony to
the dangerous repetition of this turmoil. Infused with insecurities and choices of behavior
leading to loss of control of the self, Joe and Violet get caught in stories of selfgenerated
abuse and selfinflicted offences. The improvisatory, jazzlike feel of the novel is
especially indicative of these transgressions that both characters attempt, unsuccessfully,
to resolve. Violet’s attack and stabbing of Dorcas’s corpse at the burial ceremony is only
one instance of her deeply rooted emotional unstable character. This lack of grounding
of the self is particularly manifest in the “private cracks,” the “dark fissures” that the
narrator of Jazz perceives in Violet (22). Premises of a dedoubling of personality, these
cracks distract Violet from a continuous attachment to reality. As such, at times, she
clearly lacks connections and grounding to a nurturing cultural history. Instead, she
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attaches to a racial memory that testifies to her missing a solid foundation in the self.
Violet’s surges of disconnectedness are particularly evident in the following excerpt.
Like Charlotte did after Auschwitz, Violet experiences forms of dissociation from her
own self. In the words of Marlene Steinberg, this is similar to the “dissociative state of
altered consciousness,” from which a person may suffer in a case of “depersonalization.”
In that state, the individual reports “feeling a sense of unreality about the self.” Or, she
feels that “her real self is distanced.” Sometimes, she may even feel that “she is
observing the self from the outside” (“Systematizing Dissociations” 62). As such, the
“private cracks,” not the “openings or breaks,” but the “dark fissures in the globe light of
the day” that Violet displays are very revealing (Jazz 22). Piercing Violet’s frame of
mind, the narrator observes,
She wakes up in the morning and sees with perfect clarity a string of small,
welllit scenes. In each one, something specific is being done: food things, work
things; customers and acquaintances are encountered, places entered. But she
does not see herself doing these things. She sees them being done. The globe
light holds and bathes each scene, and it can be assumed that at the curve where
the light stops is a solid foundation. In truth, there is no foundation at all, but
alleyways, crevices one steps across all the time. But the globe light is imperfect
too. Closely examined it shows seams, illglued cracks and weak places beyond
which is anything. Anything at all. Sometimes when Violet isn’t paying attention
she stumbles onto these cracks, like the time when, instead of putting her left heel
forward, she stepped back and folded her legs in order to sit in the street. (2223)
Violet’s lack of active involvement in ordinary life is continually underscored by her over
active inclination for destructive acts. Even after Joe kills his lover in a murderous act of
jealousy, Violet feels the urge of vengefully knifing the corpse. As such, “the girl’s
memory” remains “a sickness in the house—everywhere and nowhere.” While there is
nothing for Violet “to beat or hit,” after the girl’s death, Violet sustains her desire for
revenge. As Morrison writes, “and when she has to, just has to strike it somehow,” there
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is “nothing left” for Violet to harm. “All there is left is straw, or the sepia print of the girl
staring from the mantelpiece” (28, 12). This may explain why, back to her apartment
after the burial, Violet “took the birds from their cages and set them out the windows to
freeze or fly.” She also sent to an almost certain death her parrot who said, “I love you”
(3).
Violet’s violent nature, and her repressed, yet undying longing for a child, once
even had Violet halfconsciously kidnap a baby in the street. This act of public craziness
made her the target of the shaming gaze and gossip of the neighborhood people. Even
though she protested her innocence at the time, she still views the kidnapping accusation
as “an outrage to her character.” Despite Violet’s denial, she is unable, however, to put
behind the feelings surrounding her possessing the stolen baby. The memory of “the
light . . . that had skipped through her veins” when she held the lightskinned child
occasionally comes back to her. She then imagines “a brightness that could be carried in
her arms.” Eventually, that brightness could be “distributed, if need be, into places dark
as the bottom of a well” (22).
While Jazz indeed emphasizes the need to invent new ways of understanding
experience, the novel clearly underscores specific aspects of the AfricanAmerican
experience that remain clearly “undigested.” The experiences, of improvising a new life
set in freedom, clearly draw on the musical qualities of jazz as a “distinct and brilliant art
form with a clear African heritage” (Oxford Companion 397). Not only do they remain
improvisational and unfinished, but as importantly, the processing of the trauma they
engendered remains improvisational and unfinished as well.

168

Chapter 4. Ambiguous Communities
If we assume that Auschwitz and After narrates a single story, Delbo’s traumatic realist
writing could have this general outline: the first volume, Aucun de nous ne reviendra,
begins with a scene of arrival at Auschwitz. It ends while Delbo is still in Birkenau, the
Auschwitz camp for female inmates. The second work, Une connaissance inutile, begins
in Birkenau and ends with the liberation of Ravensbrück. The third testimonial book,
Mesure de nos jours, which tells initially of repatriation, consists mostly of testimonies.
These are attributed to certain of Delbo’s fellow survivors, who were her companions in
the camps and her comrades in the aftermath. For Michael Rothberg, Auschwitz and
After works thus on at least “three different narrative modes,” all of which capture
“different aspects of the concentrationary universe.” According to Rothberg, the first
mode, that of Aucun de nous ne reviendra, serves to assemble Charlotte’s testimonial
“micronarratives.” These “reveal the spatial closure and repetitive temporality of
Auschwitz.” Une connaissance inutile, on the other hand, proposes the narrative as a
“metonymic chain.” The chain both traces and transgresses the various internal and
external borders of the camp universe, which Aucun de nous ne reviendra had brought
forward. While Une connaisance inutile adds frames of references from the everyday to
the narrative, these frames are perceived to overlap with those of the camp. The realms
of the ordinary and of the extreme keep mutually interfering with each other. So not only
does Une connaisance inutile evidence a profound unsettling of spatiotemporal
boundaries. It also indicates, and insists on, a seemingly lasting psychological
traumatization. Une connaisance inutile reveals thus the inevitable extension of the
concentrationary universe into the space and time of postwar everyday life. As one of
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Charlotte’s camp companions notices, “Once we were free and had resumed our daily
lives we mourned as we had not done over there.” As she further considers her process
of grieving, she reflects that “The empty places were noted more keenly, we missed
intensely those we lost.” She also poses the question about “Why their absence had
seemed less cruel over there, and so unbearable once we were free?” As she attempts to
bridge the gap between the “then” and “there” of the camp, and the “here” and “now” of
the everyday life thereafter, she tentatively suggests that it is “because over there nothing
seemed real.” Even though the return was “hard for everyone,” for Poupette, “the return
was wretched. Wretched, sordid, a pile of shabby details” (Auschwitz and After 271).
For Michael Rothberg, this metonymic chain also purports the failure of “ordinary
society to respond to the message borne by survivors.” As Delbo reveals it in Une
connaissance inutile the disappointment at the failure of “postwar history to alter its
course accordingly” has kept numerous survivors in trauma (Traumatic Realism 175,
165). In her own voice, and throughout Mesure de nos jours, the third volume of her
trilogy, Delbo keeps writing of her failed attempts to make nonsurvivors understand “the
difference” between “our time there . . . which was empty,” and “time over here . . .
which is hollow” (The Measure of Our Days 343). As she explains in the third volume
of her trilogy,
Je ne peux pas leur faire comprendre la différence entre le temps de làbas et le
temps d’ici, entre le temps de làbas qui était vide, et qui était si lourd de tous ces
morts, parce que les cadavres avaient beau être tout légers, quand il y en a des
milliers de ces cadavres squelettiques, cela fait lourd et cela vous écrase sous le
poids, entre le temps de làbas qui était vide, et le temps d’ici qui est du temps
creux. (Mesure de nos jours 197)
The remembering and recording of experiences after liberation takes, however, a new
dimension in Mesure de nos jours. More so than in Aucun de nous ne reviendra and in
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Une connaissance inutile, Mesure de nos jours advocates memory as a collective and
public performance. Indeed, in Delbo’s third volume, memory is no longer mainly an
individual and private act. Similarly to Morrison’s narrative strategy of revealing
AfricanAmerican history through various (hi)stories told by several narrators, Delbo’s
trilogy offers that kind of space where the cultural work of remembering is actively and
collectively engaged. Through, but also beyond, a plurality of individual voices, Delbo
attempts to keep revealing the profound scarring that followed her and her friends’
internment experiences. As such, in Mesure de nos jours, Delbo concentrates on
assembling individual stories written by former camp inmates unhealed from their
personal traumas. Even though every testimony insists on separate aspects of personal or
collective experiences by the survivor, all stories seem to converge towards the same
incapacity of readjusting to everyday life. As such, Mesure de nos jours is not only
crucial in transmitting collective, rather than individual, acts of testimonial. It is relevant
also in examining a collective experience of readjusting—or not—to life, and attempting
to rebuild a future after Auschwitz.
Most troublesome for many Auschwitz survivors was their facing the coexistence
of the two temporalities that we discussed earlier. Most of all, their inability to integrate
these into their lives was what was most challenging. As a result, as I noted in Chapter 3,
the selfsplitting that this layering entailed became so problematic as to diminish
individual agency. But Mesure de nos jours shows that this double image of the self is
threatening to a collective sense of identity also. Ida, a Jewish survivor, summarizes it
best for most survivors. She reports,
J’étais double et je ne parvenais pas à réunir mes doubles. Il y avait un moi et un
spectre de moi qui voulait coller à son double et n’y arrivait jamais. Je le voyais
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s’approcher comme une forme molle dans laquelle je me reconnaissais quand elle
était près de moi et qui se défaisait en charpie quand j’y touchais.
. . . J’ai repris ma place à la maison. J’étais guérie.
Je me croyais guérie mais je ne l’étais sans doute pas . . . Je suis heureuse. Et
soudain, sans savoir comment, pourquoi à tel moment plutôt qu’à tel autre, sans
que j’en aie le moindre pressentiment, je sens monter cette angoisse qui m’a
envahie pour la première fois après la naissance de Sophie . . . Ce jour, j’ai été
prise d’une angoisse insurmontable. Ma gorge s’étranglait, ma poitrine était
écrasée dans un cerceau de fer, mon cœur m’étouffait. Je me suis mise à crier de
terreur. Tout à coup . . . je suis sans force. C’est comme si, tout à coup un ressort
se cassait. (11921)
The ghost, the “spectre,” but also the “revenant,” whose notion Rothberg explores with
this excerpt, haunts Ida, and keeps haunting her. It is the “sign,” for Rothberg, of a
trauma that is “temporal” in “two senses.” Not only does the ghost “return without
warning, thereby upsetting the continuity of everyday time.” But also, and it is my point
here, the ghost functions in this case in a way similar to Morrison’s ghost in Beloved. In
the insidiousness of its character, it signals, as it does in Morrison’s, “a rupture.” Not
only in the continuity of time, but of life’s expected “generational continuity” (Traumatic
Realism 165). In the case of Ida, this rupture comes from the acknowledgment that Ida’s
child Sophie cannot take the place of a lost generation, that of her parents, both of whom
Ida lost in Auschwitz. The split is first revealed, for Ida, after she happens, one day, to
unexpectedly see her father in the camp. Spotted by Ida in a column of men marching
towards the factory at Auschwitz, her father does not, however, recognize her, even after
she tries to catch his attention with “‘Papa! Papa! C’est Ida! Ida!’” The radical “change”
in him, as Ida remembers him then, “vieux, maigre, en haillons,” while, as a “tailleur . . .
il était toujours si bien mis,” is an insurmontable shock (Mesure de nos jours 117). His
failure to recognize Ida and his “turning around and throwing a frightened look in her
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direction” is hurtful to Ida (Auschwitz and After 296). Not only does the father’s lack of
acknowledgement partially produce, and later maintain, the rupture of continuity in her
everyday time after Auschwitz. It also points at the destruction that the loss of
irreplaceable connections with other generations has generated.
Mesure de nos jours presents thus anat times contradictory—collective of
individual voices that upsets the temporality of before/during/after Auschwitz. Then, not
only does Delbo’s work extend the experience and social significance of genocide
beyond the individual experiencing of the deathworld. It also grounds the stories of the
survivors into psychologically, historically, and communally persisting malaises that
Rothberg calls “the maladies of time and space” (Traumatic Realism 165).
While Delbo’s trilogy may lend itself to a certain chronological experience, for
Thomas Trezise, “chronology constitutes neither its sole nor even its most important
organizing principle.” Not only does the trilogy include poems whose interconnections
and overlapping disrupt any rigorous narrative continuity (“The Question of Community”
859), but the prose of Auschwitz and After contains temporal embeddings, which are not
predominantly linear. What is at stake then is thus a fragmentary articulation of trauma,
survival, and irreversible psychological and collective damage caused by experiencing
the concentrationary universe. Delbo keeps problematizing these paradigms, already
probed in Aucun and Une connaissance inutile, in Mesure de nos jours. She raises in it,
and in Convoy to Auschwitz and La mémoire et les jours, volumes published in the mid
sixties and mideighties respectively, the fundamental question that I wish to address in
this chapter: that of the role of community. In proposing a testimonial trilogy that pushes
back the limits of official histories and chronology, and aligns individually and
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collectively based testimonies, Delbo makes the examination of a collective French post
war public experience even more pressing. The last piece of her trilogy will thus enable
us to scrutinize how a notion of community can assume a relative intelligibility of
traumatic experiences in an aftermath.
Along with the question of community, this chapter explores how forms of
communal lives shape not only past experiences, but also those of an aftermath. It
examines the roles that communities can take—or decline to adopt—when it comes to
writing a piece of history that inscribes itself in an ambivalent future.
Just as the characters of Morrison’s Beloved and Jazz must learn to negotiate a
need to confront their individual traumas, and remember their painful past, they must also
move forward with their lives. While in Beloved it is ambiguously stated that the story of
Beloved “is not a story to pass on,” Morrison’s prose clearly suggests that Beloved should
indeed be a necessary story to pass on (275). Likewise, while the nonlinear design of
Jazz entices the reader to engage with the different narratives and stories of the novel’s
characters, there is also in the book, an invitation for the reader to participate in the
construction of the story on his or her own terms. As the epilogue of Jazz has the
narrator, who is also a listener and receiver of the novel’s stories, whether individual or
collective, secret or public, claim,
But I can’t say that aloud; I can’t tell anyone that I have been waiting for this all
my life and that being chosen to wait is the reason I can. If I were able I’d say it.
Say make me, remake me. You are free to do it and I am free to let you because
look, look. Look where your hands are. Now. (229)
For Nancy Peterson, “books literally do not speak to readers.” Yet, paradoxically, the
narrator of Jazz manages to say what she has just mentioned she is not able to express.
For Peterson, “somewhere in the course of the novel,” something in the “typical story, the
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typical history” has “gotten off track,” and this requires a response or reaction. In this
puzzling instance of interpellation and need for public recognition of AfricanAmerican
lives and stories, lies an insight that has repercussions for Morrison’s project of historical
reconstruction. Namely, that “(black) history books have no life, no meaning, unless they
engage readers and compel them to ‘make’ and ‘remake’ the story in order to locate
something useful for living today and tomorrow.”
Morrison’s trilogy as a whole enacts thus the complex engagement of revealing
black history through forms of memory. These, for Morrison, like for Delbo, should
encompass not only individual forms of recollection. These should definitely be
collective as well. Enabling survivors’ memories like Sethe’s, Paul D’s, Violet’s and
Joe’s to become “rememories” thus allow for such testimonies to play a major part in
Morrison’s dynamic process of disclosure. But also, while not having experienced the
trauma firsthand, we, as readers, should also be possibly enabled by those testimonies.
Morrison’s community of readers might want to engage in mutual and collective acts of
remembrance as well. They would possibly connect to a “‘genuine’ and useful African
American history,” whose restitution Morrison asks for (Against Amnesia 87).
Morrison, like Delbo, is committed in her trilogy to exploring the limits of official
and historical discourses. She is also willing to probe the limits, not only of individual,
but also collective, memory which underlie those narratives As such, her work
specifically examines three major premises which undergrid the whole of the trilogy. For
Justine Tally, these three underlying, and achronologically layered, “themes” are
“history, memory, and story.” According to Tally, the “focus” in each of the novels,
however, is “shifted.” Whereas Beloved focuses on the role of memory, Jazz is centered
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around the development of story and multiple storytelling. Yet, for Tally, Paradise, the
last volume of the trilogy, “is devoted to the cultural production of History/history and its
unstable relationship to both memory and story” (Paradise Reconsidered 14). As such,
her trilogy, and Paradise in particular, rests on the understanding that is also proposed by
Therese Higgins, that,
Slavery, persecution, ancestry—all deeply rooted, deeply psychological matters—
are wrestled with between people who have experienced a brutal, painful past and
people who are attempting to experience a more hopeful and less painful future.
(“Paradise: The Final Frontier” 125)
Morrison’s narratives, like Delbo’s, rest on a circular, rather than linear or
chronological organization. Her work, like Delbo’s, assembles, and is grounded in,
actual historical data, which inspired the creation of the characters of the trilogy. Sethe
of Beloved, for instance, is modeled on nineteenth century Ohio fugitive slave mother,
Margaret Garner. Hers is the story of a mother who preferred to kill her child rather than
see it returned to bondage. The funeral photograph of the body of a teenage girl inspired
Morrison to write Jazz. This was after Morrison first viewed the photograph by the
“nowfamous Harlem photographer” James Van der Zee in the Harlem Book of the Dead
(Against Amnesia 54). Not solely because the young girl was shot at a party by a jealous
boyfriend did the story catch Morrison’s attention. Because she died refusing to identify
her assailant so that he could get away was Morrison’s interest piqued. These historically
grounded incidents of AfricanAmerican experience undeniably inspired Morrison. She,
then, decided to explore them in the realms of her imagination and fiction. Through these
events, Morrison also came to offer profound insights into a subject of critical concern to
her. It eventually became the title of her latest novel, Love. The theme of love, so dear to
Morrison, centers around the nature of maternal love in Beloved, and concerns the
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romantic type in Jazz. Yet, it is approached in her trilogy from an unusually negative
perspective. Both novels indeed delve into how obsessive kinds of love can sabotage the
self. As such, Morrison demonstrates how love, when excessive, can lead to destruction.
Morrison found both records for Beloved and Jazz when she was editing The Black Book,
“an ‘anecdotal’ collection of clippings and snapshots,” published while she was an editor
at Random House (Paradise Reconsidered 15).
With Paradise, Morrison keeps documenting less conventional, more destructive,
kinds of love present in AfricanAmerican experiences. The kind of love we encounter in
Paradise is more of a collective nature, though. It is essentially grounded in the pride of
belonging to a community, albeit one that rests on practices of inclusion and exclusion.
With Paradise, Morrison sets out to portray how forms of communal love can be
empowering. However, she also reveals how traumatically destructive an excessive love
for community and its ideals can be, especially when that love is defined on the premises
of excessive pride that leads to elimination of those not deemed to fit or belong. This
love is also disastrous when it ruptures ordinary ways of responding to community
matters, and pushes reactions to an extreme. In other words, the type of excessive and
transgressive behaviors that can emerge from a simulacrum of love for a community is
what I propose to examine first in this chapter. As Alain Badiou would put it, if love has
you name what he calls the “innommable,” it can induce “un Mal désastreux.” Nazism,
for instance, did so, as I demonstrate later, as did the leaders of Paradise who engineered
the collective murder of five helpless women (Ethique 76).
As was the case with Beloved and Jazz, the detail that sparked Morrison’s interest
and imagination for writing Paradise was a historically grounded piece of information.
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In this instance, it was the founding of allblack towns in Oklahoma. Especially the
promises and shortcomings that these towns held for their newly formed communities
was of interest to her. The idea specifically came to Morrison, according to Nancy
Peterson, from a recurring headline in a black newspaper. It appeared in the Langston
City Herald that was published during the years 18911892. While allblack towns of
Oklahoma often distributed pamphlets, ran adds, and used methods to promote their
town, the line that caught Morrison’s attention was this. Based on a financially
exclusionary premise, it said, “Come Prepared or Not at All” (Against Amnesia 90).
These towns, as a matter of fact, were supposed to have been havens for black
communities, since they could remove themselves from white racism and lynching. They
were not, however, always successful. They indeed always ran the danger of cutting
themselves off from larger political, economical, and collective spheres. Morrison
examines and fictionalizes this possibility in the third novel of her trilogy.
Prior to the founding of Ruby, in whose “enclosed space and repetitive
temporality,” most of Paradise takes place, a group of exslave families had long traveled
(Traumatic Realism 175). They first had moved from Mississippi to Louisiana, and
finally to Oklahoma. There, they had expected to turn their experience out of slavery into
a life of safety and freedom. Before settling Ruby, however, they had intended to join
other exslaves in their newly established towns and lives. But they had been rejected,
humiliated, and disillusioned. Turned down everywhere, the group of exslaves had
finally decided to found a town of their own, which they had named “Haven.” As they
recall their painful journey, we read in Paradise,
the one hundred and fiftyeight freedmen were unwelcome on each grain of soil
from Yazoo to Fort Smith. Turned away by rich Choctaw and poor whites, chased
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by yard dogs, jeered at by camp prostitutes and their children, they were
nevertheless unprepared for the aggressive discouragement they received from
Negro towns already built. The headline of a feature in the Herald, “Come
Prepared or Not at All,” could not mean them, could it? Smart, strong, and eager
to work their own land, they believed they were more than prepared—they were
destined. It stung them to confusion to learn they did not have enough money to
satisfy the restrictions the “selfsupporting” Negroes required. In short, they were
too poor, too bedraggledlooking to enter, let alone reside in, the communities that
were soliciting Negro homesteaders. This contemptuous dismissal by the lucky
changed the temperature of their blood twice. First they boiled at being written
up as “people who preferred saloons and crap games to homes, churches, and
schools.” Then, remembering their spectacular history, they cooled. What began
as overheated determination became coldblooded obsession. “They don’t know
we or about we,” said one man. “Us free like them; was slave like them. What
for is this difference? (1314)
As a result of repeated refusals, the one hundred and fiftyeight freedmen kept moving
west. They became “stiffer, prouder with each misfortune.” As Morrison adds, the
“details” of this selfproclaimed “disallowance” were now “engraved” into “the powerful
memories” of some of the founding members of Ruby, actual descendants of the
founding fathers of Haven (14). The feelings of shame that had accompanied the
rejections, fueling anger and pride, were indeed now, not only remembered, but also
transmitted to the younger generations.
In the novel, these strong feelings are mainly articulated through the hegemonic
discourse of Deek and Steward Morgan, the allpowerful founders of Ruby. The twins
are the ones, indeed, who, one day, took responsibility in assuming the unilateral
discursive version of the history of Ruby. Memory, in this case, and in the words of
Justine Tally, has become, then, more than just memory. It is a locus, in which the
“inadvertent preserver of cultural memory,” of “social difference,” and of “ideological
struggle” have come together (The Story of Jazz 13).
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The plurality of voices and testimonies that Delbo and Morrison engage in their
works do, however, present venues for contesting the hegemonic construction of history
that was desired by Hitler, and by Deek and Steward Morgan. Also, the nonlinear and
circular literary modes that Delbo and Morrison bring forward in their narratives may
also provide aesthetic and ethical spaces for guarding against unique—dominant and
controlling—forms of discourse. It is with this line of reading that I examine the works of
Delbo and Morrison.
I propose to delve into some of the forms of community, and communal ideals
that are found in the trilogies of both writers. As such, the values promoted by National
Socialism in Nazi Germany, and by the empowered 8rock patriarchs of Ruby, are the
ones that will come under scrutiny. In both instances, an ideal of communitarian
substance, and existence, have turned utopic and deliberate forms of action into scenes of
death and destruction. Alain Badiou’s Ethics: An essay on the Understanding of Evil,
examines this process very clearly. Badiou’s discussion, around a theory of evil, relates,
indeed, to an ideal of community, similar to that of Nazi Germany and Ruby, that has
turned its content into war and massacre. I propose to look at it in detail now.
For Badiou, the evil fostered by Nazi ideology is first and foremost grounded in
“a fidelity to a simulacrum.” The simulacrum here is the posing of the existence of an
Aryan race, believed to be leading to some kind of necessary “truth.” The simulacrum of
Nazi ideology can also be related to the following process. Namely, that the “National
Socialist revolution,” which sought a “break with the old order,” would lead to the
construction of a new, “truthful” type of order or “event.” This pseudo process of truth,
coming into being with the Nazi era, was, importantly enough, rooted in some typical
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community ideals. For Badiou, these ideals encompassed a characteristic pride in “soil,
blood, and race.” The novelty of this break with the past, grounded in revolutionary
National Socialist ideals, provided thus a major vehicle in constructing and implementing
Nazi ideology.
Badiou explores how a “process of truth” can come about through “the novelty of
an event.” Yet, for Badiou, along with this truth building process, the event is eventually
to disappear in time. The event is, indeed, just “a kind of flashing supplement that
happens to a situation.” What ultimately should serve to guide “the fidelity” to that event
later on is nothing more than a “name,” or a “trace.” Besides, for Badiou, the truth that
“relates to the particularity of a situation,” should then only be attained through “the bias
of its void.” That way, the “void,” which Badiou defines as “the multipleofnothing,”
would neither “exclude” nor “constrain anyone.” It would be the “absolute neutrality of
being.” For Badiou, this neutrality of being allows this. Namely, that a genuine
“fidelity” that “originates in an event,” while it operates “an immanent break within a
singular situation,” can “nonetheless” occur and be “addressed.”
For the Nazis, however, both ideology and revolution served to “carry a particular
community,” that of the German people, not towards a necessary neutrality of being.
Rather, ideology and revolution served to carry their particular community “towards its
true destiny,” which, Badiou observes, was arbitrarily defined as one of absolute and
“universal domination.” That destiny, brought into being, thus “named” not the “void” of
the earlier situation. Instead, it called for what Badiou refers to as its “plenitude.” It
conveyed “not the universality of that which is sustained, precisely, by no particular
characteristic or particular multiple.” Instead, it brought forward the “absolute
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particularity of the Nazi community,” which “worked directly against truths,” as it staged
that community as a universal (73). There can be no doubt, on this account, that it
brought “terror” and “violence.”
Fidelity to a simulacrum, instances of which are found in Auschwitz and After and
Paradise, allows for the following claim. Namely, that the “closed particularity” of the
“abstract set,” or “ensemble,” of the “Nazi Germans,” the “Aryans,” or the “8rock”
families, gives sustenance to their particular group. Truly enough, for Badiou, the
“invariable operation” of any particular ensemble is directed towards the “unending
construction” of its own set. The problem, however, is that, in our cases, it enables no
other means of doing this construction except eliminating, or “voiding,” what surrounds.
The “void” thus “avoided,” or “chassé,” by the simulacrum, returns then with “what
must” have “been accomplished,” in order for the substance of the event to emerge and
be. For Badiou, it implies that, for those, arbitrarily designated, as “that which did not
belong to the German communitarian substance”—the Jews, the Gypsies, the mentally ill,
the homosexuals, the communists—“it meant death.” As Badiou adds, if it was not
death, it was at least “that deferred form of death,” which is “slavery,” in the service of
“the German substance.”
Inasmuch as it served to organize the extermination, “the name Jew,” for Badiou,
was “a political creation of the Nazis.” Up to that point, according to Badiou, the name
Jew had indeed been without “any preexisting” referent. He further claims that the name
Jew later became “a name” whose “meaning no one can share with the Nazis.” As such,
it “presumed the simulacrum and fidelity to the simulacrum,” as well as the “absolute
singularity of Nazism as a political sequence” (7475).
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The name Jew as a Nazi construct, and deathfilled referent, is at work in Delbo’s
writings. It is important to remember that Delbo entered the camp universe as a political
prisoner, and not as a Jew. From the point of view of the Nazis, this difference was
obviously radical. It had fundamental implications for the kinds of handlings and
sufferings that the Nazis imposed on their victims. Actually, the survival rate of less than
twentyfive percent of Delbo’s nonJewish convoy was still significantly greater than that
of deported French Jews (Convoy to Auschwitz, backcover). While only fortynine
Frenchwomen returned out of the originally two hundred and thirty of Delbo’s group, the
point here is that Delbo’s dead comrades, and the Jews murdered in the Nazi genocide,
died, however, at the hands of the same system. For Michael Rothberg, “both groups”
must “make demands on our memory and conscience” (Traumatic Realism 149).
The following instance makes clear how the Nazi construct of a Jewish category
impacted the conditions of survival of the prisoners. In Convoy to Auschwitz, Delbo
discusses this point, as she at first makes a reference to her own group. She writes,
We were by no means the only Frenchwomen at Birkenau, but we were the only
ones under the rubric “political.” The others were “Jews.” A Jew might be taken
in combat, gun in hand, or in a roundup; it made no difference. To the Gestapo,
he was a Jew, never a political prisoner. Jews no longer had a nationality. Since
Jews and nonJews were all at Auschwitz, what was the difference? The
difference was enormous from the first. On arrival, the Jewish convoys faced a
selection. Only young people able to work entered the camp. The others were
gassed right away. Often there was no selection: the entire convoy was sent to the
gas chamber.
As Delbo further explains,
At Birkenau, conditions for Jews and nonJews were nearly the same. Nearly.
But that slight difference led to a higher mortality rate among the Jews. The
blocks of Jewish women were more overcrowded than the others. Not everyone
could lie down for the night. Those who did not find a place on the planks of the
tiers spent the night standing in the aisles. The Jews suffered general punishments
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more often than we did, doing roll call on their knees with their arms in the air,
for example: something we never experienced. (9)
Not only is the Nazi process of making differences in the treatment of Jews and
nonJews suggested in Auschwitz And After. It is also explored through the awareness
that both groups had in tentatively estimating their chances of survival. Delbo attests to
this process in the following, very moving, passage. The excerpt, entitled “Dialogue,”
relates to a very brief encounter that Delbo has with a young Jewish woman at the camp.
The discussion centers around the greater probability of dying, that the Jewish woman
senses in her instance, based on her ethnicity. As she initiates the conversation, she asks
Charlotte,
“Tu es française?
 Oui.
 Moi aussi.”
Elle n’a pas d’F sur la poitrine. Une étoile.
 D’où ?
 Paris.
 Il y a longtemps que tu es ici ?
 Cinq semaines.
 Moi, seize jours
 C’est beaucoup déjà, je sais.
 Cinq semaines… Comment estce possible ?
 Tu vois.
 Et tu crois qu’on peut tenir ?”
Elle mendie.
 “Il faut essayer.
 Vous, vous pouvez espérer mais nous…”
Elle montre ma jaquette rayée et elle montre son manteau, un manteau trop
grand tellement, trop sale tellement, trop en loques tellement.
“Oh, nos chances sont égales, va…
 Pour nous, il n’y a pas d’espoir. ”
Et sa main fait un geste et son geste évoque la fumée qui monte.
 “Il faut lutter de tout son courage.
 Pourquoi… Pourquoi lutter puisque nous devons toutes…”
Le geste de sa main achève. La fumée qui monte.
“Non. Il faut lutter.
 Comment espérer sortir d’ici. Comment quelqu’un sortiratil jamais d’ici.
Il vaudrait mieux se jeter dans les barbelés tout de suite.”
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Que lui dire ? Elle est petite, chétive. Et je n’ai pas le pouvoir de me
persuader
moimême. Tous les arguments sont insensés. Je lutte contre toute ma raison.
On
lutte contre toute raison.
La cheminée fume. Le ciel est bas. La fumée traîne sur le camp et pèse et
nous
enveloppe et c’est l’odeur de la chair qui brûle. (Aucun 2627)
In the silence of the gesture by which death is evoked, the smoke of the
crematoria indicates the very tension at the center of the conversation. According to
Thomas Trezise, and his “The Question of Community in Charlotte’s Delbo’s Auschwitz
and After,” “Dialogue,” indeed, focuses on the following, partially silenced,
understanding. Namely, that the “us” for whom the Jewish woman speaks is at much
“greater odds” of being “excluded from speech” or “dialogue” than Delbo’s. For Trezise,
the victimization of “the Jews,” and I would add, of those deprived of their nationality,
such as the Gypsies, the mentallyill, the homosexuals, etc., was indeed “exceptional.” It
was exemplary in the following regard. The victimization of the Jews reflected “the
general strategy” whereby Nazism “exploited differences” both “between and within
communities,” in order precisely to better “destroy them” (862).
The eradication of Jewish particularity, which the Nazis purposely promoted in
the camps to discourage and demoralize their victims even further, is very apparent in the
following instance. The excerpt, from Aucun, concentrates on the arrival of a Jewish
convoy in Auschwitz. With it, Delbo makes clear the process of depersonalization that
the Nazis made gruesome for the Jews. In order to reveal their being dispossessed of
their material or moral, familial or communal significance, Delbo uses a depersonalized
third person plural to refer to the group. Not only does she insist on the sudden forms of
thorough deprivation and confusion that was their lot. Her choice of an impersonal style
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of writing also draws attention to the brutal loss of a personal or communal voice that the
Nazis forcefully imposed on their Jewish prisoners. For Trezise, in this instance, “the
particularity of the first person is ruthlessly converted into the universality of the third.”
As such, it makes prominent, the “deprivation of speech,” and the “general
dispossession” of the Jewish inmates, that Delbo sets out to convey. As she witnesses
their disorientation on their arrival, Delbo writes,
Ils ne savent pas qu’à cette garelà on n’arrive pas.
Ils attendent le pire—ils n’attendent pas l’inconcevable.
Et quand on leur crie de se ranger par cinq, hommes d’un côté, femmes et
enfants de l’autre, dans une langue qu’ils ne comprennent pas, ils comprennent
aux coups de bâton et se rangent par cinq puisqu’ils s’attendent à tout.
Les mères gardent les enfants contre elles—elles tremblaient qu’ils leur fussent
enlevés—parce que les enfants ont faim et soif et sont chiffonnés de l’insomnie à
travers tant de pays. Enfin, on arrive, elles vont pouvoir s’occuper d’eux.
Et quand on leur crie de laisser les paquets, les édredons et les souvenirs sur le
quai, ils les laissent parce qu’ils doivent s’attendre à tout et ne veulent s’étonner
de rien. Ils disent “on verra bien,” ils ont déjà tant vu et ils sont fatigués du
voyage. (1011)
Whatever sense of particularity may still be conveyed in this descriptionwith its specific
references to the categories of men, women, mothers, and children within the groupis,
however, soon to be erased. For Trezise, “particularity,” in the following instance, is in
fact elided by “its insertion within an endless series of more or less identical convoys”
that will keep arriving at Auschwitz. The “abstractness of the third person includes a
space and time” that actually allows for an even more abstract form of speech. It is the
use of the “on” form, that insists on the regularity and indifference, with which the Jews
kept being disinherited. While dispossession can be said to even transcend death itself,
we read,
On habillera un orchestre avec les jupes plissées des fillettes. Le commandant
veut qu’on joue des valses viennoises le dimanche matin.
...
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On distribuera aux Allemandes malades des olives noires et du lokoum mais
elles n’aiment pas les olives de Calamata ni les olives en général.
Et tout le jour et toute la nuit
tous les jours et toutes les nuits les cheminées fument avec ce combustible de
tous les pays d’Europe
des hommes près des cheminées passent leurs journées à passer les cendres pour
retrouver l’or fondu des dents en or. Ils ont tous de l’or dans la bouche ces juifs et
ils sont tant que cela fait des tonnes.
Et au printemps des hommes et des femmes répandent les cendres sur les marais
asséchés pour la première fois labourés et fertilisent le sol avec du phosphate
humain. (Aucun 1718)
For Trezise, the loss “of the distinguishing features” of the Jewish community
rendered by Delbo, not only produces an idea of “literally naked uniformity.” It also
results in perceiving the Jews in “complete isolation from other communities, from one
another, and from themselves.” This, Trezise adds, comes from the “severance” of a
certain “relationality,” that normally “precedes and informs” an acknowledgment of an
“identity” through an “other.” That certain relationality, indeed, is also crucial in
enabling and maintaining what Trezise calls, the “universal” as a “condition of
community.” “Particularity,” for Trezise, would thus call for an “intrication” or
“involvement” with “alterity.” For him, it is precisely this alterity that would give birth
to the self, whether it is an “individual” or “collective” one. Only at the condition of
acknowledging alterity, can the self be “in turn construed as a tension between particular
and universal.”
As Delbo demonstrates, it is in fact that type of relationality that Nazism sought
to destroy at all cost. Since the denial of particularity “severs the dialogical or
differential relation” that is “constitutive of social life itself,” it became one tool of
destruction that the Nazis exploited with great ferocity. They converted the “universal,”
or the possibilities of a first person singular or plural, and switched it from the
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“possibility of community” to the “actuality of its annihilation.” Thus, not only did
Nazism deprive its victims of any interlocutor. Nazism also voided each and every one
of those victims of their possibility of having a particular referent, an “I,” to refer to
themselves. For Trezise,
The tension between particular and universal was “resolved” by Nazism through
the strategic prohibition of the universal itself to certain particulars. In the “final
solution” of “the Jewish problem,” . . . Jews became the indistinguishable third
persons named “the Jews” insofar as each was denied the universal right to speak,
or more precisely, the right to be heard in the first person and hence to state
something other than his or her membership in this collectively stereotyped Other.
The position, in which any speaker can normally assume a voice in the first person, was
thus radically altered by Nazism. So was the dialogical relation that this position of the
subject presupposes. These voided spaces came to be occupied only by those considered
worthy of having a self or community identity. This idea, for Trezise, which I have
already introduced through Badiou, implied thus also “the evacuation” of all those
“others,” for whom “a space once existed,” but was threatened to the core (“The Question
of Community” 88081).
The loss of an individual and collective agency, which the Nazis engineered by
suffocating speech in those who were the recipients of their hate, is clearly rendered
throughout the trilogy. Mesure de nos jours, and Aucun de nous ne reviendra, to some
extent, offer however, an interesting complement to the silencing of voices that Nazism
sought to implement. Indeed, with Mesure de nos jours, Delbo crucially encourages a
resurgence of some of those voices that were threatened by annihilation. Not only does
Charlotte bring forward her own voice to bear witness to the attempted extermination.
She also goes beyond the particular form of narration that she used to articulate her own
experience. She posits in her work a communal voice as well. Crucially enough, that
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voice is one that acts as an enabler of collective experiences and remembrances to be
brought forward. Not only does it bring to light, and reveal, the almost total annihilation
that Delbo witnessed. But yet, through its communally grounded tone, this collective
voice succeeds in reassuming, albeit incompletely, the necessity and condition of
community, which was so threatened during the Nazi era.
In Mesure de nos jours, Delbo’s voice is supplemented by those of her
companions, Gilberte, Gaby, Germaine, Louise, and many more, all camp survivors
themselves, to whom she remained attached in the aftermath. Her trilogy takes, at that
point, the form of a collection of memories and testimonies. All insist on the uselessness
of the knowledge gathered at Auschwitz, and on the relative indifference, and lack of
understanding, with which that knowledge was received in postwar France. Her trilogy,
however, also presents a plurality of voices that offer more than lamentation and despair.
It encompasses the trials and tribulations experienced by these women. But it also
testifies to the communal exchanges, and the emotional support, that Delbo’s companions
and the women of her group provided to one another. By soliciting the testimony of
other survivors, and playing the role of an active listener, Delbo thus succeeds in carrying
“a word” that is collective rather than individual. Even though the “word” is not
transmitted “as such,” but passes through Delbo’s literary transformations, it successfully
carries out the following, formidable task: that of reengaging a dialogical relation, that
Trezise sees critical in reconstituting a “social life.” But also, by the same token, Delbo
and her surviving companions assumed, with the passing of the word, a crucial “ethical
responsibility.” That of transmitting a message that, even though it is useless, is
nonetheless necessary for the world to hear (“The Question of Community” 865).
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The dialogical relations that Delbo brings to light in the aftermath had already
been established, and actually maintained, at the camps. Delbo makes these social bonds
and signs of community exchanges particularly visible in Convoy to Auschwitz, a
“collective biography” of “the 230 Frenchwomen who were deported from Compiègne to
Auschwitz on January 24, 1943” (xi). Delbo first proceeds to contrast group interactions
and abundant exchanges among her companions, with the lack of support, and the
isolation, which, we observed earlier, overwhelmed the Jewish women. At first, Delbo
reiterates the differences between the Jewish inmates and the women of her group, in
regards to their unequal chances of survival. But she also insists on how mutual care,
compassion, and social contacts among her group pushed back the limits and imminence
of death. She writes,
. . . These Jewish women, thrown together at the eve of deportation, rarely formed
cohesive, supportive groups. Their blocks were a mixture of Jews from different
countries without a common language or much basis for friendship and mutual
aid. If our convoy had so many survivors—and for Birkenau in 1943, fiftyseven
out of two hundred and thirty after six months was exceptional, unique in the
history of the camp—this was because we already knew each other (having spent
weeks, and sometimes months, together at Romainville) and had formed small,
tightly knit units within a large, homogeneous group, helping each other in all
sorts of ways, often quite small: holding each other’s arms while walking, rubbing
each others’ backs during roll call; and of course, we could talk to each other.
Speech was selfdefense, comfort, hope. By talking about who we were before,
about our lives, we perpetuated the time before, we maintained our reality. Each
of the survivors knows that without the others, she would not have returned. (9)
Delbo furthers explores forms of connections to others, and the existence of a vital and
lifesustaining community in the following instance. This time, she makes the point
through a negative reversal, which makes her tackle the question of survival in the face of
loneliness and abandonment. As her clinging to life, and hope for a return, somehow
dwindle at the thought of being left alone, Delbo writes,
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Je reste seule au fond de ce fossé et je suis prise de désespoir. La présence des
autres, leurs paroles faisaient possible le retour. Elles s’en vont et j’ai peur. Je ne
crois pas au retour quand je suis seule. Avec elles, puisqu’elles semblent y croire
si fort, j’y crois aussi. Dès qu’elles me quittent, j’ai peur. Aucune ne croit plus
au retour quand elle est seule. (Aucun 164)
Charlotte’s endurance and belief in a return were thus only conceivable because she
felt supported by the women sharing her ordeal. Delbo inscribes, and insists, in the
trilogy, on the necessity of relying on a communal lifesupporting system. The following
excerpt is a powerful example of this system. It shows how the women of her group
united in joint efforts of communal acts of resistance and resilience while they were in
Auschwitz. The women seem to make one body, one circulatory system, while they are
connected, through one another, to one sustaining will to survive. Set in the context of
the infamous roll calls on the frozen plain of Auschwitz, Delbo writes,
Dos contre poitrine, nous nous tenons serrées, et tout en établissant ainsi pour
toutes une même circulation, un même réseau sanguin, nous sommes toutes
glacées. (103)
Almost all testimonies by Delbo’s companions make clear, as presumed by Delbo
in Une connaissance inutile, that returning to a socalled “normal” self, or to a genuine
way of being after Auschwitz was impossible. Yet, as Delbo’s testimony did, the
women’s also all bring to light, in Mesure de nos jours, the companionship and the
persisting sense of solidarity that they maintained within their group. Encouraged by
supporting friendship and mutual exchanges, many, if not all, also believed, correctly,
that their chances of returning were increased if they did not remain isolated from each
other.
Mado, one of Charlotte’s companions, is one of those who saw collective support
as a means of survival as well. As she reflects on her tribulations, she inscribes them
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within the personal, but also overwhelmingly collective and social dimensions of her
experience. Through a profoundly honest, yet very disturbing testimony, we learn,
however, that the strength she derived from her companionship at Auschwitz did not help
her reattach to a communityatlarge after she was released.
Mado first reflects on complex feelings of relief and joy at her liberation that, in
her case, often got mixed with guilt, helplessness, and despair. While moments of
discouragement would often assail her at the camp, she would, already then, call on
Charlotte and other women of her group, to help assuage her desolation and hopelessness.
Sharing so much together, ultimately, had her achieve, then and later, a degree of mutual
understanding, never experienced before, with the women of her group. As she keeps
investigating, later on, into her “before,” “during,” and “after” Auschwitz, she clearly
remembers the burden of having “to decide every minute between living and dying.”
She also acknowledges, at that point, how generational continuity with the past, and
communal bonding were influential in the women’s opting for life. As she reflects,
Làbas, nous avions tout notre passé, tous nos souvenirs, même des souvenirs
lointains qui venaient de nos parents, nous nous sommes armées de notre passé
pour nous protéger, nous l’avons dressé entre l’horreur et nous pour nous garder
entières, pour garder notre moi véritable, notre être. Nous puisions dans notre
passé, dans notre enfance, dans ce qui avait formé notre personnalité, notre
caractère, nos goûts, nos idées, pour nous reconnaître en nousmême, pour nous
garder, pour ne pas nous laisser entamer, pour ne pas nous laisser anéantir. Nous
nous sommes cramponnées à nousmêmes. Chacun a raconté sa vie mille et mille
fois, a ressuscité son enfance, le temps de la liberté et du bonheur pour s’assurer
qu’il l’avait vécu, qu’il avait bien été celui qu’il racontait. Notre passé nous a été
sauvegarde et rassurance. (4950)
While she recalls that the extensive and intimate talking sessions that she and her
companions entertained at the camp encouraged them to remain alive, she also
acknowledges the following, very upsetting truth about herself. Namely, that the bonding
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and verbal exchanges, however crucial, did not succeed in maintaining her emotionally
alive in her life “after” Auschwitz. Neither did the companionship experienced at
Auschwitz release her from her other companions, dead at the camp, who now live in her
mind and in her future as ghosts. As she writes,
Je fais ce qu’on fait dans la vie, mais je sais que ce n’est pas cela, la vie, parce que
je sais la différence entre avant et après. . . . En rentrant, j’ai voulu un enfant.
Quand mon fils est né, j’ai été baignée de joie. Je dis baignée parce que c’était
comme une eau caressante et tiède qui montait autour de moi, montait en moi, me
portait et me faisait légère, heureuse, baignée de joie. Ce fils que j’avais souhaité,
il était là, à moi. Une joie calme et bienfaisante. Je n’ai pas pu me laisser porter
par cette joie, je n’ai pas pu m’y abandonner. En même temps que montait autour
de moi, en moi, cette eau douce et enveloppante de la joie, ma chambre était
envahie par les spectres de nos compagnes. Spectre de Mounette qui disait :
“Mounette est morte sans connaître cette joie.” Spectre de Jackie qui tendait des
mains inutiles. Spectres de toutes ces jeunes filles, de toutes ces jeunes femmes
qui sont mortes sans avoir connu cela, sans avoir été baignées de cette joie. L’eau
soyeuse de ma joie s’est changée en boue gluante, en neige souillée, en marécage
fétide. (Mesure de nos jours 49, 5556)
A process of identification, or identification “atadistance,” would, for Kaja Silverman
be opposed to a type of identification that she calls “heteropathic identification.” While
the latter recognizes the “other” and her experience as “other,” and not as one’s own, the
former, for Silverman, entails “precisely the opposite state of affairs—the condition or
quality of being ‘other’” (The Threshold of the Visible World 15).

Inasmuch as an

identification atadistance would be “inimical” or detrimental to a process of working
through, it is clear that Mado is helplessly challenged by and caught in it. This becomes
particularly clear when she discusses her newly born son, whose image she interchanges
with corpses. While she keeps investing the world of the living with that of the dead, she
writes,
Je revoyais cette femme—tu te souviens, cette paysanne, couchée dans la neige, morte,
avec son nouveauné mort, gelé entre ses cuisses. Mon fils était aussi ce nouveauné là.
Je regarde mon fils et je lui reconnais les yeux de Jackie, le vertbleu des yeux de Jackie,
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une inflexion de Mounette. Mon fils est leur fils à toutes. Il est l’enfant qu’elles n’auront
pas eu. Leurs traits se dessinent par dessus les siens, parfois s’y confondent. Comment
être vivante au milieu de ce peuple de mortes ? (Mesure de nos jours 5556)
In the same despairing tone, she keeps expanding on how enormous her loss has been in a
retraumatizing postAuschwitz life. She implies that the uncomprehending reception of
the significance of Auschwitz by “ordinary” people has led to an emptiness in her
postwar life that is insurmountable. While she is facing the failure of her attempts “to
construct an utopia that would counter the concentrationary dystopia,” in Rothberg’s
terms, she, however, also reiterates an idea of community that was possible in Auschwitz,
but not in an aftermath (Traumatic Realism 173). She also acknowledges how
overwhelming the distance and estrangement has been from a postAuschwitz French
community that has failed her. As she mourns a severance from that community, and
deplores a lack of connection with its future and future generations, she claims,
Et depuis que je suis rentrée, tout ce que j’étais avant, tous mes souvenirs d’avant,
tout s’est dissout, défait. On dirait que je l’ai usé làbas. Ma vraie sœur, c’est toi.
Ma vraie famille, c’est vous, ceux qui étaient làbas avec moi. Aujourd’hui, mes
souvenirs, mon passé, c’est làbas. Mes retours en arrière ne franchissent jamais
cette borne. Ils y butent. Tous les efforts que nous avons faits pour empêcher
notre destruction, pour persévérer dans notre nous, pour maintenir notre être
d’avant, tous ces efforts n’ont servi que pour làbas. Au retour, ce noyau dur que
nous avions forgé au cœur de notre cœur et que nous croyions solide parce qu’il
nous avait tant coûté, ce noyau a fondu, s’est dissout. Plus rien. Ma vie a
commencé làbas. Avant, il n’y a rien. Je n’ai plus ce que j’avais làbas, ce que
j’avais avant, ce que j’étais avant. Tout m’a été arraché. Que me restetil ?
Rien, la mort. Quand je dis que je sais la différence entre avant et après, je veux
dire qu’avant je vivais et que j’ai tout oublié de cette vielà, ma vie d’avant.
Maintenant, je ne suis plus vivante. Cette différence, j’en ai l’exacte mesure, la
connaissance sensible et ma lucidité ne m’aide pas. Rien ne peut combler l’écart
entre les autres et moi, entre moi et moi. Rien ne peut combler la différence, rien
l’amenuiser. (Mesure de nos jours 495051)
Social interactions, verbal exchanges, and physical gestures of care and comfort
helped Delbo and her companions maintain conditions of alterity and community at the
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camp. These same dialogical or differential relations—or lack thereofalso contributed
to the reframing of their identity in an aftermath. Even though, for most survivors, this
identity turned into states of disassociation, split personalities, and moments of
distressing remembrance or erasure, Nazism did not succeed, however, in annihilating
their identity altogether.
A similarly destructive, but not eradicating either, identityshattering process can
be traced in Morrison’s Paradise. One variation, however, can be observed in the
authors’ trilogies. Delbo seems to insist, as does Morrison, on the importance of life
sustaining and vibrant communities. For Delbo and her companions, in an identity
reconstructing process, it is mainly alterity and social interaction among human beings—
or loss thereof—that helped them shape or reshape their identity. For Morrison, it seems,
so too. Yet, for her, it is also under the significance of memory that this vital exchange
takes place. Even though each author may delve into one agency more intensively than
in the other, the two writers acknowledge the necessary incidence of interactions among
and between the two paradigms. Deborah Barnes makes the point of the privilege of
memory in Morrison’s oeuvre very clearly. In “Movin’ on up: The Madness of
Migration in Toni Morrison’s Jazz,” she insists that,
As in all Morrison’s novels, memory is the saving grace. Without memories of a
historical, cultural, and personal foundation, the sojourner will have no identity,
no point of orientation, no way to proceed and nowhere from which to begin
anew. Even an evolving identity must be rooted in a past. (293)
In Paradise, then, memory is not simply the preserver of a tortuous past. Even if
it wants itself to be empowering and glorifying. It is also what the descendants of the
survivors of slavery, in exodus and in search of Paradise, hold as their most precious
commodity. When they set out to found Ruby, their sole possession is indeed their
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remembrance of a communal past. Instilled in them, there is thus a profound need to
preserve that true communal spirit of the past that they seek to keep alive. Not only do
the founders of Ruby set out to create, or recreate, the spirit of their history. But by
establishing an authentic, strong, and hardworking community, they also wish to write,
and even rewrite, the story of that community. Meanwhile, they also see to it that a sense
of belonging, grounded in the past, be maintained. And for the new community of Ruby,
and for Deacon Morgan in particular, one of its founders, memory is an idealizing, yet
powerful, and enduring tool indeed. As memories of past wanderings of the ancestors,
and of the new settlers, forcefully compel Deek in his remembrance and reverie,
Morrison writes,
What they saw was sometimes nothing, sometimes sad, and Deek remembered
everything . . . Even now the verbena scent was clear; even now the summer
dresses, the creamy, sunlit skin excited him . . . So among the vivid details of that
journey—the sorrow, the stubbornness, the cunning, the wealth—Deek’s image of
the nineteen summer ladies was unlike the photographer’s. His remembrance was
pastel colored and eternal. (Paradise 10910)
At this point, Mesure de nos jours, along with Paradise, enable us to emphasize
how a framing of cultural consciousness can be informed, and approached, through
various pointers. One of these, as previously mentioned, is directed towards memory.
Another is made up of social and discursive interactions, whose workings we have seen
at play in Delbo’s work. It is now appropriate to bring these out in Morrison’s oeuvre.
In his Up from Bondage: The Literatures of Russian and African American Soul,
Dale E. Peterson brings to light how memory and social interactions contribute to
ideological and communal productions. At first, he poses the question of the “strange
meanings of being . . . black” in a world that “measured civilization by a single standard
of literacy” (200). As he draws parallels between Russian and AfricanAmerican
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experiences, especially those that have been partially or totally left out in history, he
comes to explore forms of cultural nationalism. Doing so, he insists on a particularity he
has observed among many AfricanAmerican writers, namely that there is a majority that
has attempted to give “visibility and voice to a native culture” that has “been hidden from
view,” and that has been “held in bondage to narrow Western standards of civility and
literacy” (6).
This uncovering of AfricanAmerican experiences is definitely part of Morrison’s
archeological project. But one point that needs to be made very clear here is this. As
Morrison goes about her task, she does not attempt to privilege one form of discourse
over another. She, as Badiou would have it, does not use her art to fill a “void” with one
singular, specific, form of “plenitude” (Ethics 73). Rather, like Delbo, she chooses to
align a plurality of voices, to which the reader has the responsibility to respond. As a
matter of fact, Paradise, like Mesure de nos jours, states a belief in, and offers an
interpellation from, a plurality of experiences. As such, both works are instrumental in
displaying a necessary diversity of verbal and cultural interactions. They also point at a
muchneeded multiplicity of social and community exchanges that can help defy any
single totalizing meaning. As Justine Tally very aptly remarks in her discussion of Jazz,
relevant for our own argument around Paradise, a “story may be useful in constructing
alternative history, but that still does not raise it to the category of ‘Truth’” (Paradise
Reconsidered 35). Also, as Alessandro Portelli contends, the “truth of the story” is the
“truth of art.” As such, it does not “vouch for the facts but tells another kind of truth, and
this is why it is told” (The Text and the Voice 11920).
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While bringing to the foreground a multitude of stories, Morrison thus facilitates a
process of verbal exchanges constitutive of dialogues between self and self, self and
other, and self and community. She, then, has stories purposefully, yet partially, told
from one person to another. In turn, these are retold in another situation, or to another
person with more information, or even from a different perspective. That way, Morrison
enables some sort of historical process, or at least communal process, to come about. For
Rafael PérezTorres, this historical process, signaled by Morrison’s narrative strategy,
consists in being grounded in their “drawing together.” Not only do the stories become a
“means” of “articulating the accumulated wisdom of communal thought,” they also
enable “hearing the dead through the voices of the living” (“Knitting and Knotting the
Narrative Thread” 104). Besides, as Morrison herself contends, “it’s important not to
have a totalizing view.” As she explains in her Paris Review interview, “in American
literature we [AfricanAmericans] have been so totalized—as though there is only one
version.” But yet, “we are not one indistinguishable block of people who always behave
the same way.” Hence for Morrison, it became crucial to structurally organize her work,
and Paradise, around “several voices speaking throughout each book” (Women Writers at
Work 369).
The dialogic attributes of language and experience that Mikhail Bakhtin
postulates in his Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics can shed light on Morrison’s practice.
Even though Bakhtin’s theory of language, especially “heteroglossia,” seems to
concentrate on the linguistic elements and the literary aspects of language, his work is
relevant in our context because it enables us to approach, beyond a mere linguistic line of
thinking, the ideological points of view, values, and opinions that attach to and are
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reflected by language. As Michael Holquist phrases it in Dialogism, “there is an intimate
connection between the project of language and the project of selfhood.” It is that “they”
actually “both exist in order to mean” (23). Also, the relevance and modernity of
Bakhtin’s theory of language, for Holquist, not only lies in its being a “pragmatically
oriented theory of knowledge that seeks to grasp human behavior through the use humans
make of language” (15). It also enables us to access, in Bakhtin’s own words, “specific
points of view on the world.” While “each” of these viewpoints is “characterized by its
own objects,” it is also guided by its “own meanings and values” (“The Dialogic
Imagination” 348). The multidimensional character of heteroglossia, that may be found
in the consciousness of individuals, but also communities, can thus enable us here to
examine whether some forms of discourse are invitingor notof dialogical interaction.
For Bakhtin, there is no self at all without an “other.” It is through this other that
the individual “self” comes into being. This process of fusing this “other” into the self
takes place precisely through language, which, for Bakhtin, is always openended and
dialogic. It is always social. This dialogic, and thus polemical, nature of language is
inherent in the individual’s awareness of the self, and his selfaffirmation. Also, what is
crucial for Bakhtin is how the discourse and consciousness of the other shapes, alters, and
establishes the self and his discourse. As Bakhtin develops his argument on the “word,”
he insists that it “does not exist without its intense sideward glance at someone else’s
word.” While he insists on the necessary presence and existence of the “other” in the
self, and of the language of the “other” in the hero’s, he asserts that,
The hero’s attitude toward himself is inseparably bound up with his attitude
toward another, and with the attitude of another toward him. His consciousness
of self is constantly perceived against the background of the other’s consciousness
of him—“I for myself” against the background of “I for another.” Thus the hero’s
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words about himself are structured under the continuous influence of someone
else’s words about him. (Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics 20307)
The concern of the individual for the past, and the cultural, communal voicing of
it, is prevalent and vital in Toni Morrison’s Paradise. Similar to Bakhtin’s work, it offers
a comprehensive examination of human action based on attitudes revolving around
language. In Paradise, there is present, then, the fundamental concept of dialogism, or
doubledvoiced consciousness. It is made visible through a plurality of discourses,
recollections and experiences. Yet, there is also, revealed in Paradise, a lump of human
action that is dangerously grounded in a monological voice, and in a fixed, selfcentered
form of consciousness and remembrance. This voice is brought about by a memory
shaped in a communal experience of rejection and disgrace. It is also informed by
denials of interactions from other communities. It relates, as a matter of fact, to a
memory that has gradually transformed the ways of thinking of many, even most, among
the Paradise community, to one of intolerance. It centers around an approach or world
view that has become nondialogic, dominant, and controlling. With great aesthetic skill,
Morrison posits, however, that there are other forms of thinking possible. The
incidences, and collisions of these diverging memories and discourses are thoroughly at
work in the novel. Not only do these interactions, or lack thereof, ask for ethical
perception. They also require the reader’s active contribution in appraising the negating
acts of violence that these collisions have produced.
In his work, Bakhtin proposes a rhetorical correlate to his famous concept of
heteroglossia. It concerns the constant struggles that the “centripetal” and “centrifugal”
forces of language oppose to each other. The centripetal forces provide the coherence in
language necessary for communication. The centrifugal forces of language allow for its
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constant renewal. In our case, the former concept would relate to modes of thinking and
grasping realities of the world from a more centered, established manner. Acting within
more improvisational attitudes, and evolving in the realm of the less contained and more
imaginative would be the stance around the latter. While Bakhtin discusses these
phenomena in linguistic, rather than existential, terms he, nonetheless, draws attention to
the idea that these spheres of influence should inscribe themselves in a context that is
necessarily dialogical. In Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, Bakhtin asserts that “the
authentic life of prose discourse . . . must be based not . . . in a ‘text’ excised from
dialogic interaction, but precisely within the sphere of dialogic interaction itself, that is,
in that sphere where discourse lives an authentic life.” He further claims that,
The word is not a material thing but rather the eternally mobile, eternally fickle
medium of dialogic interaction. It never gravitates toward a single consciousness
or a single voice. The life of the word is contained in its transfer from one mouth
to the other, from one context to another context, from one social collective to
another, from one generation to another generation. In this process, the word does
not forget its own path and cannot completely free itself from the power of these
concrete contexts into which it has entered. (202)
Through the dialogic character of prosaic language, the dangers of a fixed, rigid, and
dead word can thus be illuminated. What Justine Tally contends about Morrison’s work
in general and in the context of Jazz, is also very appropriate to Paradise:
It is precisely the plurality of experiences, manifest in language, which Morrison
has insisted is necessary to combat the ossification of authoritarian discourse; that
is, we very much need the Babel of competing narratives to combat an oppressive,
dominant social myth that privileges some human beings over others. (The Story
of Jazz 61)
In Paradise, tensions between diverse experiences, points of view, and opinions on
values and life are constantly at play. I propose to examine, at this point, these different
tensions as they emerge from, and are enacted in, the following conflicting discourses.
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One of these is shaped through the language of the Founding Families of Ruby, also
called the “8R.” One of the numerous narrators of Paradise, Patricia, contends that “8
R” is “an abbreviation for eightrock.” She explains that the name suggests the “deep
deep level in the coal mines.” But it also refers to the “Blueblack people, tall and
graceful, whose clear, wide eyes gave no sign of what they really felt about those who
weren’t 8rock like them,” when they established the community of Ruby (193). As
numerous onesided narratives and violent acts in Paradise indicate, theirs is a discourse
of supreme authority. It wants itself righteous and rigid, and it seeks to make past history
cohere with a present one. The forms of discourse with which it collides are the
communal actions of the women inhabiting the Convent, and the words of the young
people of Ruby. Both the women’s and the youth’s discourses come from a language of
change and challenge. It is the language of “the other.” Finally, there exist, among these
almost stereotyped forms of discourses, a plurality of individual voices, situated within a
wide spectrum of experiences. It is these voices, as Michiko Kakutani states, with which
Morrison “is constantly having her characters spell out the meaning of her story”
(“‘Paradise’: Worthy Women, Unredeemable Men” 2).
It would be acceptable, I believe, to posit Toni Morrison as a master of dialogism.
Likewise, Paradise can be read as an instance of dialogic discourse. Paradise, indeed,
allows for meanings to emerge from deeply sustained tensions revealed at the core of the
novel. Yet, the discourse of the Founding Fathers is highly problematical, because it has
become nondialogic and nonrelational. With it, the “generalizing centripetal forces of
[the] extrapersonal systems” of the empowered 8rock patriarchs violently engage with
the “chaotic and particular centrifugal forces of subjectivity” of the erring females who

202

have taken refuge in the Convent (Holquist, Dialogism 28). An imposing mansion, it was
once a school for Native American girls. But it now serves as a haven to five women’s
uncertain steps. It is also a place of massacre where the deeds of the Ruby Fathers have
threatened the existence of the other to its very core.
The discourse of the empowered New Founders of Ruby, grounded in the story of
the original nine –or eight—or fourteenFounding Families of Ruby, is mostly
articulated through Deacon and Steward Morgan, Nathan DuPres, Arnold Fleetwood, and
Reverend Pulliam. Theirs is a discourse that wants to allow no sideway glance. Neither
does it permit doubting or interpellation. It is a discourse solidified by the memory of a
past that seeks to establish the actual, presentday living experiences of the thoroughly
black community of Ruby in an exclusive and prescriptive manner.
This resistance to change is particularly articulated by the twins Steward and
Deek. They are the ones who attempt to unequivocally control the discourse. Their
position becomes especially assertive when it is challenged for the first time in the
controversial renaming of the great Oven, which the young people of Ruby have
requested. Symbol of the past and constant reminder of a collective history, the great
Oven has become central to the citizens’ concept of themselves. Yet, while it later
becomes the subject of the internal strife of the community, it also stands as the topos
where the word of the ancient, of the past, comes into collision with the word of the
young, of the present.
The justification of the power of the past over the present lies in the glorification,
quasi sacralization, of the deeds of the Old Fathers. This matter allows, according to the
twins, for no dialogue. As Deek declares, plainly and loudly to all willing to rename the
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Oven, “Nobody, I mean nobody, is going to change the Oven or call it something strange.
Nobody is going to mess with a thing our grandfathers built” (Paradise 85). The Oven,
in its capacity to distinguish the present from the past, and to enact the story of Ruby
based on its history, comes to exemplify the monologic aspect or principle of the Ruby
Fathers. As their discourse concentrates around one center, one consciousness, and
subordinates itself to one unified voice, the Ruby Fathers tolerate no objection. As we
understand from Paradise, Steward Morgan is the character who has the final say in the
official version of the discourse. As we read, “as could have been predicted, Steward had
the last word.” His words to anyone willing to challenge and change the “Beware the
Furrow of His Brow” inscribed on the Oven, into the “Be the Furrow of his Brow”
requested by the younger generation, sound somber and threatening. He declares: “‘If
you, any one of you, ignore, change, take away, or add to the words in the mouth of that
Oven, I will blow your head off just like you was a hoodeye snake’” (87).
Another menacing symptom of the twins’ discourse of exclusion requests
attention here. It does not so much concern expressing threats in the face of necessary
processes of change and challenge that the Ruby Fathers read as acts of defiance. More
insidiously, Deek and Steward Morgan are also observed justifying the power of their
individual voices in a semblance of communal consensus. As such, they relate and
ground their acts through forms of speech, and values that, at one time in the past, were
spelled in communality. But then, they are justifying their own, individual stories of
human experience by appropriating and manipulating for their own, exclusive voice, the
stories of these ancestors. They have not only, questionably, recollected the past under
goings of their forefathers. They have attempted to rewrite the painful story of the
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“Disallowing” of their community in view of their own personal need for justification of
racial exclusion (194).
The sufferings and the deep wounds that the repudiation by other black groups
inflicted on the Ruby families then, we understand, rendered the subsequent deeds of the
ancestors quasi sacred. Their acts became symbols of bravery and valor in the face of
rejection. But by the same token, as this rejection deeply marked the history and the
identity of the community, it encouraged the Morgan twins not only to seek prescriptive
control on Ruby. It also led them to read in the words of the Oven encouragements to
angered pride, and deep racial segregation within their own, allblack community. As
such, the twins have not only not condoned, but appropriated, the unspeakable and
unspoken rule that “blacker is better” in “the separation” between “lightskinned” against
“black” (194). By reading the past history of their community in a nonevolving and non
dialogic manner, the twins have thus subverted the historical process of the present. They
have made it to fit their own purpose. Once disallowed by other blacks, they have, in
their monolithic way of experiencing communal life, become disallowers themselves. As
Reverend Richard Misner, talking about the Fathers of Ruby, reflects, “they think they
have outfoxed the whitemen when in fact they imitate him.” As he pursues his reflection,
he states that “they think they are protecting their wives and children, when in fact they
are maiming them.” And “when the maimed children ask for help, they look elsewhere
for the cause” (306). Not only have they induced a truth, appropriated a word, and
regulated a discourse that they not only want exclusive and univocal. They have also
decreed that their vision and deeds would be immutable and prescriptive. As Deek
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repeats his dominant and controlling narrative as a way to justify his rejection of a
challenging discourse, he insists that,
“Nobody is going to mess with a thing our grandfathers built. They made each
and every brick one at a time with their own hands. . . . They dug the clay—not
you. They carried the hod—not you. . . . They mixed the mortar— not a one of
you. They made good strong brick oven when their shelter was sticks and sod. . .
. And we respected what they had gone through to do it . . . so understand me
when I tell you nobody is going to come along some eighty years later claiming to
know better what men who went through hell to learn knew.”. . . “That Oven
already has a history. It doesn’t need you to fix it.” (8586)
By relating Ruby solely to its past, and reducing its history to “non contradictory”
statements, the Ruby Fathers have, in the words of Badiou, forced “the naming of the
unnameable.” Yet, “the community and the collective,” for Badiou are “the unnameables
of political truth” par excellence. In order to remain viable, they need to remain, as such,
unnameable. Badiou’s Ethics warns thus against the danger of arbitrarily forcing a
certain political truth to come about under one name. As Badiou claims, “every attempt
‘politically’ to name a community induces a disastrous Evil.” He then gives the extreme
example of Nazism, which was discussed previously in the context of Delbo’s work.
Yet, Badiou also cites another name as potential instance of disastrous Evil. It concerns
“the reactionary usage of the word ‘French.’” With Paradise, the word that is foretelling
of evil is not French, but “8Rock.” In their capacity to mean in an intransigent manner,
the words “French”or “8Rock,” in their narrowed and limiting usage, do, for Badiou,
only serve one “purpose.” It is to “persecute some of those who live [here] in France
under the arbitrary imputation of being ‘foreigners’” (Ethics 86). In the instance of
Paradise, I propose that the persecution would be directed against those in Ruby whose
skin is “of sunlight” complexion, of “racial tampering,” or whose blood is presumably
impure (197).
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Morrison’s concern for the responsibility of the individual to his community
parallels Bakhtin’s insistence that the individual subject, however, only acquires meaning
within the group. Michael Holquist, in Allegory and Representation emphasizes that
same concept, anticipated by Bakhtin, and revealed in Morrison’s. Holquist states that,
indeed,
Men define their unique place in existence through the responsibility they enact,
the care they exhibit in their deeds for others and the world. Deed is understood
as meaning word as well as physical act: the deed is how meaning comes into the
world, how brute facticity is given significance and form, how the Word becomes
flesh. (176)
The problem we are facing here is as follows. The memory that the twins access
to rewrite a history of exclusion and rejection excludes any history or group that does
not conform to theirs. It leaves out individuals who are not as “darkskinned” as they are.
Likewise, it rejects those who are not ready to “consolidate the 8rock blood,” like
Patricia’s father, “who was the first to violate the blood rule”(Paradise 19495).
Moreover, the substance that gives sustenance to the twins’ selfrighteousness is not only
unreliable and hazy, but it is personal. Also, it is not grounded in shared beliefs of home,
love, true companionship, and connection. Since the memory of the New Founders in
Paradise is more than just memory, but a topos of ideological struggle, we, readers, are
then faced with the following ethical responsibility. Namely, we may ask, what is the
viability of the construction of identity, collective and individual, based on memories and
words of one or two individuals who want to prescribe it for an entire community?
Even though the process of arriving at the “twins’ truth” is clearly stated through
Steward’s testimony, we should keep in mind that it is merely indicative of one version of
reality, namely his reality. As we read about Steward's inner thoughts, we certainly come
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to reflect on how the words of the Oven somehow helped shape his vision. We also
understand how the discourse of his elders impacted him and his twin, as they heard “the
strong words, strange at first,” prior to the founding of Ruby. But we also read that these
words “became familiar, gaining weight and hypnotic beauty the more they heard them.”
We realize, then, that the twins have “made” those words dangerously “their own.” Also,
they have reduced the meaning of these to only one possible interpretation (111). Yet,
we may reasonably ask, how could the construction of this simulacrum of truth have been
so unequivocally binding and blinding?
A semblance of choice among the plurality of voices around the history of Ruby
needs, at this point, be discussed. Revealed through the novel’s dialogical narrative
technique, there is, in Paradise, not only an abundance, but also a complexity and
intricacy, of versions and stories. It is especially true when it comes to explain the
historical past of Ruby. I propose, however, that the tensions resulting from these
contradictory stories about the past can be read as falsely implying that the political or
communal construction of Ruby has remained “unnameable,” and, as such, acceptable
(Ethics 86). The following point reveals otherwise.
As we know, the memory of the inscription on the Oven, “Beware the Furrow of
his Brow,” was consecrated by the old generation of Ruby. It is interesting to note,
however, that it was transmitted, according to Arnold Fleetwood, by Esther, a baby girl.
It was brought down to the community of Ruby, through memory, oral tradition, and
storytelling. The value of the word of baby Esther, for the patriarchs of Ruby,
commands respect. It mandates approbation that wants itself uncontested and
unchallenged. While Reverend Misner, the voice representing the young people of Ruby,
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suggests that Esther, “was a baby” then, he attempts to make clear that “she could have
been mistaken.” Yet, in his response to Misner, Arnold Fleetwood leaves no doubt as to
who will preserve the memory of the event and control the discourse. Insisting on the
veracity and accuracy of the original words “Beware the Furrow of his Brow,” he retorts
that, “‘Esther was there’” and “‘Esther never made a mistake of that nature in her life.
She knew all there was to know about Haven and Ruby too.” In a similar episode of
denying the voice of anyone not in agreement, Harper Jury silences a young voice of
Ruby, who professes the claim that, “‘ It’s our history too, sir. Not just yours.’” Instead
of listening to the words of the youth, Harper Jury plainly states that “‘That [Destry] boy
needs a strap. Blasphemy.’” Even though it is not “specified what the Furrow might
cause to happen and to whom,” the reply by Harper Jury leaves no doubt that, “Beware
means ‘Look out. The power is mine. Get used to it’” (8687, 195).
It is interesting to note, however, that in the story about the powerful words at the
base of the Oven’s mouth, told by another narrator (one of the twins), in another chapter
(in chapter one), “it is still not clear where the words came from. Something [the
possible author of the inscription] heard, invented, or something whispered to him while
he slept curled over his tools in a wagon bed.” As the narrative goes on, we, readers,
comprehend that “His name was Morgan.” We are also asked to ponder on whether “he
invented or stole the halfdozen or so words he forged.” What becomes particularly
clear, however, is that those “words that seemed at first to bless them” later “confounded
them,” and finally “announced that they had lost” (7).
The power of control over discourse, memory and ideology are excessively
present in the Morgan twins, who, born in 1924, “heard for twenty years what the

209

previous forty had been like.” As we read, “They listened to, imagined and remembered
every single thing,” because “each detail was a jolt of pleasure, erotic as a dream, out
thrilling and more purposeful than even the war they had fought in” (16). Their
reminiscence of facts, words, deeds, seems so powerful, however, that it keeps raising the
beforementioned and serious issue, not only of the nonreliability of their memory, but
of the nondependability of their one discourse as well. As we read, “The twins have
powerful memories. Between them they remember the details of everything that ever
happened—things they witnessed and things they have not” (16,13).
Also, the idea that their personal history, here their participation in World War II,
is actually less relevant than, and subordinated to, the history of their ancestors, is
actually very puzzling. Even though Morrison very clearly advocates the necessity of
keeping in touch with the “ancestors,” and of not being “removed from their experience,”
she makes clear that this connection to the ancestor should be predicated on the following
significance. Namely, that these nurturing relations play a beneficial role in connecting
the individual with his or her past in order to enhance his or her “present” and “future,”
not limit them. As she contends in “Memory, Creation, and Writing,”
If my work is to be functional to the group (to the village, as it were) then it must
bear witness and identify that which is useful from the past and that which ought
to be discarded; it must make it possible to prepare for the present and live it out,
and it must do that not by avoiding problems and contradictions but by examining
them; it should not even attempt to solve social problems, but it should certainly
try to clarify them. (389)
As Morrison claims in “Rootedness” the ancestors are thus not just “parents.”
They are sort of “timeless people whose relationships to the characters are benevolent,
instructive, and protective.” They are the ones who “provide a certain kind of wisdom.”
Most often, it is “the presence or absence of that central figure” that determines “the
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success or the happiness of the character.” As Morrison has seen at play in some
contemporary fiction, it is often “the absence of an ancestor that is frightening, that is
threatening, and [that] causes huge destruction.”
Morrison instructs against the danger of the loss of connections with the ancestors
not solely in her critical work, but in her fictional one too. She often insists on the idea
that “the progression” of an individual within the community may be “really diminishing
of his or her abilities” if the ancestor is absent from his or her life in a “nourishing way.”
It is thus when, or if, “we don’t keep in touch with the ancestor” that “we are, in fact,
lost.” Morrison proclaims, then, that, “when you kill the ancestor, you kill yourself”
(344).
In Mesure de nos jours, it is precisely this type of loss, namely a loss of
connections with a past “before” Auschwitz that progressively disconnected Mado from
her self. It is also the bereavement of parental and intergenerational bonding that
produced the split in her and “killed” her future. For Deek and Steward Morgan, it is not
only their obsessive idealization and freezing of the words of the ancestors that have
diminished the possibilities of an enhanced tomorrow. The absence of intimacy with, and
support from, a live word, has been equally detrimental. As such, losing touch with the
present, and living in a sort of ivory tower, removed from the community, has, for Deek
and Steward, turned very problematic. And for Morrison, if there is a loss of “balance”
between past and present, but also, in her words, between “male” and “female,” the
consequences can be utterly devastating. In her view, if “that balance is disturbed, if it is
not nurtured, and if it is not counted on and if it is not reproduced,” we face a “disability”
against which “we must be on guard” for “the future.”
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Deek and Steward’s grandfather, Morgan, who led his people in exodus to finally
found Haven, certainly appears as a mythical, benevolent figure whose guidance
nourished the exslave families who followed him. But, certainly, Morrison does not
simply caution against losing touch with the ancestor, which, in the instance of Deek and
Steward, did not quite happen. However, she pointedly advises against loss of balance in
the attachment to the ancestors. Her suggestion is particularly resonant if, or when, these
ties exclude a live connection, or when this exclusion prevents living the present out.
Morrison does not solely warn against rigid attitudes in reading the discourse of the past.
She also guards against the dangers of psychological entrapment resulting from an
excessive love for an idealized past. Exclusive reliance on the past and on the self,
inducing a loss of consideration for present and collective needs can, thus, for Morrison,
be as destructive as a loss of nurturing connection with the ancestors.
Losing touch with the present may appear to have been devastating only to a
small extent to Deek and Steward. But it has certainly been profoundly detrimental to the
entire community of Ruby, and not only in regards to the women of the Convent, who, by
the way, were never considered part of the community. They were, rather, just outcasts
accused of threatening the ways of Ruby. But the deeds of the twins have been extremely
damaging to the group of people that somehow got beneficially connected to these
women. As Morrison claims, “I want to point out the dangers, [I want] to show that nice
things don’t always happen” to the “totally selfreliant” if there is no “conscious
historical,” or, I would add, communal, “connection” (“Rootedness” 34344).
Besides, the authority exerted by both Deek and Steward is not limited to memory
and discourse. It is also inscribed in a context of social and financial power as well. As
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affluent residents and owners of the only money lending institution of Ruby, it comes as
no surprise, that Deek and Steward become more and more defiant towards Reverend
Misner and his communityoriented attitudes. The twins’ resentment is particularly
strong after Misner forms a sort of “piggy bank,” that offers “noprofit—small
emergency loans to church members; no penalty payback schedules.” As K.D., nephew
and sole heir of Deek and Steward, reflects on Reverend Misner’s actions, he ponders on
the menace that these could pose. As K.D. claims, “A man like that, willing to throw
money away, could give customers ideas. Make them think there was a choice about
interest rates” (Paradise 56).
Reverend Misner, the young people of Ruby, and the women of the Convent
greatly contribute to revealing the heteroglossic nature of Paradise. Standing for the
centrifugal forces of language, and its ideological decentralization, they posit, indeed,
types of discourse profoundly different from that of the prominent inhabitants of Ruby.
Belonging to fundamentally “discordant” social groups, they deconstruct the presumption
of a unitary ideology, which they will come to undermine. Among their group, each
individual is seen articulating and enacting the “discordance” or “decentralization” of that
language through his or her own mode of expression. Misner, as the reverend who has
“scripture and the future” on his side, for instance, is opposed to Senior Pulliam, who has
“scripture and history” on his (150). As the former welcomes the ideological movement
of the young people who want to “voice opinions about the words,” he, as such, is made
to revitalize the univocal discourse of the elders in control (83).
Likewise, the women of the Convent not only come to oppose the Founding
Fathers’ obsession with the purity of the race. They not only challenge the Ruby rule of
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welcoming interactions exclusively with people of deep dark skin, or marrying inside a
prescribed racial group. The women also come in conflict with the strictures of a self
sufficient life that has shut itself off from the outside world and the future. In fact, what
the women have to oppose to the life style of Ruby is a fecund, anarchic, and vital
enactment of life. That productive living out grounds itself in resounding eroticism,
mutual caring, and acceptance of the other. This reverence for life stands in sharp
contrast with Ruby, where a need for safety from intrusion, and an active and vibrant
construction of the present are absent. As Reverend Misner ponders Ruby and its
inhabitants, he wonders:
But why were there no stories to tell of themselves? About their own lives they
shut up. Had nothing to say, pass on. As though past heroism was enough of a
future to live by. As though, rather than children, they wanted duplicates. (161)
These impressions about life in “RUBY POP. 360,” a dead and empty town constructed
on exclusion and isolation, is also indicated by Mavis, on the day of her arrival in Ruby:
“Mavis’ immediate impression of the little town was how still it was, as though no one
lived there” (45).
Consolata was a little Panama orphan girl rescued and brought to the Convent by
Sister Mary Magna decades ago. She, however, also stands as the sort of ancestor figure
or healer whose presence has become so indispensable in Morrison’s work. Not only
does she instruct a future based on opportunities for living in the present moment.
Rather, she also grounds the present in the respect of an other, and in communal values,
which, for Morrison, can spell out possibilities for a sustainable future. Consolata, like
Pilate in Song of Solomon, is thus the “ancestor” whose role is crucially outlined in
Paradise. Here is how her presence and her story are, not frozen and rigid, but
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significant and vital. This is also how her talent for living, and being attentive to the
other, will be passed to the members of the community.
When she arrived at the Convent at age nine, Consolata was instructed by the
Sisters, along with a few other Native girls. She soon became the one who “slept in the
pantry, scrubbed tile, fed chickens, prayed, peeled, gardened, canned and laundered.”
For thirty years, “she offered her body and her soul to God’s Son and His Mother as
completely as if she had taken the veil herself.” To Sister Mary Magna and the Virgin
Mary, “of the bleeding heart and bottomless love,” she offered a life of piety and
devotion (225). But when Mary Magna died, Consolata, who was fiftyfour years old at
the time “was orphaned in a way she was not as a street baby and was never as a servant”
(247). Yet, when she becomes the only woman left in charge of the Convent, she clearly
comes to stand as a metaphor of acceptance of, and sharing with, an other.
Just as Delbo was in Auschwitz and After, Consolata is revealed as a character, in
Paradise, who most noticeably contradicts a language of singularity that wants to be
voided of an other. As such, Consolata is the one who comes to articulate most clearly a
communal language of love and care. In Morrison’s terms, she is “the critical voice
which upholds tradition and communal values and which also provides occasion for an
individual to transcend and/or defy group restrictions” (“Memory, Creation, and Writing”
389). She is also the woman who challenges “blackness” as “racial purity” in favor of
human solidarity (Paradise 112). It is certainly how she appears to the four women,
Mavis, Gigi, and Seneca, including “the white girl” Pallas, whose distressed lives and
drifting steps have led to the Convent. To them, Consolata is,
This sweet, unthreatening old lady who seemed to love each one of them best;
who never criticized, who shared everything but needed little or no care; required
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no emotional investment; who listened; who locked no doors and accepted each as
she was. (262)
At one point in her life, however, Consolata had found her self empty and blank,
with only absence at the center of her life. Void of definition and meaning, she had let
hopelessness and despair overwhelm her, especially after her passionate, yet illicit, love
affair with Deek turned out fruitless. Even though Consolata and Deacon loved ardently
for a few months in the shade of two loving trees, theirs was a love with no future.
Announcing the desertion of Deek, Morrison writes, “No figs ever appeared on those
trees during all the time they met there, but they were grateful for the shade of dusty
leaves and the protection of the agonized trunks” (231).
Consolata’s gifts of life and love are, however, powerful. After months of trying
to drink herself to death in the darkness of the cellar of the Convent, she reclaims her
self. Urged by Lone DuPres to act against the dying of the son of the man she used to
love so intensely, she successfully revives Deek’s son, Scout Morgan. As she returns
him to life, she also brings him back to his mother Soane, wife of Deek. Even though she
is “half exhilarated by and half ashamed of what she has done,” the reviving deed re
opens the way to other, smaller and greater, acts of love. She starts, for instance, a long
lasting relationship of friendship with her rival, the wife of Deek. At that point, her “gift”
of love and life is so abundant, that it becomes paramount in helping the young lost,
displaced, or abandoned women who start arriving at the Convent (245).
Not only does Consolata help the women reclaim a voice that has been muted
because of traumatizing experiences. She is instrumental also in encouraging the women
to reconstruct a lost sense of self. By the same token, she also enables them to face,
possibly recover, from their lives, however shattered these have been. These lives,
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indeed, have not only been broken by the irresponsible death of infants, parental
betrayals, and pain of rape. They have been fractured also by anguish at abandonment,
loss of romantic ideals, and heartbreak.
The women of the Convent rework and vocalize their traumatic memories and
their dramatic past. They do so by first listening to Consolata’s stories of loss,
disorientation, and pain. Then, under Consolata/Connie’s directions, they start telling
and retelling their own stories to themselves and to each other. They stop reliving their
traumatic history on their own. Instead, they start working through their pain by sharing
it. This collective work of narration, as Nancy Peterson puts it, “enables the women to
enter each others’ separate pasts.” As such, the narrative exchanges in which they engage
at the Convent allow the women to “rememory” their terrible past, so that “the hurt and
trauma are shared” (Against Amnesia 93). Together, they face the quiet sleep of the
newly born twin girls that Mavis has accidentally left suffocating in the heat of her
husband’s Cadillac. Together, they confront the profound need for parental and romantic
love that has been refused to Gigi, as she wanders in search for an idealized form of
erotic love she never finds. Together, they confront the pain of maternal abandonment
and sexual abuse that Seneca has experienced, as she wanders from foster homes to bus
stations covered in selfinflicted wounds and cuts. Together, they swim, panicstricken,
away from male pursuers, as Pallas did, after running away from the traumatic memory
of her lover Carlos betraying her with her own mother.
As collective enunciation of pain and trauma begins, it allows real healing to
begin. As such, a collective “loud dreaming,” painfully, yet beneficially, takes place
among the women. With it, “accusations directed to the dead and long gone” are
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“undone” by “murmurs of love” (Paradise 264). Also, as the women inscribe their own
sufferings, they symbolically draw their bodies in chalk on the floor. They do so in a
space external to themselves. Not only the loud dreaming, but the ritual painting on the
basement floor, allow them to transfer the pain and wounds from their own body to their
traced image. Soon, then, “the Convent women were no longer haunted.” As might have
been perceptible to the visitor of the Convent, with its “life” now so “real and intense,”
the women were indeed no more haunted, but “connected” (266). After telling, sharing,
transposing their stories, and articulating their trauma, the women are now unable “to
leave the only place they were free to leave” (262). In the haven of the Convent,
surrounded by the comforting, nonjudging, welcoming presence of Consolata and the
other women, they now find grounds to reply to their own questions,
What is she talking about, this ideal parent, friend, companion in whose company
they were safe from harm? What is she thinking, this perfect landlord who
charged nothing and welcomed anybody; this granny goose who could be
confided in or ignored, lied to or suborned; this play mother who could be hugged
or walked out on, depending on the whim of the child? (262)
At that point, along with the orderly discourse of the Ruby Fathers of Paradise,
and contrasted to it, come the narratives of renewal of the women of the Convent. With
this concurrence of discourses, however, the foreshadowing of the implacable act of hate,
the massacre of the women, is skillfully introduced. It is Lone, the “gifted midwife,” sent
on a mission by God to rescue the women of the Convent, who first indicates that, “the
men spoke of the ruination that was upon them.” Informed of their anger, she also
reports them expressing “how Ruby was changing in intolerable ways” (27375). An
“abandoned child picked out of poverty and neglect by a feisty Fairy, but not a member
of the 8rock families,” Lone’s voice is not only, in Tally’s words, “a voice which is
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easily drowned out” (Paradise Reconsidered 36). Hers is also an informed and lucid
voice that exists adjacent to the official side of discourse. Through Lone, we learn that,
for the men of Ruby, the women of the Convent, indeed, “this new and obscene breed of
females,” had something to do with that change (Paradise 279). We also read that “[the
men] did not think to fix it by extending a hand in fellowship or love.” Instead, “they
mapped defense,” and “honed evidence for its need.” Finally, we learn, still through
Lone, that “the leadership was twinned” (275).
Syncrisis and anacrisis, two basic devices of the Socratic dialogue elucidated by
Bakhtin in his Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, are useful at this point. With them, we
can gain another insight into the multiple and complementary narratives of Paradise. We
can also possibly, and responsively, commit to, or at least access, meanings more
thoroughly. Syncrisis is understood as “the juxtaposition of various points of view on a
specific subject.” In Paradise, Morrison achieves syncrisis by having her numerous
characters reminisce and reverberate thoughts, actions, and objects of reflection in their
own narratives. Anacrisis, on the other hand, is a “means for eliciting and provoking the
words of one’s interlocutor.” It is used also as a device to “force him to express his
opinion and express it thoroughly.”
A great master at syncrisis, Morrison juxtaposes various discursive viewpoints on
subjects as crucial as the shaping of communal identities and the destruction or re
recreation of the self. But she also uses syncrisis to delve into themes as crucial as
believing—or not in altruism, or the construction of a viable community.
Morrison is also a skilful expert of anacrisis. In Paradise, she knows how to
force her characters “to speak,” and “to clothe in discourse their dim but stubbornly
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preconceived opinions.” She expertly also succeeds in “illuminating [her characters] by
the word and in this way expose their falseness or incompleteness.” She certainly excels
at “dragging the going truths out in the light of day.” Likewise, she thrives at
“extirpating out of the notion of the dialogic nature of truth” a “response” or a
“reflection” from her characters (Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics 110).
Pat, the teacher who gains insight into the collective histories, psyches and stories
of the patriarchs of Ruby, is very instrumental in the process of anacrisis. She is one of
the few characters who offers her own understandings of the motives underlying the
massacre at the Convent. Besides giving her own reflection on what happened, however,
Pat also mentions two divergent stories. These are the ones rendered by the perpetrators.
As these two accounts start to emerge as the official stories, we read from the first
version that
nine men had gone to talk to and persuade the Convent women to leave or mend
their ways; there had been a fight; the women took other shapes and disappeared
into thin air. And two (the FleetwoodJury version), that five men had gone to
evict the women; that four others—the authors—had gone to restrain or stop
them; these four were attacked by the women but had succeeded in driving them
out, and they took off in their Cadillac; but unfortunately, some of the five had
lost their heads and killed the old woman. Pat left Richard to choose for himself
which rendition he preferred. (Paradise 29697)
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As Pat leaves Richard Misner to choose for himself “which rendition he preferred,” we
sense that he is discerning enough to doubt either official version. As such, he adopts a
useful engagement with history, which Morrison strongly encourages. While he
scrutinizes, in the words of Peterson, the two “too neatly narrated” official stories,
Richard is sensitive enough to be aware that these two versions are inadequate (Against
Amnesia 95). While Pat resists disclosing her own version to him, we feel that it may be
the one closest to what actually happened. We read,
What she withheld from [Richard] was her own: that nine 8rock murdered five
harmless women (a) because the women were impure (not 8rock); (b) because
the women were unholy (fornicators at the least, abortionists at most); and (c)
because they could—which was what being an 8rock meant to them and was also
what the “deal” required. (Paradise 297)
Through Lone also, we learn about how the story of the massacre was being
retold, and “how people were changing it to make themselves look good.” We also find
out that “every one of the assaulting men had a different tale.” Also, “their families and
friends (who had been nowhere near the Convent) supported them, enhancing, recasting,
inventing misinformation” (297).
As we see the principle of anacrisis also at work through Dovey, Steward’s wife,
we are also made aware that even though the murderous men attempted to silence the
voices of the women, they may not have been able to do so completely. Besides, the
men, revealed as having harmed their own community very profoundly, are exposed as
having damaged their own selves as well. As such, they have made their women
conscious of the process of destruction that they unwittingly directed at themselves, but
perniciously at others. As Dovey ponders on her husband’s words and deeds, she claims
that she has “watched her husband [Steward] destroy something in himself for thirty
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years.” Also, she reflects that, “the more he gained, the less he became.” Soane makes a
similar reflection about Deek, who, we find, is the one who shot Consolata. Denying the
women, including his wife, a necessary relation of alterity, Deek has let himself be
known mainly to Soane through his deeds, perceived as detached and bitter or aggressive
and destructive. As she recalls their “intimate conversations,” she claims that, indeed,
and so far, they “had been wordless . . . or brandishing ones.” After the massacre, Deek’s
words are shown to be even more angry and intolerant. His “words” now “came out like
ingots pulled from the fire by an apprentice blacksmith—hot, misshapen, resembling
themselves only in their glow” (287).
Yet, beneficial rememories will keep haunting the living in Paradise. The women
of the novel make these rememories, in the words of Peterson, “powerful” and “vital”
enough, as to keep the spirit of the Convent alive. The women and their voices “will
remain,” no matter “how strong the efforts to deny or forget them.” The memories and
traces left by them ensure that their “disruptive, inventive, creative life forces” will not be
forgotten or erased entirely. Despite the violent attempts of the “fraudulent official story”
to silence the women’s truths, for Peterson, that story will never be entirely successful in
“sanitizing” the historical process of denial at work in Paradise (Against Amnesia 96
97). The constructive working through in which the women engaged, and the inspiration
around it will account for that. They, as such, make it possible to read, at the end of the
novel, a message not solely of despair, but of expectation for the future also. They enable
to form not an image of total destruction, but a melody of soothing undertones, tenuously
promising of life and, possibly, renewal. These promises are held in a vision of earthly
haven or paradise, and are sung in a ballad by Piedade along the sea. Correlating
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Morrison’s own idea of what earthly paradise could have been, but failed to be in
Paradise, we read,
There is nothing to beat this solace which is what Piedade’s song is about,
although the words evoke memories neither one has ever had: of reaching age in
the company of the other; of speech shared and divided bread smoking from the
fire; the unambivalent bliss of going home to be at home—the ease of coming
back to love begun. (318)
An ethics that calls one to a responsibility for and to the other is thus what
Morrison asks us to consider. Despite the challenging reality of exclusion and potential
silencing of some others, Morrison affirms that communal acts of sharing and growing
together are, however, possible. Paradise, as a repository of heteroglossia, testifies to
that. With the novel, we may be reminded of life’s potentials, along with its perils,
especially if indifference takes control, or if ethical vigilance leaves us. But as the realist
prose of Paradise, an “unquestionably political” and “irrevocably beautiful” work makes
clear, it is promising to grapple with different forms of discourses (“Rootedness” 345).
To quote Bakhtin one more time, and conclude the chapter with his insight, we can be
reminded that,
All languages of heteroglossia . . . are specific points of view on the world, each
characterized by its own objects, meanings and values. As such they all may be
juxtaposed to one another, mutually supplement one another, contradict one
another and be interrelated dialogically. As such they encounter one another and
coexist in the consciousness of real people—first and foremost, in the creative
consciousness of people who write novels. (“The Dialogic Imagination” 348)
It is up to us to remain attentive to what every discourse entails, and be open enough to
discern how reductive or enhancing of the future they propose themselves to be.
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Conclusion: Some Kind of Future Community
Delbo’s Auschwitz and After and the trilogy of Morrison are complex, yet intimate, works
based in individual but also collective concerns. Even though their trilogies can indeed
be said to be personal testimonial works by postmodern and postcolonial witnesses and
artists, they are vital in manifesting an underlying, deeply grounded preoccupation for
forms of community as well. Also, Delbo and Morrison are those types of artists who do
not claim their own voice as an authority, unique and absolute. They call for “affective
and participatory relationships” between “the speaker and the audience” (“Rootedness”
341). Their works avoid a type of monovocality as a literary mode because of the one
sidedness of the insights these works may produce. They also decline a discourse of
authority and truth in favor of one of multivocality and truthfulness. With the former,
there lies the danger, indeed, that “they might be impoverishing, limiting, closing down
the possible meanings that their writing might produce” (Lodge, After Bakhtin 145). This
is obviously not what Delbo and Morrison had in mind for their trilogies.
The tale of the wise old storyteller in Morrison’s Parable, “Bird in the Hand,”
delivered during her Noble Prize Lecture, marks the responsibility of the reader in a very
evident manner. In the parable, the storyteller addresses a question posed by two
inquiring children. But she gives them no definitive answer as to whether the bird that
they are holding in their hands is dead or alive. Instead, she invites the children, the
audience, but also all readers, to consider and figure out the answer for themselves.
Through Cheryl Lester’s “Meditations on a Bird in the Hand,” we learn that Morrison
assumes the position of the wise storyteller, and that the bird is a metaphor for language
and its vitality. As we read,
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The old woman’s silence is long, the young people have trouble holding their
laughter. Finally, she speaks, and her voice is soft but stern. “I don’t know,” she
says. “I don’t know whether the bird you are holding is dead or alive, but what I
do know is that it is in your hands. It is in your hands.” (128)
As David Lodge states, “it is the nature of texts, especially fictional ones,” but, I
would add, those of a testimonial character also, “that they have gaps and indeterminacies
which may be filled in by different readers in different ways” (After Bakhtin 159). As the
old woman wants her audience to know, “vital language does not fix meaning.” Also, “it
does not even point toward meaning,” rather, she believes, “it arcs toward the places
where meaning may lie” (“Meditations” 132).
As works that embody a complex sense of reality charged with traumatic traces of
painful past histories, Delbo’s and Morrison’s trilogies do not fix meaning. They also
resist proposing a definite closure, and not only in the sense that the protagonists of the
trilogies are unable to reach closure as most remain obsessed with the trauma of their
pasts, but also in relation to the readers who, confronting the tragic (hi)stories of Delbo’s
and Morrison’s characters, are denied a sense of closure. This inability by both
protagonists and readers to let go is not only constructed through the aesthetic and ethical
practices that Delbo and Morrison assign to their works. It is also hinted at in the idea
that Delbo’s and Morrison’s narratives are meant to be openended. As Gary Morson has
it, in another context, but that I will apply here, in Delbo’s and Morrison’s works, “truth”
may be revealed, not by “a proposition,” but “only by an unfinalizable conversation”
(“Extracts from a Heteroglossary” 258). Willing to be truthful, rather than true, Delbo’s
and Morrison’s literature of testimonials opens thus unfinalizable discussions, not only
because they are inscribed in a continued need for working through stories marked with
excessive trauma, but also because a constructive approach to healing must necessarily
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involve some form of social exchange and communal embrace. This may explain why
the trilogies have (hi)stories spelled, not by one individual, but by numerous authors and
witnesses. Delbo and Morrison ascribe then, not only to themselves and their vital
language, but also to witnesses, companions, or fictional characters involved in an
irremediably disastrous past, the power to mean directly. Further on, Delbo’s
traumatized imagination and Morrison’s dialogic one, more than fixing meaning, invite
readers to move “toward the places where meaning may lie” (“Meditations” 132).
Delbo raises in her trilogy the question of a paradoxical quasiimpossibility, yet
obligation, to testify to a traumatic event of genocidal death. In her work, she uses a
suffocated, fragmented, and figural language. It does not only reveal an indispensable
lucidity at remembering and transmitting her experience. It also exposes the dilemma
around a deeplyfelt necessity to remember—coincident with a profound desire to forget
the experiences that she, her companions, but also thousands of others for whom she
speaks, survived—or not. In Aucun, Delbo engages in acts of retrieving ghostly and
ghastly memories by transmuting their details into testimonial narrative. She also brings
to light the intensity and incommensurability of the destruction. Not by undermining the
memory of a tragically imposed deprivation of life and voice, but by inviting readers to
explore the necessary silences of her text and having them respond to the partial
mutedness of destruction, Aucun not only encourages memory. It also enables readers to
sensitively connect to the spaces in which Delbo reveals the torment of the inmates
tortured by cold, thirst, hunger. Aucun likewise has us draw on our own senses, and our
emphatic perceptions, to recognize the anguish of the prisoners having to witness scenes
of brutal death. By opening her narrative to her readers for them to identify, engage, and
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respond to this fracture between the familiar and the extreme, life and death, she also asks
them to ethically respond to the nature of what she experienced. Une connaissance
inutile certainly addresses the uselessness of the knowledge she gathered. Excessive, the
teachings of the camp undeniably remain engraved in her deep memory, that of the
senses. Unable to shed the memories, she can recollect those sensations immediately.
Delbo can feel, over and over again, exactly how Auschwitz was. She can acutely
remember what lack of sleep or thirst really felt like. But by being so extreme and
intense, will the readers, who are asked to perceive these afflictions in their own, familiar
context, be ready to believe? Will they even care? Even though it is Delbo’s deepest
concern and wish, will the knowledge she gathered at such painful cost be instructive?
While the meaning of her experience is not to be “given” through her words, but
“produced” by an interaction between the readers and her text, the crucial character of her
and her companions’ testimonies is thus this: will her readers, people, the world hear her
plea? Will they act upon it? The collective testimonies of Mesure de nos jours presume
that the world did not hear, care or act after World War II about the fate of the prisoners.
Mado, then, does not only remember “cette volonté qui nous tenait comme un délire de
supporter, d’endurer, de persister, de sortir pour être la voix qui reviendrait et qui dirait.”
She does not only think of the voice “qui ferait le compte final.” She is aware that that
voice asks also, in “un vide glacé:” “pourquoi revenir si je suis la seule qui revienne? ”
Puzzled by the necessity to consider, however, and along with Charlotte and others of
their companions, that their voices may not be heard, she declares, “Et me voilà, moi,
mais morte aussi. Ma voix se perd. Qui l’entend? Qui sait l’entendre? Elles aussi elles
voulaient rentrer pour dire. Et moi, je serais vivante ? Alors que je ne peux rien dire.
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Vivante, alors que ma voix s’étouffe? Que nous soyons là pour le dire est un démenti à
ce que nous disons” (48). As the indifference of a world that remained deaf to the horror
of the camps inspired Jean Cayrol to write the following commentary after his release
from Mauthausen, it is also implied, as in Delbo’s, that the following question be faced
by us. Namely, that even though the generation of those who survived the camps were
indifferent to the inmates’ pleas, does it mean that we, over half a century later, need to
remain deaf as well? The concluding commentary of Nuit et brouillard has us wonder, as
we read
Les déportés regardent sans comprendre.
Sontils délivrés ?
La vie quotidienne vatelle les reconnaître ?
 “Je ne suis pas responsable,” dit le kapo.
 “Je ne suis pas responsable,” dit l’officier.
 “Je ne suis pas responsable.”
Alors qui est responsable ?
Au moment où je vous parle, l’eau froide des marais et des ruines reluit sur les
collines décharnées,
Une eau froide et opaque comme notre mauvaise mémoire.
La guerre s’est assoupie, un œil toujours ouvert.
L’herbe fidèle est venue à nouveau sur les Appelplatz, autour des blocs, dans un
village abandonné encore plein de menaces.
Le crématoire est hors d’usage.
Les ruses nazies sont démodées.
Neuf millions de morts hantent ce paysage.
Qui de nous veille de cet étrange observatoire pour nous avertir de la venue des
nouveaux bourreaux ?
Ontils vraiment un autre visage que le nôtre ?
Quelque part parmi nous, il reste des kapos chanceux, des chefs récupérés, des
dénonciateurs inconnus.
Il y a tous ceux qui n’y croyaient pas ou seulement de temps en temps.
Il y a nous qui regardons sincèrement ces ruines comme si le vieux monstre
concentrationnaire était mort sous les décombres, nous qui feignons de reprendre
espoir devant cette image qui s’éloigne
comme si on guérissait de la peste concentrationnaire,
nous qui feignons de croire que tout cela est d’un seul temps et d’un seul pays,
et qui ne pensons pas à regarder autour de nous et qui n’entendons pas
qu’on crie sans fin. (Nuit et Brouillard)
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Along with the mutual and collective construction of the “stories” that Morrison
proposes in Paradise comes also the possibility for constructing a legitimate and useful
AfricanAmerican story. Even though Beloved and Jazz leave little room for the
reconstruction of a life and a future freed from pain and trauma, Paradise assumes
another sort of instruction. It enables contesting and disabling hegemonic narratives that
have shaped and threatened to fix as traumatic, not only an individual memory, but a
cultural one as well. Even though the dislocations and traumas of a collective past cannot
be undone for AfricanAmericans, there is in Morrison’s work, the possibility for a new
task at hand. It goes beyond reiterating the tragedies and the traumas of history that
Beloved brings to light and in which Sethe remains captive. It also implies looking
beyond the ghostly existence of rememories that are so impeding and threatening in
Beloved. The rememories not only involve Denver in the trauma of an experience of
slavery which she has never directly experienced, but also entangle Sethe in a cycle of
guilt, similar to that of a survivor, for which there is no adequate reparation. Unable to
regain a lost innocence, Sethe is thus physically and mentally consumed by the
rememory, not only of slavery, but also of her killing of Beloved. While rememories
haunt the living in Beloved, so do they in Jazz. With the second novel of the trilogy,
Morrison likewise vividly dramatizes the cost of forgetfulness and historylessness. Not
only do these come about because strong and nurturing family connections have been
lost. They also exist in forms of failed parental involvement or support, as Violet and Joe
have experienced. Likewise, they come across through the absence of an individual
sense of life being worth living. And maybe also through too strong a shame or intense a
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fear of confronting the self in order to build a future more promising. Unhinged by
bereavement and lack of grounding, Violet’s and Joe’s lives remain at a dead end.
At the end of Jazz, Morrison extends, however, a new kind of invitation, which
she reiterates in Paradise. Her powerful words of “Say make me, remake me” confirm
the extent of her proposal (Jazz 229). Her request is to go beyond the entanglement of
trauma, however profound and obsessive it has been. It asks us to consider what a
dynamic relation to history might produce if there is an engaging in a communal,
collective project of reconstruction. Paradise, indeed, offers a more affirmative position
on rememory than does Beloved. It also presents more possibilities for actively taking
charge of one’s own and others’ lives and futures than does Jazz. Remembering the past
and retelling the history are only part of the solution, as revealed in Beloved and Jazz.
They certainly are necessary steps in opening possibilities for mourning. But beyond
that, Morrison also allows the readers to explore how a more communally active and
immediate engagement with one’s and others’ lives and stories may, after all, have
potential for growth. Because the stories of the women of the Convent are not erased
easily, they continue to haunt the community of Ruby and the readers. But these, unlike
in Beloved, are grounded in a constructive haunting. The dynamic, healing relationships
and creative life forces that the women enacted can resonate in us. They can have a
powerful and positive impact on our own lives. As Nancy Peterson puts it, as she
discusses Morrison’s trilogy:
Working through the history of slavery, of emancipation and Reconstruction, of
great migration both north and west, Morrison’s historical trilogy ultimately ends
not by reiterating the tragedies and the traumas of history, but by trying to
imagine shimmering possibilities, a new story of life “down here in Paradise.”
(Against Amnesia 97)
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While negative images of an upcoming future prevail in Delbo’s and Morrison’s,
there nevertheless is a call in their works for upcoming possibilities. It requires that we
remain attentive to being connected to not only our pasts, histories, ancestors, but also to
our selves, and communities. Also, both Delbo’s and Morrison’s works gesture towards,
rather than prescribe, the need for some kind of future community. By indicating what
still remains excluded, their works signal the necessity for a future more responsible and
a collectivity more inclusive. But rather than stipulating what forms these should take,
both works guard against the disastrous consequences that some forms of denials or
exclusions may produce. As a matter of fact, by pointing, in the words of Richard Misner,
at the “Lack of words, . . .Lack of forgiveness. Lack of love,” that may endanger future
communities, Delbo and Morrison do not so much attempt to offer a resolution (Paradise
330). Nor do they attempt to provide a definite answer to the problem of the future, or to
the question of the community. Their vision, in the words of Sam Durrant, is more like a
“presentiment” or “promise,” rather than a “fully realized representation” of what must
be done. Their works, as such, come across as a reminder of a need that has to be
infinitely renewed. As Durrant claims,
Like mourning, the attempt to redraw the boundaries of community must remain
incomplete, unsuccessful; its success is measured precisely by its failure to
complete itself, its capacity to remain perpetually open to the difference of the
other, to the possibility of different others and not yet imagined modes of being.
(Postcolonial Narrative 111)
Insofar as the postmodern and postcolonial testimonial works of Delbo and
Morrison are addressed to communities of readers about future modes that are still in
processes of becoming, they are thus meaningful. They are resonant in the infinite
address that they can direct towards the here and nowpresent generation, but also to the
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future ones. As reminders of histories and pasts stories that have blatantly failed
somewhere, Delbo’s and Morrison’s works not only make us ponder, as in the words of
Richard Misner, on “how exquisitely human was the wish for permanent happiness, and
how thin imagination became trying to achieve it” (Paradise 307). Their works also ask
us to think of ourselves in terms of being endlessly yet definitely, responsible for a future
and a community based not on a narrow definition of selfinterested individualism
grounded in reductive terms. But they call for bringing forward a future and a
community that include the recognition of nonexclusionary forms of solidarity. This
means grounding our selves and our future in values based on beliefs such as acceptance
of the other, true companionship, and connection.
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